Such polemic positions - characteristic of the postmodern/modern debate - imply a false dichotomy. These criticisms of justification and grounding are best understood as a means to argue for eclectic viewpoints of human understanding. I conclude that Wittgenstein's idea of "human life form," or world-picture, provides further context for insisting upon interdisciplinary dialogue in lieu of an assumed hierarchy of specialized sciences. In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty argues that Quine's doctrines of indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity call for the end of epistemology. Nonetheless, Rorty criticizes Quine's physicalist stance.
Hintikka, Jakko. "Aristotelian Induction," in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (1980): 422-40. Milton, J. R. "Induction before Hume," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1987): 49-74. Urbach, Peter. Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science.
Consciousness and Intentionality of Action ABSTRACT: One much discussed issue in contemporary philosophy is the relation between consciousness and intentionality. Philosophers debate whether consciousness and intentionality are somehow ‘connected’; whether we have reason to be more optimistic about an ‘objective,’ ‘scientific’ or ‘third person’ ‘account’ of intentionality than about an analogous account of consciousness. This paper is intended as a limited contribution to that debate. I shall be concerned only with the intentionality of action. Not everything which is true of intentionality of action is true of intentionality of other phenomena, such as beliefs.
Works Cited Popper, Karl. “Science as Falsification”. Conjectures and Refutations, London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1963, pp. 33-39; from Theodore Schick, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Science, Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 9-13.
Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and conventionalism as developed by Russell and Strawson.
Heidegger is one of the few Western thinkers to have succeeded in going beyond the Western philosophic tradition. Because his radical criticism is believed to have fractured the foundations of modern philosophy, his thinking is usually at the center of the controversy between the defenders of the tradition and those who wish to break with it and start afresh. In the heat of this debate, the question of Heidegger's place in relation to that tradition in general and to Cartesianism in particular has been neglected. I wish to address the question by focusing on the major aspects of Heidegger's critique of Cartesian philosophy and the modern tradition. I will first show that the strength of his criticism lies in its all-encompassing penetration of the foundations of modern philosophy, running through both the ontological and epistemological channels.
As long as human beings have been organizing themselves, t... ... middle of paper ... ...sity Press,1985 Crombie, A. C., The History of Science From Augustine To Galileo. New York: Dover Publications, 1995 Goldstein, Thomas, Dawn of Modern Science. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988 Lindberg, David C., The Beginnings of Western Science The European Tradition in Philosophical, Religious and Institutional Context, 600B.C. to A.D. 1450. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992 Neugebauer, O[tto], The Exact Sciences in Antiquity.
I show that the prejudices of the postmodernist arguments are as invidious as the discriminatory assumptions and the neglect of the quality of educational practice in the Western cultural inheritance. Recalling some insights which can be gleaned from the educational practices of Socrates, the last section joins these with findings of contemporary philosophers on the pre-judgements and partiality which are inescapable features of human understanding. This is a reclamation and elucidation of a practical and promising humanitas which does justice to the claims of diversity and universality. Introduction: Hard Times for Paideia To many it may seem quaint or quixotic to make the ancient notion of paideia the theme of a world conference of philosophy in cultural circumstances which are variously described as post-industrial, post-Marxist, post-Christian, post-religious, or post-mod... ... middle of paper ... ..." in R. Hollinger (ed.) Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985).
Thoughts on a Possible Rational Reconstruction of the Method of "Rational Reconstruction" ABSTRACT: Rational reconstructions standardly operate so as to transform a given problematic philosophical scientific account-particularly of a terminological, methodological or theoretical entity-into a similar, but more precise, consistent interpretation. This method occupies a central position in the practice of analytic philosophy. Nevertheless, we encounter-even if only in a very few specific publications-a vague image of it. This is due on the one hand to the problem of the intentions of application, i.e., of the normativity of rational reconstruction (descriptive/prescriptive-ambivalence). It is also due on the other hand to the problem of the significance of the method in the field of history of philosophy (systematic/historical-dichotomy).
The above explanations also against the idea that - 'science is objective' because I claimed that individual opinion and speculative imagining should be seen as a part of developing science knowledge. As a result, I would say that science is partially subjective and partially objective. In conclusion, the view of Chalmers would be falsified and against to Popperian's hypothetico-deductive method. I agree with Popperian's view and objected the definition of science which defined by Chalmers because science knowledge is not always reliable. Also, individual opinion and personal speculative imagining and have a place in science.