There are significant reasons why Field Marshal Rundstedt’s operational concept to defend against the Allied invasion of France was superior to Field Marshal Rommel’s and could have changed the course of the war. Geographically, Rundstedt’s concept provided the Germans the best chance to defeat the Allied advance. Operationally, he accounted for several military and intelligence assessment considerations that gave his plan the edge. From a strategic and political standpoint, had Hitler been willing to negotiate peace, a major Allied defeat in France offered by Rundstedt’s plan presented Germany its last chance to achieve victory.
Had Rommel made a proper assessment of the French coastline and countryside, he would have probably sided with Rundstedt. “It was clear to von Rundstedt that 2,600 kilometers of coastline could not be made impregnable…” (Ose, 8) In Rundstedt’s view, the best strategy to defend the coast “called for using an offensive defensive by operating behind the coast strong armored divisions, strictly controlled and flexibly led.” (Ose, 9) Obvious geographic challenges along the coast meant that Rommel’s plan to be decisive with armored divisions would have given the German Army little chance of success. The first major problem with Rommel’s plan was the length of coastline which would have been impossible to defend unless he was lucky enough to determine the exact time and location of attack. The long coastline of France had already overextended German forces and their defenses were growing weaker due to commitments elsewhere in the European theater. (Cubbage, 149) Even with Rommel’s plan for extensive obstacles along the coast, it seems he “forgot that a concrete and steel barrier with an exploitable wea...
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...epts to defeat the Allied invasion of France. Upon examination of each operational concept, it becomes clear that Rundstedt’s plan would have given the German Army the best chance of success. In the summer of 1944, a decisive victory over Allied forces in France could have drawn Great Britain and the United States to the negotiating table. A decisive victory would have also afforded the Germans more forces on the Eastern Front. More forces in the east could have halted the Soviet advance, and could have brought Stalin to the negotiating table as well. Given those possibilities, we know in hindsight that it would have been unlikely for Hitler or the Allies to accept anything less than total victory. In other words, the operational success offered by Rundstedt’s plan would not have translated into strategic victory given the resolve of Hitler and the Allies.
Interestingly enough, each commander had planned to initiate an attack on the other side with a feint attack on the enemy's right flank and a massed attack on the opposite flank. Had this been done simultaneously, and both been successful in their purpose, the two armies would have simply pivoted around each other and ended up in each other's rear, able to march unopposed to Washington or Richmond, as the case may be. As it turned out, the general least successful in initiating this movement was the winner.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
superior to the German artillery. The BEF was thirty-five miles long. line in the centre of the bulge while the French Army in the area. commanded by General Ferdinand Foch, manned the flanks to the south of the city of the city. At the outset of the battle, French and Foch both retained the hope of launching an offensive of their own.... ...
...attle was to take advantage of General Patton’s Army and stop the initiative. Adolph Hitler had no time to plan his counterattack on the 3rd U.S. Army, and his men had no training. The unity of command principle of war from the 3rd U.S. Army side was perfect.
In this essay I will explain the battle between Germany and Britain, discuss how important winning this battle was, what Britain had that the Germans did not have, and what could have happened if Britain would have lost. It is known cleverly as “the Battle of Britain”.
...ced to retreat or be cut off from their supplies. The German High Command, at this point, knew that they could no longer continue to fight and needed to surrender or face annihilation.
relieve their sorely-pressed armies in the East. The Dieppe raid also served as a risky opportunity for
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
The Germans took an unrealistic approach in the decision making process for the battle. During the debate in the German High Command about what to do in the summer of 1943, two options were introduced. The realistic option, which was supported by the best German field commanders and many soldiers, was to compensate for the large Russian numerical advantage by fully utilizing the superiority of the German commander and soldiers in tactics, command and fighting, by a strategy of dynamic mobile defense that would cause great losses to the Russians in a series of local clashes. This would delay the Russians and was a realistic goal as it was easily achievable. However, Adolf Hitler wanted to follow the enthusiast-optimistic option of having a major decisive battle against a large portion of the Russian armour in order to destroy them. He thought that the best suited place for such a battle was the Kursk salient, where the Russians had already established battle grounds. In fact, aerial photos taken by German airplanes clearly revealed that the Russians had already built dense and deep fortifications at the Kursk salient in order to counter an attack. Also, it was evident that many Russian tanks were moved deeper behind the front line. Finally, the Blitzkrieg tactic that was often used by the Germans would have to be changed.
On May 10, 1940, the Wehrmacht (German army) rapidly conquered Belgium and the Netherlands with their lightning-speed blitzkrieg tactics while three Panzer corps invaded France through the Ardennes Forest rather than their heavily fortified Maginot Line. German forces swept through France in days and confined the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), three French armies, and the remainder of the Belgian army along the English Channel at northern France. In the wake of this military disaster, a plan was immediately drawn up - Operation Dynamo - with the lofty objective of withdrawing all Allied forces from Dunkirk across the English Channel lest they be captured or killed.
The French placed their defense in old, outdated tactics of static warfare. Gone were the days of two sides slugging it out against prepared reinforced defense structures. Closely integrating concentrated armor, infantry, and closely supported by aviation assets all combined to crush France in a matter of only six weeks. France was simply not prepared for this new age of warfare.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
victory or a loss. The Normandy invasion plan of attack was fairly simple: find relatively suitable
It was military plan for outlined to tackle with a threats of Russia and France if Russia declared war on Germany. Germany had fear because France was militarily stronger at that time. First, Germany would set up a defensive line of military on the Russia and German border to secure their eastern side. This plan involved German troops entering France through its more lightly defended northern borders—but most would instead invade via the small nations of Belgium, Luxemburg, and Netherlands. The plan was strategically important to play a defensive role in the
Clearly throughout this paper as I talk about all of the things the Allies did to the Germans you can infer that they Allies did in fact win, which they did. Hitler thought this surprise attack would be a great victory for the Germans. Hitler’s plan was to cut off their supplies, but things didn’t go anywhere close to how he planned them. In the beginning the surprise attack did work on the Allies, they kept fighting and eventually won this battle. Germany was severely weakened by the fact they didn’t have enough fuel and the fact the Allies had killed many of their experienced soldiers. Throughout this hard battle the Allies won and it was a great victory for them.