“War is a matter not so much of arms as of money.”
Thucydides
The bloody brotherhood war during the ancient Greek, known as “Peloponnesian War”, that remains and continues nowadays in different ways. The desire and the power to control everything, forever, it can be a tragic, as history has shown. Athenians and Spartans have conducted the greatest war in the humankind history. The long and comprehensive war through alliances and leadership for three decades, with different policy and strategies from the both sides politically and militarily, were the biggest determinants for the ends.
To understand the complexity of the Peloponnesian War it is vital to identify differences between those two city-states. The differences between Athene and Sparta were on political system, military and culture. Athenians were limited democracy, while Spartan was a more centralized oligarchy. The Spartans accentuated on expanding their power and gaining control over other vital territories through military rebellions, with rule based strategy at the beginning, while the Athenians were more oriented on economic, infrastructure, and leadership, political system through the Dalian league to dominate in long-term perspective, through end based strategy.
Furthermore, Pericles was prominent and good orator, but he changed the character of
Athenian strategy first and almost was dominated by Navy supremacy. “2.13 Pericles, a top Athenian general, basically lays out a defensive strategy, telling people to move back into the city, maintaining a tight noose on their allies for whence funding could be acquired.” The initial Athenian Strategy, were shaping the battlefield (avoid decisive land operation), with simple approach avoid land battles with Spartan and attack over the Spartan alliances with the great Navy fleet. The biggest change and shifting policy during the entire war was Sicilian
There is no coincidence that the rise of Athenian Democracy goes chronologically hand in hand with the rise of the Athenian Navy. Following the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks, Athens’ naval successes allow it to surpass the previous naval power of Corinth; create the Delian league to fund and support this navy; and eventually ruffle enough feathers with their fellow Hellenic neighbours that they inspire the Peloponnesian war. Overall their naval reputation and intimidation comes from the skill of the men who maneuver and command the ships, and the tool they use to wield their power, the Athenian trireme. By looking at the design of the trireme, and the work and numbers put both into the ship and the men that drive it, hopefully both the wealth and skill of the Athenian navy can be appropriately highlighted. In the end, it is this immense power and resources that allow the Athenians to overstep their limits and caused such demoralizing defeats such as the expedition at Syracuse and the eventual loss of the Peloponnesian war, after which they prove unable to grow to the same undefeated sea power they were.
Thucydides set out to narrate the events of what he believed would be a great war—one requiring great power amassed on both sides and great states to carry out. Greatness, for Thucydides, was measured most fundamentally in capital and military strength, but his history delves into almost every aspect of the war, including, quite prominently, its leaders. In Athens especially, leadership was vital to the war effort because the city’s leaders were chosen by its people and thus, both shaped Athens and reflected its character during their lifetimes. The leaders themselves, however, are vastly different in their abilities and their effects on the city. Thucydides featured both Pericles and Alcibiades prominently in his history, and each had a distinct place in the evolution of Athenian empire and the war it sparked between Athens and Sparta. Pericles ascended to power at the empire’s height and was, according to Thucydides, the city’s most capable politician, a man who understood fully the nature of his city and its political institutions and used his understanding to further its interests in tandem with his own. After Pericles, however, Thucydides notes a drastic decline in the quality of Athenian leaders, culminating in Alcibiades, the last major general to be described in The Peloponnesian War. While he is explicit in this conclusion, he is much more reticent regarding its cause. What changed in Athens to produce the decline in the quality of its leadership?
Dating back to 449 B.C., Sparta and Athens always had an alliance, but as time grew that balance slowly began to fall as one felt threatened by another. Before any sight of unsteadiness the Spartans and Athenians had a bound partnership. Beginning after their domination of the Persian war, the two states slowly became aware of one another’s growing power. More time went by, and the Spartans began to grow conscious of the other states, feeling wary and paranoid around them (Fox, 170). No state was particularly to blame for the strain on their peace treaty, nor for the war, it came as the two states developed. Eventually the two states had clashed enough and declared war. Although the Spartans gave the Athenians a chance to back down and temporarily stall war, the two states would never be equal, their allies resented one another far too much. The growing urge for power was bound to take over sooner or later. Finally, after 7 years of uneasy tension, Sparta could wait no longer and declared war against Athens (Fox, 167). Although the Athenians and Spartans lived together in peace for so long, they existed in a fragile balance that was bound to eventually lead to war.
Ancient Greece was rich in culture, as the country was separated into many polis (city-states). Among these cities, were the two most authoritative rivals—Athens and Sparta; having strived to attain power more than the rest, Athens and Sparta earned the most recognition. While both cities were two of the most powerful in Ancient Greece, the attainment of this power was approached in contradicting ways, as their values and lifestyle greatly differed. Athens and Sparta’s contrasting visions for their citizens framed their culture, which became the sole deciding factor in the kinds of laws that were implemented and enforced to form divergent systems including government, social class and gender roles.
Of all the history of the Ancient Greece, there were two events that showed really well how disunity among the Greeks highly contributed to its downfall, which were the Peloponnesian War and Successors’ War. Interestingly, both wars occurred after a unity and followed by a unity that was carried out by “outsiders”. This may have actually shown that the Greeks had never learned from their past
The stunning Greek defeat of the Persians, the specter of which lurks behind the events of the Peloponnesian Wars, was for Herodotus proof of the superiority of Hellenic form of government and way of life, and Herodotus ends his history at this pinnacle of Greek history. Thucydides then accepts the task of chronicling Greece’s unraveling from a position as the dominant power of the Mediterranean, and a center of cultural, technological, and political development to the final result of the Peloponnesian Wars—a fractured, demoralized, and dependent Greece that lies wide open to foreign conquest. This result is, for Thucydides, apparent from the beginning of the conflict. Greece can only dominate when the balance of power between Athens and Sparta is maintained, and the destruction of either is tantamount to the destruction of the whole. An accurate understanding of the national characters of Athens and Sparta makes it clear which of the two will ultimately be the victor of a long, arduous military struggle, but the same understanding of national character makes it equally apparent that the one which can dominate militarily cannot lead Greece. The speeches made at the First Lacedaemonian Congress emphasize not only the character of the two nations in conflict, but more broadly, the inevitability of Hellenic demise as a result of this conflict.
An understanding of these very different cultures is illustrative of their leaders' ultimate strategies and projections before the conflict. At the time of the war, Greece was divided into two great alliances. Sparta dominated the Peloponnesian League, an alliance in the Peloponnese region. These "allies" included small states close enough to the militant Sparta to be easily controlled; stronger (and more remote) states over which Sparta still had considerable influence; and the truly strong, independent cities of Thebes and Corinth.
Throughout the Ancient Greek world, there have been many wars and standoffs. However, there has been only one which changed the course of Greek history forever; the Peloponnesian War. Caused by the growing tension between Athens and Sparta, it came and left, leaving only destruction in its wake. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War caused the downfall of Greece, and the end of the Classical Age.
In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles commends the ergon of Athenian heroes, which has placed them in the realm of logos, while directing the Athenians to follow these ideals of logos. The maintenance and continued success of Athens' political establishment relies on the prevalence of polis, rationality and discourse over family, emotion and reckless action. However, the indiscriminate turns of fate and fortune, often place logos in opposition with the base, primal nature of ergon. Both Thucydides and Sophocles recognize that when logos conflicts with the unexpected ergon, the preservation of rationality and unanimity among the citizens of the polis depend on the leadership of a single honest leader. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents Pericles as a man of logos, whom Athens needs to achieve its full potential as an empire and later to rescue her from disaster. Likewise, Sophocles presents Theseus, in Oedipus Colonus, as the perfect successor of Pericles, who returns Athens to its former glory before the end of the war. In these two examples, we see that the dominance of logos over ergon within a polis lies in the ability and logos of the city’s current leader.
The Peloponnesian War is the conflict between the pelopoponesians league led by Sparta and the Delian league, led by Athens. Much of our knowledge on the causes and events of the Peloponnesian War, depends on the Athenian Thucydides 460-400 BC, writer of the History of the Peloponessian War. He servd as an Athenian commander in Northern Greece during the early years of the war until the assembly exiled him as he lost an outpost to the enemy. During this exile, he was able to interview witnesses on both sides of the conflicted. Unlike Heredotus he concentrated on contemporary history and presented his account of the war in an annalistic framework that only occasionally diverts from chronological order. In his account, he discuses the precursors to the war, including the 30 years truce and revolutions, such as the stasis in Corcyra. When looking at wars, the primary focus is normally the fighting itself, such as what we see for World War II. However, it is important to look at the anatomy of war, meaning what effect the war has on the people who are experiencing it first hand, and the consquences that the conflict has on the rest of the world. Therefore in this essay I shall discuss, drawing directly from Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, how the civilians reacted to the war, their involvement and socio economic factors. Furthermore, the first section of my essay shall focus on the direct effect of war on the people, regarding the plague, and violence and hopelessness that was experienced. Then I shall go on to discuss more general effects of the war and how it affected the Greek world, discussing the social and economic losses that occurred such as the cost of the war in attica, the coup d’etat that occurred in gove...
In this essay, I am going to anaylise the Peloponnesian War. I will look at what appears to have caused the war, how it developed, and what the outcome of it was. As Thucydides is virtually the only surviving primary source of this event, I will also discuss the man and his method.
In 480 and the years prior the Athenians and Spartans, banned together to defeat the Persian Army. The Spartans stand at Thermopylae, allowed the Athenians time to prepare, and ultimately allowed the victory. With both of these great city-states located so close together in Hellas, there differences would ultimately lead to dissension. Throughout the course of this paper, I hope to explain the reasoning behind the dissension between Sparta and Athens, made war between these former allies inevitable.
There are times in history that something will happen and it will defy all logic. It was one of those times when a few Greek city/states joined together and defeated the invasion force of the massive Persian Empire. The Greeks were able to win the Greco-Persian War because of their naval victories over the Persians, a few key strategic victories on land, as well as the cause for which they were fighting. The naval victories were the most important contribution to the overall success against the Persians. The Persian fleet was protecting the land forces from being outflanked and after they were defeated the longer had that protection. While the Greeks had very few overall victories in battle they did have some strategic victories. The Battle of Thermopylae is an example of a strategic success for the Greeks. The morale of the Persian army was extremely affected by the stout resistance put up by King Leonidas and his fellow Spartans. The Greeks fought so hard against overwhelming odds because of what they were fighting for. They were fighting for their country and their freedom. They fought so hard because they did not want to let down the man next to them in the formation. Several things contributed to the Greeks success against the Persian invasion that happened during the Second Greco-Persian War.
The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) was a conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta that resulted in the end of the Golden Age of Athens. The events of the war were catalogued by the ancient historian Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ writings showed the ancient Greek belief that there is a parallel between the city-state and the character of its citizens; in order for the city-state to be successful, its citizens must be virtuous. Thucydides did not believe that the true cause of the Peloponnesian War were the immediate policies of the Athenian Empire against the city-states in the Peloponnesian League but rather the fundamental differences in the character of the two city-states
When examining the causes for the Peloponnesian War, which was between 431-404 B.C., there are a number of causes that factored into the cause of this war. However, one of the most important causes to this war was largely due to the fact that the Spartans feared the growing power and success of Athens. The Spartans were “particularly alarmed at the growing power of Athens” (Cartwright, “Peloponnesian War”). During the Persian war in 479 BC, Athens grew fiercely strong with power with help of its many allies and continued with their no mercy attacks on Persian territories. When the Persians left Greece, Athens further enraged Sparta when they built large and tall walls around its empire in the event of an attack, which was mostly thought to be from Sparta if it happened.