Then I will discuss the requirements of ethical egoism and the difference between ethical egoism general principle of self-interest and the notion of “whatever one wants.” I will then briefly suggest that Ethical Egoism is plausible but show the theory cannot be plausible in the same argument. Furthermore I will discuss the argument against ethical egoism that proves the theory to be arbitrary from the general principle concerning the treatment of others. Lastly I discuss why this arbitrary concept poses a problem for moral theory and reasons in ethics. Ethical Egoism states that we should pursue our best self-interests of the long run. Morally right actions are those, which benefits our-self.
Deontologists create concrete distinctions between what is moral right and wrong and use their morals as a guide when making choices. Deontologists generate restrictions against maximizing the good when it interferes with moral standards. Also, since deontologists place a high value on the individual, in some instances it is permissible not to maximize the good when it is detrimental to yourself. For example, one does not need to impoverish oneself to the point of worthlessness simply to satisfy one’s moral obligations. Deontology can be looked at as a generally flexible moral theory that allows for self-interpretation but like all others theories studied thus far, there are arguments one can make against its reasoning.
(Foot 1972: 311). Morality and its standards are often assumed to be 'intrinsically' motivating, and this is how they regulate society's behaviour. (Prinz in Batson 2011:41). Yet Batson suggests rather than intrinsically motivating, we conform to the principles to avoid social and self-rewards, where we are viewed as morally good. Morality for Kant is determined by whether certain moral actions could be turned into a universal maxim.
If we are to remain moral as well as logical, then we must restore consistency to our code. This is accomplished by adding exception clauses to current principles, and giving priorities to some principles over others, or by some other device. I argue that we must accept moral dilemmas as an essential part of real-life reality on the grounds that some moral statements concern values. According to Moore's "axiological thesis," whether these statements are true depends on two factors: the set of alternatives from which we make an evaluation, and the scale of values with which we rate them. Also, it is possible that a given alternative is no better than another in some respect.
Morality involves what we ought to do regarding right and wrong and/or good and bad based on our values, virtues and principles (Gray, JW). Something is moral if it is the right thing to do or rational thing to do based on the facts presented in a situation. Objectivity is the state or quality of being true even outside of one’s individual biases, interpretations, and feelings (Wikipedia). Objective decisions are ones that are not based on personal feelings or opinions, but instead it is based on the circumstances and facts presented when considering a particular decision. I shall argue that morality that is case-by-case or situational can still be objective without universal or general rules.
However, the existence of conscience gives rise to the definition of a moral act. It is only expected that a moral act answers to the circumstances surrounding a good or a bad intention. Some circumstances can be justified if the main intent is morally good without causing any harm, but when the primary intention is to cause harm, it becomes morally bad. However, there is always a possibility for struggles as a result of conscience using input, threshold and output. Input is brought about by the main aim of carrying out an action whereas threshold are contributing factors to carrying out such action and the output focuses on the final result and its influence from concrete judgments as evidenced by good or bad.
The underpinning principle of deontological ethical theory is the categorical imperative that refers to an inherent absolute and unconditional command that tells people what they ought to do in a particular situation or should do in their present situations, (Braswell, McCarthy & McCarthy, 2011). The deontological ethical theory is against the treating of individuals as means to an end and supports the need to treat individuals as ends in themselves, (Braswell, McCarthy & McCarthy, 2011). Justifications and Objections to Normative Ethical Systems in Law Enforcement Most often than not, law enforcement agents use some techniques that may be regarded as morally right or wrong depending on the ethical framework from which one approaches such
The theory in itself says we are hard-wired to be selfish and focus on what type of actions promote use and is self serving. The moral appraisal of things assumes our curiosity, necessitates and even contentment of others should factor in a stability of what we perceive morally and what is in our self-interest. What is morally right and
I find, however, that one can tackle his dilemma and reveal holes in his argument in a manner that would allow us to uphold the concept of morality and moral evaluation in the world. This is my aim. Nagel’s primary concern is in holding people morally accountable for certain things which are out of their control. “…we feel that the appropriateness of moral assessment is easily undermined by the discovery that the act or attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not under the person’s control” (Nagel 25). For Nagel, moral luck is defined as an instance in which a significant aspect of what someone does is dependent on factors outside of his control, yet we still treat him as the primary object of moral judgment.
We have to balance the question of our philosophical grounds for believing that the moral theory is in fact true — that it corresponds to the demands that actually exist for us in reality — rather than merely being an accurate codification of what we happen to believe. It could still turn out that the 'true' moral theory, the theory that comes closest to capturing the things one actually ought or ought not to do, coheres less well with our ordinary moral beliefs than another theory which is less revisionary in its consequences. The issue I'm addressing is the proof of a set of moral principles, the proof of the validity of a moral outlook or theory. Various attempts have been made to avoid this seemingly irrational consequence by supplying what often have been referred to as "proofs" of' moral principles. The term "proof" as so used had a widely variable meaning but in general what is intended is a set of considerations, other than the internal consistency and adequacy of the theory, which are particularly persuasive in making a choice of one theory or principle over another.