Some Esential Points in Reading The Critique of Pure Reason

Some Esential Points in Reading The Critique of Pure Reason

ABSTRACT: (1) Things are not to be found in the Critique (real things also called physical objects-an epoché 'avant la lettre' as in Husserl). The things as appearances are only Vorstellungen (representatio, B376). Confusion arrives because Kant calls these objects with the same names employed in the language of common sense for designating the things. (2) Due to the absence of these things, nothing is said concerning the relation between things and empirical objects (things as appearances, Erscheinungen). (3) Things in themselves, considered in the abstraction of sensible receptivity, are for this very abstraction, unknowable. Consequently, they cannot be considered as the origin of appearances. (4) I propose an explanation of the relation mentioned in (2). (5) What is the use of the Critique of so strange a conception as the thing in itself instead of simply mentioning real things and their representations in the subject? (6) Mind is not an adequate translation of the German gemüt. I think subject is better.

At this paper I shall limit myself to expose only two items as possible themes of an adequate reading of the Critique. (1a) According to the imposed extension of the paper a detailed treatment is not to be found here. These two themes are: the first one, things and things in themselves. The other one, the translation of the German word Gemüt as subject and not as mind or spirit.

Previous Definitions

Two languages will be used: one of them it's Kant's exposition of his sistem, the transcendental idealism (TI) and the other one, designated as the common sense language (CSL), the colloquial language concerning Husserl's natural actitude. (1) In this later one, the things are the so called real things or physical objects, things we can see, touch and handle and modify them according to determinate purposes

In this paper I shall refer only to this kind of things, simply calling them things. It is no necessary, I think to mention each time that Aristoteles defines these things as being in the mode of fusis and techne. (2) Heidegger also defines them as the natural things (3) When we are looking at something — a state of things — in this same action a representation appears in conscience of that we are looking at. We erroneously believe that we truly see things directly, but instead what we really do is to become conscious of the representation of the thing.