1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart over the Atlantic Ocean, killing the seven crew members on board . The Challenger was the second space shuttle constructed by NASA and had completed nine successful missions prior to the disaster. Following the accident, the shuttle program was suspended for 32 months as President Ronald Regan appointed a Commission, chaired by William P. Rogers and known as the Rogers Commission, to investigate the cause of the accident . The analysis in this
1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated in midair as the nation watched in disbelief and sadness. The cause of the Challenger accident was determined to be a system design failure on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters. Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are a pair of large solid strap-on rockets that were utilized by NASA during the first two minutes of the Challenger’s Space Shuttle launch. The pair of SRBs was applied to provide an extra liftoff boost for the Space Shuttle during takeoff
On January 28, 1986 the Space Shuttle Challenger destined for space came to a crashing halt after just 73 seconds into liftoff. What would the first thought of any normal person be? Why? What went wrong? All seven crew members aboard The Challenger perished. While the physical cause of the Challenger is now known as the failure of mechanics, the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident revealed that the primary cause of the disaster was “flaws in the decision
long as there exist flaws in the system that have no reliable safeguards. Numerous studies have investigated such a ‘Normal Accident Theory,’ and two notable cases very strongly indicate its validity: petroleum refinery accidents and the space shuttle Challenger, both of which will be discussed in this paper. Normal Accident Theory (NAT) is the label for a school of thought that considers accidents in complex systems to be inevitable. Two characteristics of complex systems that are very important
Space Shuttle Challenger Case Morton-Thiokol Inc. had engineered the space shuttle's solid rocket booster (SRB) based on the Air Force's Titan III design because of its reliability. The SRB's steel case was divided into segments that were joined and sealed by rubber O-rings. Although the Titan's O-rings had occasionally been eroded by hot gases, the erosion was not regarded as significant. A second, redundant O-ring was added to each joint to act as back-up should the primary O-ring failed.
The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, chaired by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, investigated the circumstances surrounding the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger shortly after liftoff on January 28, 1986. The Commission was established in February, 1986, pursuant to Executive Order 12546, and it issued its final report in June, 1986. William Rogers was at the time a practicing attorney and senior partner in the law firm Rogers & Wells. In 1973
lives of many people. This means that if these systems were to fail they could lead to devastating consequences. Here are some examples of where software systems are used heavily and could be very dangerous if they were to fail - aviation, hospitals, space exploration, nuclear power stations and communications. I will be looking at some examples of actual software failure in these fields to explain the reasons why systems fail.2.0 Reasons for Systems FailureIf software systems failure can be so dangerous
president that left the nation with outstanding rhetorically great speeches. One of these is his world-renowned speech given to the nation after the explosion of the Challenger shuttle January 26, 1986. George W. Bush, a president just as distinguished as Reagan delivers a speech on February 1, 2003 on a parallel account. Another shuttle, the Columbia, exploded with similar characteristics, and in much the same way, Bush’s speech resembled Reagan’s address to the nation. There were many parallels with