The leadership foresight needed to pre-plan war termination that achieves the political goal is often beyond the capabilities of countries and their leadership. The Japanese provide us with a rare scenario where their pre-war plan was nearly identical to the post war results. As a result, the Russo-Japanese War can offer current planners and leaders several valuable lessons on war strategy, planning and termination that are still relevant to today’s conflicts.
The nation’s self-interest was divided into different ideas between the two parties. At this time imperialism and anti-imperialism were the dominant topics regarding America’s destiny. One argument backing U.S. imperialism is by naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan. At this time, Great Britain had the strongest sea power. Mahan states that America’s navy must be as strong to compete in trade and war.
For it to be fruitful, the coerced must be communicated clearly that the coercing power is much more resolve, committed and capable in achieveing their aims than the coerced power. Failure to do so would damage the coercing power’s credibility and serves to empower future aggression against them. A comparison between the Third Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996 and the USS Pueblo crisis in 1968 illustrates this notion. The massive showcase of U.S. Navy while, in the former case, compelled Beijing to cease their hostile series of naval exercises and missile tests, failed to secure the realease of the USS Pueblo and her crew in the latter case with Pyongyang. The checkered record of coercive naval diplomacy stands as testimony to
The reasons why can be explained in how the two countries saw the threat after World War One, their assessment where the potential naval conflict would arise and what capabilities their own navy would need to be successful in the next war. During the Interwar period between WWI and WWII Britain and US took separate paths to prepare their navies for future conflicts. The British were complacent and the US was keen to prepare. Initial causes came from how the two countries evaluated the threat after World War One. Great Britain saw no single nation’s navy as their rival in contrast to the United States who assessed that Japan would be their foe in the next war.
Now it would have to shift its stance from the offense to the defense, as the ever-strengthening allied forces began pushing their way up the Slot towards Rabaul. For the Americans, difficult fighting still lay ahead, and they would suffer several more tactical defeats at the hands of the Japanese Navy as the battles in the Solomons continued. Yet with the victory at Guadalcanal, both combatants recognized that the momentum of the pacific war had shifted decisively in the Allies favor.
As the first sea battle in World War II to pit carrier forces against each other, and as such, the Battle of Coral Sea would be pivotal in terms of naval strategies on both sides. More significantly, it would be viewed as a major step in the deterrence of the Japanese ware effort, and put the Japanese Navy on the defensive throughout the remainder of World War II. Works Cited "Battle of the Coral Sea." Royal Australian Navy. Royal Australian Navy, n.d.
World War II was a treacherous and horrifying occurrence, with the loss of an estimated total of 48,231,700, including both civilians and military. There were numerous battles that led to the conclusion of the war, the Battle of Midway being one of the most pertinent. Through ignorance, trickery, and strict strategy, the Battle of Midway is said to be a most decisive battle of World War II. The Battle of Midway came about when the Japanese wished to extend their Pacific control, broaching the idea to initiate a battle against the U.S. Navy. After the Japanese success at Pearl Harbor and their success coming to a standstill at Coral Sea one month earlier, Japanese commander, Admiral Yamamoto, had belief that it was necessary to hold a full battle at Midway as a deciding engagement.
Finally, Nimitz had much less to lose than Yamamoto in a defeat at Midway, which shows that the U.S. was fighting a total war vis-à-vis Japan’s limited political objectives. Nimitz’s Superior Intelligence Nimitz had a superior advantage of intelligence leading up to Midway that gave him the ability to understand the Japanese strategic and operational pl... ... middle of paper ... ...capabilities after the battle at Coral Sea with repairing the Yorktown. Ultimately, Nimitz concentrated his forces to attack a portion of the Japanese fleet, which proved to be a major turning point in the Japanese expansion in the Pacific. This overall plan for Nimitz mitigated the risks to the American fleet while exploiting the weakness of the Japanese intelligence and dispersed fleet. Bibliography Baer, George W. One Hundred Years of Sea Power.
However, Mackinder and Mahan are considered to render deeper resonance in the contemporary states system. Alfred Mahan emphasised the inherent value of naval dominance as a means for geostrategic supremacy. In contrast, Halfred Mackinder argued that control of Central Asia underpinned world dominance. Both theorists correctly addressed the pressing geopolitcal agenda of their respective contexts, however, the question remains of their enduring value in the contemporary geopolitcal realm. What remains to be considered is the true ability of these theories to connect with the increasingly transnational nature of modern governance and the way in which it seeks to overcome the implications of contemporary imperialism.
Specifically, the argument will be made that the newly instantiated 'Sea Race Objection' example effectively refutes Greco's version of virtue reliablism. Greco's Virtue Reliabilism- Greco contends that, “... knowledge is true belief grounded in intellectual virtue” (Greco 1). Greco then applies intellectual virtues to abilities, claiming that 'we think of' intellectual virtues as being abilities of the agent who 'knows.' Greco then argues that intellectual virtues are success from abilities, said success is creditable to the agent. Meaning, the agent who has the ability is then deserving of credit.