Summary Of Knowing One's Enemies By Ernest May

Ernest May was born in Fort Worth, Texas in 1928 and was a history professor, dean, and history department chair at Harvard University, until he retired in 1979. During his tenure, he devoted time to Harvard’s Institute of Politics (Kennedy School of Government) and lectured on the decisions of policymakers. He authored six books related to this same subject, as well as co-authored many others. He spent time in intelligence providing classified historical assessments of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms race during the Cold War, as well as advising the 9/11 Commission on understanding modern terrorism. May died in 2009.

May published Knowing One’s Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars in 1984, prior to the end of the Cold War. His

One of the accounts, U.S. Views of Germany and Japan by David Kahn, articulates the need for intelligence collection. Prior to Pearl Harbor the U.S. did not feel there was an imminent threat by Japan so no intelligence data was sought. In fact, there was plenty of intelligence available, but intelligence collection was not emphasized. Generals viewed intelligence as demeaning to their rank and feared it would provide analysts with the validation needed to seek higher positions and pay. Unfortunately, a lack of intelligence collection was to our demise. Hence, Pearl Harbor taught the U.S. the importance of intelligence gathering. The other 15 accounts show the issues with intelligence analysis. Sometimes the intelligence is tainted and based on preconceived notions or preferences. However, May’s collection points out that most issues are related to interpretation, perception, prejudice, avoidance, outside distractions, and how leaders react to the information. As well, the idea that intelligence agencies are vulnerable to deception and insider threat is a risk, so always retain skepticism and consider the source. Finally, the collection points out that military intelligence collect is very good, yet operations intelligence is not so