The Body as Anstoss in Sartre's Account of Constitution
ABSTRACT: Of all the German idealists, Jean-Paul Sartre refers the least to Fichte-so little in fact that there have been long-standing suspicions that he was not even familiar with Fichte's writings. It is perhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writings are as helpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views, especially his views on subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a key concept in Fichte's mature writings: the concept of the Anstoss, a concept which Dan Breazeale has called "Fichte's original insight." Fichte introduces the Anstoss, or "check," to explain why the I posits the world as it does. In effect, the Anstoss is the occasion of the facticity of the I. I will show that his concept can be uniquely helpful in understanding the role the body plays in Sartre's theory of inter-subjectivity. The importance of Sartre's account of the body for his theory of subjectivity and inter-subjectivity has been chronically under-appreciated by his interpreters; this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify that. In turn the concept of the Anstoss provides a means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean and Fichtean ethics based on their respective accounts of inter-subjectivity.
Of all the German Idealists, Sartre refers the least to Fichte-so little in fact that there have been long-standing suspicions that he wasn't even familiar with Fichte's writings. It is perhaps ironic, then, that Fichte's writings are as helpful as they are for clarifying Sartre's views-especially his views on subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Here I want to look closely at a key concept in Fichte's mature writings-the concept of the Anstoss, a concept which has Dan Breazeale (implicitly against Dieter Henrich) has called "Fichte's original insight." (1) I believe, and I hope to show here, that this concept can be uniquely helpful in understanding, of all things, the role the body plays in Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity. The importance of Sartre's account of the body for his theory of subjectivity and intersubjectivity has been chronically under-appreciated by his interpreters; this comparison is the beginning of an attempt to rectify that. This introduces in turn a means for analyzing the necessary differences between any Sartrean and Fichtean ethics based on their respective accounts of intersubjectivity.
The term Anstoss is first used in a systematic fashion by Fichte in the Grundlage der Gesamten Wissenschaftslehre from 1794/95.
If semiotic theory holds, we have to choose between capitalist constructivism and Baudrillardist hyperreality. It could be said that the characteristic theme of Sargeant’s[3] critique of Sartreist absurdity is the role of the reader as observer.
At the end of Being and Nothingness,Jean-Paul Sartre concedes that he has not overcome one of the key objections to existentialism viz., an outline of ethics, and states that he will do so later. Although Sartre attempted the project of an existential ethics, it was never quite completed. Enter Simone De Beauvoir. In this book, De Beauvoir picks up where Sartre has left us, refusing to answer the question of ethics. For De Beauvoir, human nature involves and ontological ambiguity whose finitude is bound in a duality. This duality of body and consciousness is the ambiguity which remakes nature the way we want it to be as a facticity of transcendence. It is within this understanding that the project of ethics must begin in ambiguity. However,
At the time of his death on the fifteenth of April, 1980, at the age of seventy-four, Jean-Paul Sartre’s greatest literary and philosophical works were twenty-five years in the past. Although the small man existed in the popular mind as the politically inconsistent champion of unpopular causes and had spent the last seven years of his life in relative stagnation, his influence was still great enough to draw a crowd of over fifty thousand people – admirers or otherwise – for his funeral procession. Sartre was eminently quotable, a favorite in the press, because his statements were always controversial. He was the leader of the shortly popular Existential movement in philosophy which turned quickly into a fad for the disillusioned post-World War I generation, so even when the ideas criticized were not the ideas of Sartre’s Existentialism, he still came to the public mind. Sartre was alternately celebrated and vilified, depending on which side of the issue the speaker or writer was on, and whether or not Sartre had early espoused – and possibly later turned against – the ideals in question. Despite Sartre’s many political and philosophical about-faces, fellow Marxist political philosopher Herbert Marcuse said of him, “He may not want to be the world’s conscience, but he is.” [Hayman, 458]
Jean-Paul Sartre claims that there can be no human nature, or essence, without a God to conceive of it. This claim leads Sartre to formulate the idea of radical freedom, which is the idea that man exists before he can be defined by any concept and is afterwards solely defined by his choices. Sartre presupposes this radical freedom as a fact but fails to address what is necessary to possess the type of freedom which would allow man to define himself. If it can be established that this freedom and the ability to make choices is contingent upon something else, then freedom cannot be the starting point from which man defines himself. This leaves open the possibility of an essence that is not necessarily dependent upon a God to conceive it. Several inconsistencies in Sartre’s philosophy undermine the plausibility of his concept of human nature. The type of freedom essential for the ability to define oneself is in fact contingent upon something else. It is contingent upon community, and the capacity for empathy, autonomy, rationality, and responsibility.
At the core of Jean-Paul Sartre’s views was that existence precedes essence. This contrasted with the Aristotelian and Scholastic views that individual existence is an expression of essence or being (Brennan, 2003). Instead, Sartre believed that existence defines the essence of an individual such ...
(5) Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness translated by Hazel Barnes(New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp 432-434.
However, the paper uncovers a more adequate way of dealing with alterity in the context of the imaginary life. The paper shows that the notion of the "picture itself" allows us to conceptualize alterity as the radical withdrawal of the other. Finally, the paper argues that the imaginary subject is necessarily divided between itself and itself as another, and due to that internal split, can grasp the alterity of another person. The paper notes that The Transcendence of the Ego is Sartre's first philosophical work and investigates the problem of otherness, alterity, or transcendence. Sartre develops the notion of transcendence in opposition to immanence, aiming to arrive at the notion of immanence purified of any transcendent elements and to use that notion as a clue for his definition of subjectivity.
...of the body, and no problem arises of how soul and body can be united into a substantial whole: ‘there is no need to investigate whether the soul and the body are one, any more than the wax and the shape, or in general the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter; for while “one” and “being” are said in many ways, the primary [sense] is actuality’ (De anima 2.1, 12B6–9).Many twentieth-century philosophers have been looking for just such a via media between materialism and dualism, at least for the case of the human mind; and much scholarly attention has gone into asking whether Aristotle’s view can be aligned with one of the modern alternatives, or whether it offers something preferable to any of the modern alternatives, or whether it is so bound up with a falsified Aristotelian science that it must regretfully be dismissed as no longer a live option.
...ating Sartre's attitudes towards the constituents of human action, that which constitutes human being. Even though it may, in the final analysis, prove to be an unsatisfactory account of consciousness, it serves to illuminate some possible further lines of study, if only as a negative example.
ABSTRACT: Levinas depicts a pluralism of subjectivity older than consciousness and self-consciousness. He repudiates Heidegger's notion of solitude in order to explore the implications of the Husserlian pure I outside the subject. A hidden Good constitutes the Other in the self: a diremption not at the expense of the unity of the self. Levinas stands with Nietzsche on the side of life which requires and is capable of no justification whatsoever. But for Levinas the totality is ruptured by the thought that there is a unity of self undiminished by its immemorial responsibility for the Other, a unity of self beyond totality. This self containing the Other is the transcendence of the Ego otherwise immanent in Husserl's pure intentionality. Just here Levinas' thought is most perfectly distinguished from Sartre's notion of the transcendence of the Ego as complete exclusion from the immanence of intentionality. The pure I is otherwise than the Hegelian absolute Elastizität: incarnate and inspirited, the "self tight in its own skin." The transubstantiation of Ego to Other has not yet occurred to thought in Levinas, but what does occur here is the altersubstantiation of the I. The Other in the Same is an alteration of essence. It is precisely through thinking the contraction of [the modern] essence [of consciousness] that Levinas thinks otherwise than being, beyond essence, thinks "a thought profounder and 'older' than the cogito." Humanity signifies a "new image" of the Infinite in the preoriginary freedom by which the Self shows the Other mercy.
In education today, art studies are not often viewed as a priority for students and they very frequently get cut from school’s curriculum due to a lack of proper funding. Howeve...
It is only natural for humans to question why we have been put on this wonderful earth of ours. What does it mean to be these lucky ones called humans? Do we really have a human nature that is all our own? Are there really living beings that kind find something within this world to call our life purpose? And if there are, how do may we achieve it? It is happiness or simple the drive to survive that propel us forward? These are just some of the types of questions that philosophers have been wrestling with for centuries. Some argue that human nature is very much a real thing and that it is essential to living a happy fulfilled life, while others reject that idea completely. However, despite the completely opposite stances that philosophers can take when it comes to human nature, it’s not uncommon to see some surprising similarities between those who support it, and those who do not. One of the biggest examples of this, would be in regards to the Aristotle and his books on Nicomachean Ethics and Sartre with his writing of Existentialism Is a Humanism. When it comes to these two philosophers in particular it would appear on the surface that they are nothing alike. Aristotle being quite the supporter of human nature and it’s ability to give humans fulfilling lives, and Sartre who rejects the human nature completely for the idea that we as humans are essentially just going through life and making choices. Having said this, I would now like to discuss the individual views and arguments that both men have in regards to their views on human nature, it’s relationship to purpose, free will, and politics, and show that within these both Aristotle and Sartre give us the ability to see, that maybe to a certain that we are in fact responsible fo...
Sartre is one of the constructors of the philosophy of existence that is existentialism. Humans must first be born and exist before they are able to define their essence. He states that there is no universal statement about what humans are. But, there is one overall statement about the circumstances that make us human, which is that we are free. He believes that when we have to make decisions nothing is forcing us to do what we are doing. Which leads to the idea that humans have to take full responsibility for our actions, beliefs and emotions. By being aware that we are free, the responsibility of this can cause “anguish” according to Sartre. One of the most painful thoughts can be that we alone are totally responsible for what happens to us. To avoid the pain of some of the bad decisions we make people can act as if they had no choice and may pretend that they are not free which would make them not responsible. When you act like you were not free and are not responsible is known as having bad faith. That is humans try to convince themselves that outside forces, forces that are beyond control or our conscious mental state helped determine the decisions we made.
Sartre and his existentialist philosophy have been subjects of curiosity for me for years. Only recently, after taking a philosophy class, have I begun to grasp some of the major principals of existentialism. Though I'm unsure about some of the peripheral arguments and implications of existentialism, the core of the system appeals strongly to me: Human beings are themselves the basis of values and meaning, and in this sense values are real--evolving, developing, and real. Existentialism places the individual at the center of things, gives him a sense of empowerment and responsibility, and erects a bridge on which Man can find his way out of many of the traps and snares he constructs for himself. Sartre's character in the play "No Exit," Orestes, finds such freedom and, in a humanist sense, is one of the most enviable characters I encountered in this course.
This paper attempts to discuss the main features of existentialist views as well as dissect Sartre's Theory into two parts, analysing its merits and consequent demerit.