Intuitions This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true.
Can Skepticism Be Defended, Perhaps In A Limited Form? 1. Introduction This essay centres around what it means to know something is true and also why it is important to distinguish between what you know and do not or can not know. The sceptic in challenging the possibility of knowing anything challenges the basis on which all epistemology is based. It is from this attack on epistemology that the defence of scepticism is seen.
If P is not a basic justified belief , but rather a nonbasic justified belief (meaning that these belief do not need support of other beliefs in order to be deemed true), it would have... ... middle of paper ... ...ss is “made-up” to achieve the desired results. How is one supposed to know which process to use in assessing a belief for reliability and justification if there might be an infinite amount of different processes to choose from? This is a major issue for reliabilists and there is no solution to this problem. Reliabilism appears to be a logical reasoning to why your beliefs might be justified, but without a proper, clear-cut, general theory, how is one supposed to know what processes to employ? And if you have beliefs that fit well with each other and make you to believe you beliefs are justified, then they are in fact justified?
These ways of knowing affect how we perceive reality, and help us create our beliefs. The title as given by IB implies that there is a difference between something that is true and something that is believed to be true. It suggests that different ways of knowing can portray a truth. This point is problematic, because I do not think that something that is believed to be true and truth itself can be differentiated. In fact, I believe that it is difficult to acquire logical, unbiased truth; I think that the closest man can gather about truth can also be called “consistent knowledge”, meaning that the information is knowledge that is unchanging.
The third element, justificati... ... middle of paper ... ... true knowledge. Alternatively, the strength in the skeptic argument challenges us to not accept propositions that lack proper justification or contain misplaced truth-values; and as such presents a challenge to place a correct label on what can and can’t be identified as knowledge. In conclusion, when we talk of knowing things we are inadvertently identifying the JTB Theory. In order to have knowledge we must first accept that a proposition is real, identify the given truth value, and provide justification for our accepted belief. Skepticism urges us to be cautions of the ways in which we come to determine a propositions truth-value and the justification we provide for believing as such.
Accordingly, as an example, belief Z must be able to justify itself without a belief Z1, and be able to justify belief Y at the same time. Thus, inferential justification must be possible for non-foundational beliefs; noninferential justification must also be possible as well. How one arrives at noninferentially justified beliefs is one of the biggest problems for the foundationalist. In my opinion, it is hard to accept that there can be foundational beliefs that are self-justified because, as has been pointed out, if a belief is to be self-justified, person O must “know” in some sense what characteristic of that belief makes it self-justified, otherwise the belief is arbitrary. So, supposing that characteristic Q is what makes belief P justified, person O would then have to know that belief P has characteristic Q.
I will argue that Unger mischaracterizes the nature of certainty as it is ordinarily used (something he says is important to his argument), and also that he has mischaracterized one of the sources he used to defend this definition. I will then present W.V.O. Quine’s psychologically based epistemology as presented in “Epistemology Naturalized” and “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, and argue that this theory provides a more adequate account of the way knowledge and certainty are understood. I will also attempt to address the objections to Quine’s theory raised by Jaegwon Kim. So, how does one begin an attack on all knowledge?
Supporting my argument that humans need reason to prove their existence, I quote Descartes when he says “I would seem to be speaking no less foolishly were I to say: I will use my imagination in order to recognize more distinctly who I am.” In this quotation, Descartes reiterates my previous point that sensing is unreliable and that reason is the only way to knowing our existence. Since we need reason to determine our existence, it means that human is a “thinking thing” because it “doubts, understands, affirm, denies, wills, refuses and imagines.” The “Wax argument” is a good example of why reason is essential. The Wax argument is a theory that discusses the different conditions of wax. Wax has a distinct form when it is solid but melt when close to fire. Without reason how will I know
Wittgenstein's Dilemma Either language can be defined or it can be investigated empirically. If language is defined then this will be mere tautology. If language is investigated empirically then this will lead to a substantial yet contingent truth. The cure for this dilemma for Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was to submit the doctrine that the structure of language cannot be said but only shown. This doctrine is vague and misconceived.
Propositional justification can be defined when a Subject “S” possesses propositional justification for the belief that some proposition “P” if and only if they have good reason to believe that proposi... ... middle of paper ... ...ate first encounter justification. This justification is what leads dogmatists to perceptual knowledge. Skeptics challenge this perceptual knowledge that dogmatist claim to gain by questioning their beliefs. We notice how James Pryor attempts to respond to these skeptics through his use of the modest anti-skeptical project. Although the point of this project was to come to know things without having to contradict obvious facts given about perception, the project failed because it only established satisfaction for the dogmatist.