The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant

A great philosopher as Immanuel Kant would not have admitted the precariousness of these developments. The “Copernican revolution” from the Critique of Pure Reason demonstrates the substantial role the subject plays for an exterior object to become a phenomenon, in accordance with our human faculties of knowledge (the sensitivity and the intellect). Thus, the subjective side of knowledge is attested, and that happens within a philosophical system, par excellence, objective. The intellect is limited to know only phenomena, the noumenon remaining unknowable. Yet, objectivity does not apply to this type of entity, but exclusively to its phenomenal appearance, in the framework of human experience.

Transcendental arguments are therefore all but common sense. They are in no respect "realistic" or ontologically dependent. (2) Whoever wants to get familiar with transcendentalism — perhaps just in order to criticize one or several of its representatives — must overcome the threshold of open or covert realism and ordinary experience. One also has to avoid the common misunderstanding that transcendental reconstruction represents a form of idealism. So this kind of philosophy seems to be a fortiori charged to give a good deal of pedagogical help for its own sake.

1 Thus it is clear to Kant that the long-held idea that reason existed to nurture man's happiness is fundamentally untrue. However Kant maintained that there must be a purpose for which reason was placed in man. He arrives at the conclusion that although reason influences the will, it is not meant to do so in order to supply any goods outside of its initial influence, "[reason'... ... middle of paper ... ...accruing to me or even to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of universal Iason exacts from me immediate respect for such legislation. 11 This means that if one's maxim clearly nullifies itself once applied theoretically on a universal level, the maxim, or the theoretic legislation, must be considered against that which is good. When considering the Platonic form of goodness, Kant's idea of the good will is similar in that it adheres to a theoretical universal, and that reason is essential to its discovery.

Because these concepts exist a priori, it is interesting that they are used in the understanding of experience. Kant is careful in his application of his framework, however, as a goal in his writing was to outline boundaries of metaphysics as a science, and to determine if “such a thing as metaphysics be at all possible” (p. 1). Unfortunately for Kant, it is impossible for all things to be described with objective reality, as seen in his case of the soul (p. 86). While “determinable bounds [to reason] cannot be thought,” Kant successfully established a framework to examine thought and experience (p. 87). This framework exists in itself as subjective, however, and truly shows how pervasive metaphysics is.

Cambridge UP 2000. Dryer, P. D.: Kant’s Solution for Verification in Metaphysics. Allen & Unwin, London 1966. Gardner, Sebastian: Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge, London 1999.

This could be labeled "CLOSE TO NONSENSE", but we know Kant better than that. No matter how many laps on the track of metaphysics Kant takes us through, he is still widely held as one of the greatest modern philosophers of our time. Let us explore the schools of rationalism and empiricism and compare his views with that of other rationalists and empiricists (mainly Hume), and see where he ends up on the finish line towards the nature of human knowledge. The term rationalism is used to designate any mode of thought in which human reason holds the place of supreme truth. Knowledge in this school of thought must be founded upon necessary truths (those that must be true and cannot be false); our ideas are derived from our experience; everything we experience is finite, but we do have the idea of infinity or else we couldn’t conceive of things as finite.

It seems as though Kant’s use of rationality, however, involves simply speaking one’s mind and putting forth a certain set of op... ... middle of paper ... ...that all its consequences must be beneficial. The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefit of its universal recognition.” (Mill 630). For Mill, absolute “enlightenment” would be a contradiction, because for us to understand what truth is, we must understand why the dissenters from that truth are wrong. Mill’s discussion of the improvement of the human race is dependent on these dissenters, while Kant’s discussion is entirely dependent on an individual breaking his chains and thinking for himself. While both men use reason to achieve their goals, they use reason in a very different sense, a sense which exposes the similarity, yet disparity between those goals.

Kant directly deals with the problems presented in Hume's analysis of metaphysics. Where Hume stops his line of thinking and becomes skeptical as to the existence of metaphysics as a science, Kant picks up. He proceeds to analyze both the validity of metaphysics as a science and a force in our lives. Turning to the methods of other credible men in the scientific field- such as Copernicus- Kant develops a whole new approach to looking at the world. However, like Hume, Kant encounters an obstacle and does not find a solution for it.

Space is not a... ... middle of paper ... ...erlie their appearances and correspond to our concepts of them. This distinction, that the objects underlying the appearances do exist, opposes the pure illusory nature of appearances in traditional idealism and provides its “antidote” by allowing for truth in experience. Works Cited Guyer, Paul. "Kant, Immanuel." Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Still, I hardly believe that it is necessarily concluded from Hare's reading that Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this paper, I will first show that Hare's interpretation of 'treating a person as an end' as treating a person's ends as our own is reasonable, and so is his reading of 'willing our maxim as a universal law' and 'duties to oneself,' which is based on that interpretation. Then I will argue that Kant couldn't be a utilitarian despite the apparently utilitarian elements in his theory because caring about others' ends (of which happiness is the sum) is a duty. This is so, in Kant's view, not because happiness is valuable in itself, but because it is the sum of those ends set freely by each rational human being who is valuable in itself, that is, an end in itself. In his essay "Could Kant Have Been A Utilitarian?