Refuting Thomas Hobbes

In order for Hobbes to promote the necessity of a governing sovereign, it is paramount that he dismisses any objection against his argument. During his argument, Hobbes introduces a sceptic view of his third law of nature. If Hobbes is unable to dismiss this view, his third law of nature will not stand, and conversely his argument will fall. I argue that although Hobbes is unable to sufficiently dismiss the sceptic's challenge in its entirety, Hobbes is able to defend his third law of nature, and therefore maintain the necessity of a governing sovereign. In order to prove this, I will first outline and elaborate the significance of Hobbes' third law of nature. Then I will illustrate the challenge posed against Hobbes third law of nature, followed by Hobbes' four responses, which I label as scenarios (1) through (4). I argue that Hobbes is able to sufficiently dismiss three of these responses; yet, one proves to be problematic for Hobbes.

To paraphrase Hobbes' third law of nature, if one enters into a covenant, then he is required to fulfil his end of that covenant. This law is essential for Hobbes' theory of justice, in that, without it, a social contract will not form. And, without a social contract, people cannot escape the unjust affliction in the state of nature. For Hobbes, there is no justice in the state of nature, there is, however, justice and injustice in a state governed by a sovereign. Conversely, the fool points out that there are incentives, which I will discuss further into this paper, that people have to break their end of covenants. Thus, in order to preserve the third law of nature, Hobbes' argues against these incentives proposed by the fool.

The rationale behind Hobbes' hypothetical characte...

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...nal not to fulfil one's end. Therefore, the fool's challenge discredits Hobbes' third law of nature; however, I have also argued for the distinction between a valid covenant that exists in the state of nature and a binding covenant that exists in a governed society. Yes, the fool is able to discredit a valid covenant, but the fool's challenge is dismissed in regards to a binding covenant. Similar to Hobbes' forfeit of (1) to the fool, not sufficiently dismissing (3) does not discredit Hobbes' proposed necessity for a governing sovereign because the dismissal of both (1) and (3) are independent from a state ruled by a governing sovereign. Again, Hobbes's aim is to illustrate the need for a governing sovereign. Therefore, with the lack of harm done to Hobbes' aim, I argue that the fool's challenge, at best, alters the rationality of acting in the state of nature.