Finally, execution at the tactical and operational level of war must be connected to the greater political context to achieve strategic success. The 2003 invasion of Iraq to remove Saddam Hussain is still recent in the memory of today’s national security leaders. There are many critiques and assessments of what went wrong after the initial military success of the invasion. However, it still is hard to comprehend how the most powerfu... ... middle of paper ... ...trinsic to any approach to war [Bassford, 6]. It would be unwise to assert that if the US decision makers during the 2003 Iraq invasion had fully embraced the principles of a “Clausewitzian” approach the result would have automatically been a success.
He says that the impact of Iraq will be felt and deter interventions for years, creating an “Iraq Syndrome” (205). He goes on to say that the U.S. will say out of Human Rights interventions in favor of more concrete interests, and since the other two major powers also unlikely to intervene unless it is in their sphere of influence, “there is not much hope for humanitarian intervention in the modern-state formula” (205). So how does Hurth say that humanitarian intervention can occur? By giving aid and helping to organize regional organizations like the AU (206). There are certainly problems to overcome but we must help strengthen the political will and military might of the organization because it might just be the world’s only hope (206).
He is taking time to overlook the idea and make sure that more forceful action against Iraq is what is needed and that the new ideas won’t upset our allies or unfairly target innocent Iraqi citizens. Under the Leadership of Bill Clinton, the United States has faced Iraq and Suddam Hussein. This encounter was called the Gulf War. In the war, our goal was to drive out Iraqi military from Kuwait rather than to go directly after the power that Saddam had. The United States was successful in driving out Iraqi military from Kuwait, but didn’t continue to pursue Saddam militarily.
Some U.S. defense officials stated that “countering IEDs was an operational, political, and even strategic imperative.” The MRAP program ended up occupying an overlapping position in the national and operational strategy. A plausible U.S. national strategic objective for Iraq could have been to create a stable Iraqi government that is friendly to the United States. One of the ways could have been establishing a secure environment with law and order. One of the means could have been the Coalition Forces. A plausible U.S. operational objective for Iraq could have been defeating the insurgency.
The consequences, by far out-weigh the positive affects of war. Initially, September 11th seemed to be the turning point of the United States, although there is no reasonable explanation for such an action (Zinn). But still, particular event had such a dramatic change of the United States’ opinion towards Iraq. Despite of all the evidence that obviously proves Iraq is innocent, the United State... ... middle of paper ... ... time, money, and lives to accomplish what? Instead, Bush needs to swallow his pride and except his unawareness of warnings and consequences, then informing the blindly persuaded citizens the poorly hidden truth.
10. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic problems need to be addressed: how far to go militarily before making peace; what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and, who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM? The handling of the war-termination phase was extremely poor. With no regard to the end-state and the military objectives met, both the military leadership failed to understand the next move in obtaining their end-state objective, and the civilian leadership failed in delivering that message to key personal involved in the negotiations.
The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission. But our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. (The National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), p 6, preface, and p 5) Aside from violating the charter of the UN, unilateral preemption is simply not a sound national security policy. There are many advantages inherent to multilateralism that are not possible under a unilateral approach, such as the assurance of participation by all in the management of world affairs, and the legitimacy that it provides, particularly when it comes to matters regarding the use of force or the establishment of universal norms. Also, the complexity of global politics presents a serious challenge to the use of US power.
Preemptive war can be defined as an attempted attack to defeat, or repel, an attack and to gain a strategic advantage on an incoming war before the war even begins. Few people see it as effective, but countless others see this type of war as contradicting. In 2002, the George W. Bush administration passed a new national security strategy in which preemptive war tactics would be used against other nations that intended to bring threat to the United States. Although the doctrine was initially considered to be of precautionary measure, past experiences and the underlining intentions of the plan seem to argue otherwise. During World War I and World War II both the Allies and the Triple Alliance both increased their arms and technology to help gain a better advantage in the war.
These events are here to stay and will be significant in the future conflicts. The third lesson learned discusses America’s poor planning and preparation for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTR) and demonstrated the need to avoid stovepiped, single agency planning. The apparent lack of planning for SSTR operations severely complicated and extended the United States mission in Iraq. Fourth, America must always strive to be on the cutting edge and maintain technological superiority over our adversaries in order to secure great advantages. However, the United States cannot solely rely on technological savvy military to achieve success.
Among them were Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Together they would advocate for American hegemon... ... middle of paper ... ...hat necessitated the war. That these systemic forces are of greater importance than the possibility of an underlying ideology in the Bush Administration and are reaffirmed by the cause/effect of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. But this perceived reaction would not have been possible without the filter through which the global situation was being processed, namely neoconservatism. And this is truly where neoconservatism trumps defensive realism.