Such polemic positions - characteristic of the postmodern/modern debate - imply a false dichotomy. These criticisms of justification and grounding are best understood as a means to argue for eclectic viewpoints of human understanding. I conclude that Wittgenstein's idea of "human life form," or world-picture, provides further context for insisting upon interdisciplinary dialogue in lieu of an assumed hierarchy of specialized sciences. In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty argues that Quine's doctrines of indeterminacy of translation and ontological relativity call for the end of epistemology. Nonetheless, Rorty criticizes Quine's physicalist stance.
The skeptic can be disarmed as Quine has argued. Along the way I shall offer a corrective to Quine's celebrated dictum that the Humean condition is the human condition. 1. Descriptive versus Traditional Epistemologies — Three Views Naturalized epistemologies challenge the tradition in arguing that the description of cognitive processes is a more central epistemological concern than the search for foundations and principles of justification. Traditionalists have responded by challenging the legitimacy of the descriptivist's claim to be epistemologists at all.
Max Black and Humean Skepticism In this essay I will argue that the Humean problem of induction is only truly problematic when a strange, impossible definition is given to the term “reasonable”. I will begin by explaining what it is I understand Hume’s induction problem to be, and to try to flesh out the issues relevant to my case. I will then examine Max Black’s proposed solution to the problem, and show in what ways this solution is useful and why it is ultimately unconvincing. In this latter context I will invoke the work of Wesley Salmon, and then try to solve the problem that Salmon poses. Hume’s problem of induction is that inductive reasoning is not, in fact, reasonable.
Ayer does seem to leave a backdoor open for those who refer to themselves as metaphysicians by stating that "it is possible to be a metaphysician without believing in a transcendent reality." Ayer states that most metaphysicians do not deceive their readers on purpose, but they merely are using language that does not purport logical thinking. Ayer als... ... middle of paper ... ... the metaphysician is mistaken in his wordings and his errors in judgment. It seems that the metaphysical philosopher would gladly lead us into a world of untruths and a world that could never be true. Ayer lets the metaphysicians keep some dignity by states that, " although the greater part of metaphysics is merely the embodiment of humdrum errors, there remain a number of metaphysical passages which are the work of genuine mystical feeling; and they may more plausibly be held to have moral or aesthetic value."
I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken. In the argument in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, Spinoza makes two claims which have the following form: First, there is necessarily for each individual existent thing a definite cause that accounts for its existence. Second, the definite cause for the existence of a thing must either be contained in the very nature and definition of the existent thing - in which case, existence belongs to the nature of the thing defined - or must be postulated externally from its definition and nature.
I will outline utilitarianism and liberalism as theories Rawls rejects, as well as Rawls’ philosophy as a practical Kantianism. I will identify the unnecessary transition Rawls makes from the veil of ignorance, which has much merit, to the difference principle, which Sandel adequately dissolves. I will address Sandel’s critique and his fourth alternative, the moderately-encumbered self, and give my impression of a Rawlsian reaction to Sandel’s fourth alternative. In conclusion I hope to show that Rawls encounters the unencumbered self at the veil of ignorance as well as the difference principle, the former being both applicable and a contribution to political philosophy, and the latter being cogently refuted by Sandel. Sandel describes the unencumbered self as valuing the ability to choose one’s own ends, rather than valuing specific ends in themselves.
The first contradiction that can occur is that of conception. When the maxim is universalised, a contradiction may arise in conceiving of a world where the law is the case (422). When the maxi... ... middle of paper ... ...h formulae offer two ways in which a maxim can fail, allowing us to assess whether the maxim is a wide or strict duty. As stated, Kant’s project is a formalisation of our moral beliefs and intuitions; thus the result of tests ought to be similar to our pre held beliefs. One aspect of our beliefs appears to be lenience in our moral rules and tests.
In this essay, I shall give an account of Wittgenstein's theory of propositions and show that his elementary propositions are in fact divisible. I will outline his 'picture theory' and show that the consequential 'doctrine of showing' is vague and misconceived. I shall submit my own theory of the tautology as a possible cure for the above dilemma. Numbers appearing after quotes refer to the numbered passages in the Tractatus. To begin, then, some detail of Wittgenstein's theory of propositions is needed in order to see how the important 'atomic' propositions idea came about.
This might seem a pointless endeavor when we consider the kind of paradox that Wittgenstein’s theory of language presents, yet Wittgenstein was deeply familiar with the paradoxical nature of his argument. Wittgenstein advances that “[i]t is clear ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental” (TLP 6.421). Yet, the philosopher advances in one of the final sections of the Tractatus that “[t]here are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.
I shall begin by explaining the problem of induction, and the sceptical doubts Hume raises concerning the inductive process. I will then explain how Hume solves the problem. Finally, I will conclude by offering a critique of Hume's doctrine, and explain why I find it to be inconsistent. In order to understand Hume's problem of induction, it is first necessary to understand the principles upon which it stands. At the outset of his work, Hume declares that "all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.