preview

The American Intelligence Tradition

analytical Essay
2494 words
2494 words
bookmark

The United States had a birth unlike many other countries. Born of a revolution based on the values of a representative government, the United States would grow into a global superpower that is currently unrivaled. Because of its current position, the story of how the United States wrestled thirteen colonies away from Great Britain remains quite popular, both in our culture and on college campuses. The colonies defeated a better trained, better funded, professional army that was forging a global empire. Home-field advantage, the surprisingly potent Continental Army, and aid from the French are all widely noted as the tools of American victory. Yet, the above explanation is failing to mention the myriad of things that allowed for the Continental Army to be a strong fighting force. Many things contribute to victory and defeat in war, but one that has stood the test of time will endear itself to all commanders—intelligence. As it has always been for intelligence, the final intelligence product is never an end-in-itself, but rather a means to an end. Intelligence is only as good as the policy maker reading it. In the hands of the right policy maker—be they President, general, or otherwise—intelligence can sway the course of a battle, even a war. During the American Revolution, both the British and Americans attempted to use intelligence to their advantage. The British had been using their long-standing secret service, which, in practice, fell under the command of the adjunct general. The Americans, however, had to start an intelligence service from nothing. Under the leadership of General George Washington, the Americans would gain success on the battlefield and in the intelligence arena. In the end, the Americans ... ... middle of paper ... ...itary History, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June/July 2009), 28 Lengel, 28 Lengel, 29 Lengel, 33 Lengel, 33 Lengel, 34 Robert Gates, “Intelligence, Democracy, and Freedom.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, Freedom and Security (Spring 1992), 236 Gates, 235 Christopher Andrew, “Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 53, No. 3, (Jul., 1977), 393 Andrew 1977, 400 Lock K. Johnson, “Legislative Reform of Intelligence Policy.” Polity, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Spring, 1985), 551 Johnson, 552 Johnson, 554 Johnson, 556 Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers 1995), 251 Andrew 1995, 252 Andrew 1995, 275 Andrew 1995, 415

In this essay, the author

  • Explains that dr. benjamin church's intelligence gained in such an environment was substantial, noting the patriot plan to fortify bunker hill weeks before the event unfolded.
  • Introduces frank j. rafalko and the national counterintelligence center (u.s.).
  • Analyzes roger kaplan's "the hidden war: british intelligence operations during the american revolution." the william and mary quarterly, vol.
  • Analyzes edward g. lengel's "spymaster in chief." military history, vol. 26, no. 2, june/july 2009.
  • Analyzes robert gates' "intelligence, democracy, and freedom," presidential studies quarterly, vol. 22, no. 2, freedom and security.
  • Analyzes christopher andrew's article, "whitehall, washington and the intelligence services." international affairs, vol. 53, no. 3, july 1977.
  • Analyzes lock k. johnson's "legislative reform of intelligence policy." polity, vol. 17, no. 3 (spring, 1985), 551.
  • Reviews christopher andrew's book, for the president’s eyes only: secret intelligence and the american presidency from washington to bush.
  • Explains how the united states grew into a global superpower based on representative government.
  • Explains that dr. bancroft's value is debatable; even with the information given, the british could not stop an american-french alliance.
Get Access