Since the times of the Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century, most philosophers have defined science’s epistemic aims in the interlinked concepts of explanation and understanding, laws, unity of science, and causes (IIT). Most theories relating to the above four concepts emphasize generality’s importance in science’s epistemic significance (Nov 2nd handout). This notion of generalization is linked to the underlying belief that science is reducible, and the collective body of sciences aim to be unified and to discover the broad laws of nature (Neurath 306). This unity-of-science view is sustained by the reducible nature of physics— an old science admired because of its logical and mathematical structure. However, the unity-of-science view clashes with the messier and newer sciences, such as biology. …show more content…
Using Philip Kitcher’s chapter “Scientific Significance,” this essay argues that the universalization of the unity-of-science approach to all sciences is problematic and confines our comprehension of science’s
Polkinghorne asserts that “scientists are motivated by the desire understand what is happening in the world.”(551, Polkinghorne). As a physicist himself, Polkinghorne understands the desire to understand the world, even shifting careers to become a priest to better his understanding. Science asks how things happen, and does not attempt to answer every question. Questions asking why go ignored, as if they are not necessary to fully understand the world and the life that lives here. Science alone
The unificationist account of explanation and the notion of ad hoc-ness as posited by Popper are very similar concepts, but there is a nuance between the two that is worth explaining. Although both notions seem to show why we choose certain explanatory theories over others, they differ in that the model of unification shows us what type of theory we should accept, while Popper’s notion of ad hoc-ness shows us what type of theory to reject. Together, these concepts help us better understand the explanatory model of unification which leads us to a better understanding of why we are inclined to accept certain scientific theories over others. In this paper, I will attempt to show that falsifying theories based on Popper’s ad hoc-ness criteria strengthens the idea of unification by giving people a more specific way of eliminating competing scientific theories in search of the most unified one. First, I will briefly describe the unificationist account of explanation, then I will explain the idea of ad hoc-ness as laid out by Popper, and finally I will show how ad hoc-ness can be used to strengthen the account of unification by means of increasing its objectivity and by providing simpler explanations.
The following page focuses on the Revolution in Physics, specifically the scientific works of Max Planck, Albert Einstein, and Werner Heisenberg, all of which took place in the early twentieth century. In this page I will attempt to answer the following question, "How did the Revolution in Physics transform the way that humans viewed themselves and nature from 1715 to the present day?" To effectively answer this question I will cover three main points. I will start off by briefly describing the scientific beliefs that dominated European society in the years between 1715 and the Revolution in Physics. Next, I am going to explain the epoch making works of Max Planck, Albert Einstein, and Werner Heisenberg that were highly responsible for initiating this new era of scientific thinking. Lastly, I will focus in on how humans viewed themselves and nature differently after the Revolution in Physics.
ABSTRACT: Given the great historical distance between scientific explanation as Aristotle and Hempel saw it, I examine and appraise important similarities and differences between the two approaches, especially the inclination to take deduction itself as the very model of scientific knowledge. I argue that we have good reasons to reject this inclination.
Messenger, E., Gooch, J., & Seyler, D. U. (2011). Arguing About Science. Argument! (pp. 396-398). New York, NY: Mcgraw-Hill Co..
One of the influencing texts on Winner is The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge by H. M. Collins. Langdon Winner’s article is a criticism of social constructivism, which follows the methodology and guidelines of sociology of science (Winner, 1993). It follows that Collins’ article influences this article directly and indirectly. Collins discusses at length the differences between sociology of scientific knowledge and sociology of science, in addition to the levels of criticism both ...
Since the mid-20th century, a central debate in the philosophy of science is the role of epistemic values when evaluating its bearing in scientific reasoning and method. In 1953, Richard Rudner published an influential article whose principal argument and title were “The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments” (Rudner 1-6). Rudner proposed that non-epistemic values are characteristically required when making inductive assertions on the rationalization of scientific hypotheses. This paper aims to explore Rudner’s arguments and Isaac Levi’s critique on his claims. Through objections to Levi’s dispute for value free ideal and highlighting the importance of non-epistemic values within the tenets and model development and in science and engineering,
Sir Popper's piece, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations," reaffirms the scientific methods currently in use. No scientific theory is ratified without serious consideration and careful observation. Science is the pursuit of what can be proven false and the resulting assumptions of what must be true.
Before Kuhn’s book was written, the commonly held position by scientists and philosophers of science, such as Mach and Otswald , about the structure of science; was that it involved linear progression as a result of an incremental accumulation of knowledge from the activities undertaken by members of the scientific community. They thought that as generations of scientists observed more and more, their understanding of a particular scientific fact would become better refined through an ever growing stockpile of facts, theories and methods. The aim of the historian of science would be to pin point the man and the moment in time a further discovery was made; whilst also describing the obstacles that inhibited scientific progression.
A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn. "Science and Non science: Defining the Boundary." Part 1. Pages 6-19. [...]
Generally, science is a hotly discussed and vehemently debated topic. It is difficult to achieve consensus in science, considering the fact that ideas are diverse about even science definition, leave alone the true interpretations and meaning of scientific experiments, philosophies and discoveries. However, these arguments, disagreements as well as continuous trials to find a better reasoning, logic and explanation are exactly what have always been driving science progress from art to art form. It is worth noting that, in Philosophy of Science: A Very Short Introduction, the Author-Samir Okasha explore various way of looking at science via the prism of life by citing a variety of scientific experiments, and providing examples from history of science.
This essay aims to discuss the problems of the common view of science which was presented by Alan Chalmers by Popperian's view and my personal opinions. Chalmers gives his opinion about what science is and the judgment will be made in this essay through the Popperian hypothetico-deductive and my arguments will be presented in this essay. Popperian is an important philosopher of science who developed hypothetico-deductive method, which is also known as falsificationism. In my opinion, I disagree Chlamer points of view of science and this will be present in essay later. I will restrict my arguments into three parts due to the word limitation. Three aspects will be discussed in this essay: justifying the view through the Popper's view, my agreement about the Popper's objections and additional personal opinions.
The two fundamental components of Kuhn’s proposition of scientific revolutions are the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts. He defines paradigms as “sufficiently unprecedented [theories] to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity” (Kuhn, 10). Through this interpretation, Kuhn constructs the argument that possessing the ability to convince other scientists to agree with a novel proposal serves as the most crucial aspect for establishing scientific advancement. Kuhn reasons that the task of discovering “one full, objective, true account of nature” remains to be highly improbable (Kuhn...
This essay will discuss differences in motives which have driven ancient and modern science, arguing that 17th century alterations of power structures led to the ultimate division between modern and ancient science and the eruption of modern science as it is today. Comparisons will be drawn regarding knowledge accessibility, prevailing philosophies and ideologies, and the relationship between science and the church.
Ever wonder how the world would be today only if our great researchers implemented a different attitude towards their experiments? It is possible that the results would remain same. However, some argue that the consequences may be altered. Nonetheless, this does not make the earlier learned knowledge valued less or false, just supplementary. Abraham Maslow’s theory challenges nearly all ways of knowing, suggesting that if we limit our thinking, the outcomes remain homogenous, therefore, limiting the amount of knowledge we acquire. Dilemmas are mentioned in order to repudiate from the opinions that are profoundly accepted in the society. If Newton had eaten that apple, instead of using it as a tool to apply the theory of attraction, he may not have exposed gravity. Because he had more tools than a mere hammer and he was sagacious enough to expand his philosophy beyond hunger, he made such an innovation. It is widely claimed that inventions are accidental. In fact, all the chemical elements in the famous periodic table are a result of different tactics towards scientist’s research. As ToK teaches us that there is no possible end to a situation for it is influenced by the perceptive skills of the arguers. There is never a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or the ‘ultimate answer’ in the conflict, but the eminence of rationalization is what poises the deliberation. This suggestion explains that there is always that one more way to approach the conclusion. Thus, pursuit of knowledge habitually requires dissimilar ways of knowing for it lengthens the verdict.