The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and subsequently the collapse of the Soviet empire changed the political – military situation within Europe. Nearly five decades of Cold War between the Western Alliance and the Warsaw Pact countries, with relatively large standing armies and prepared mobilization plans, ended. The fight between large mechanized formations on European countryside became more and more improbable, and forced many Western countries to identify a new role for their armed forces as new threats emerged. Yet, those military organizations often struggle with such doctrinal innovations, especially in economic austere conditions combined with rapidly technological improvements. While such strategic situations determine the environment in which the military operates, ultimately people lay the foundations for a new approach. Therefore, successful innovation within a military organization depends on aligning political and military strategy, creating a learning organization, and assuring popular support to the military.
This essay identifies principles that induce change on organizational level based upon examples from the interwar period, and has not the intention to discuss neither tactical nor technical changes in detail. Such an essay would require more in depth study that draws us away from the initial argument. Without a doubt, during the interwar period almost all military organizations reformed, based on their lessons learned from World War I, and each of them booked significant advances in certain domains. Nonetheless, some organizations as a whole proved to possess more adaptive skills than others.
Above all, innovations within military organizations depend on the integration of political and military vision. ...
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... The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941”. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 37-41.
Williamson, Murray. “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experience”, in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 22-24.
Eugene, C. Kiesling in The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941”. Edited by Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 3 and 10-11.
Murray, op. cit., 14-15.
Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 13.
House. Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine and Organization in the 20th Century. 66.
Murray, op. cit., 17.
Ibid, 24-25.
Murray, op. cit., 125-127 and 139.
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Since its declaration of independence from Great Britain, the United States has experienced wars of many different sorts. Each war introduced a new kind of warfare. The Revolutionary War introduced for the first time in American history, the idea of naval warfare. Ships were armed with dozens guns and carried several dozens of men. The musket, armed with its bayonet as well as the cannon proved to be worthy weaponry advancements in the infantry together with various pistols. The Civil War introduced the revolving pistol as well as the Gatling gun which enabled soldiers to produce rapid fire and destroy enemies in large quantities with a single round. New technological advancements in transportation such as the railroad, enabled large quantities of troops to travel to a given area in nearly half the amount of time. However, the turn of the twentieth introduced new technological advancements in the country as well as the military. This ignited a century of technological advancements in the military that has enabled the United States to excel in militaristic domination.
In a recent verbal bout with my History of the Military Art professor, I contended that the true might of a nation may be inversely proportional to the size of its military during peacetime. My thinking, though perhaps idealistic, was that the maintenance of a large military during relative international tranquility is an overt admission of weakness and increases the likelihood of unnecessarily employing that force—it is contextually irrelevant. Instead, I proposed that a strong and stable economy is the best metric of national prowess, for such an economy can resource many opportunities as they arise. On the contrary, a robust standing military has a much narrower utility. To be sure, this author is not one that intentionally seeks to take an interdisciplinary approach to academia, but the connection seems relevant given the nature of this assignment. Whereas a nation may accomplish a strategic goal through military force, a leader may accomplish a task relying upon coercive power; whereas a nation may transform and develop the world through its economic strength and versatility, a versatile leader may transform others through the employment of one or many leader development principles—both theoretically based and experientially acquired. This piece serves to describe acquired PL499 course concepts and their relevance to my project team and the West Point Leader Development System (WPLDS). Only through a...
Warfare was in a state of transition. Older commanders and generals in the French and British militaries were very cavalry and infantry focused. These commanders believed that cavalry, infantry, and artillery would assure victory in any circumstance, against any foe. They clung to the static tactics of the bygone World War I era. World War I had been fought primarily on French soil, and the military as well as the government never wanted that to happen again, therefore they wanted to reinforce their main border against any future German. Little did they know that only twenty two years later they would be bested by German forces in a way that would shock the world. This research will be analyzing many important assumptions, oversights,...
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1.Langer, W. L., & Gleason, S. E. (1953). The Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (1st ed.). New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved May 16, 2011, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=7965978
It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another. Perhaps the biggest strength of Joint Warfare is how it appears on paper. It would be difficult to find someone to debate against combining the forces to achieve total dominance.
O’Neill, William L. World War II A Student Companion. 1 ed. William H. Chafe. New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.