Of the many counter intuitive quirks of quantum mechanics, the strangest quirk is perhaps the notion of quantum entanglement. Very roughly, quantum entanglement a phenomenon where the state of a large system cannot be described by the state of the smaller systems that compose it. On the standard metaphysical interpretation of quantum entanglement, this is taken to show that there exists emergent properties1. If this standard interpretation is correct, it seems that physics paints a far different picture of the world then commonsense leads one to believe.
In An Introduction to The Philosophy of Physics, Marc Lange offers a novel interpretation of entangled quantum systems, a view that may not have these consequences. However, this interpretation seems to have interesting consequences of its own. In this paper I will formulate and examine Lange interpretation of quantum entanglement, and attempt to motivate it. In section I, I will give a brief sketch of quantum entanglement and what it's standard taken to mean. In section II, I'll discuss Lange's interpretation, and how it commits one to the existence of multiply located objects, and reasons one might not be happy with this conclusion. Finally, In section III, I'll argue that one might find motivation for Lange's view on other grounds, namely, as Lange's view preserves the notion of the ontological priority of parts to their wholes.
I. Quantum Entanglement
In quantum mechanics the state of physical systems2 can be represented by a vector |Ψ>, in a vector space, V.3 Each measurable property of a system corresponds to an orthonormal basis of V, where each basis vector corresponds to a possible value of the property. The sums and differences of vectors...
... middle of paper ...
...of prior to the whole, it seems that the best way to avoid this argument is to adopt an alternative interpretation of entanglement. And insofar as one might be motivated to defend that thesis, one can be motivated to adopt the entensional intrepretation.
At the end of the day, there certainty is something intuitively strange about admitting into our ontology objects that entend. On the other hand, thinking that composite objects are more fundamental than the parts they are composed of is intuitively strange. The only apparent way out of endorsing the latter thesis is the former. It's up to one's own philosophical conscience how to weigh these two considerations. However at bare minimum, there is at least some reason to adopt the entensional interpretation of quantum entanglement, and that makes this alternative worthy of serious consideration.
...e theory already allows for knowledge. This does not follow as we are not justified in holding step one without a proper method. Step one is needed to justify three and four, you are not justified in holding either three or four as they both require that we have a justified step one. Thus the steps do not allow for complete justification.
... middle of paper ... ... Everything is basically relative and is what each separate person perceives it to be, just like the answers to the infinite questions posed by The Turn of the Screw. Works Cited Burrows, Stuart.
In this paper I shall consider Spinoza’s argument offered in the second Scholium to Proposition 8, which argues for the impossibility of two substances sharing the same nature. I shall first begin by explaining, in detail, the two-step structure of the argument and proceed accordingly by offering a structured account of its relation to the main claim. Consequently I shall point out what I reasonably judge to be a mistake in Spinoza’s line of reasoning; that is, that the definition of a thing does not express a fixed number of individuals under that definition. By contrast, I hope to motivate the claim that a true definition of a thing does in fact express a fixed number of individuals that fall under that definition. I shall then present a difficulty against my view and concede in its insufficiency to block Spinoza’s conclusion. Finally, I shall resort to a second objection in the attempt to prove an instance by which two substances contain a similar attribute, yet differ in nature. Under these considerations, I conclude that Spinoza’s thesis is mistaken.
...he many recent theories that have been raised, for example, against Einstein’s relativistic account of the universe, or even earlier attempts by natural philosophers like Ptolemy and Tycho Brahe to elucidate the structure of the universe. Many of these fringe theories have fallen over time; modern-day examples of fringe theories can be found simply by typing “antigravity” on any search engine on the Internet. By comparison to the long-standing theory of folk psychology, eliminative materialism is also a fringe theory. Perhaps eliminative materialism will also fall short of overthrowing folk psychology, but perhaps, Churchland is correct in saying that our “collective conceptual destiny lies substantially toward the revolutionary end of the spectrum” (Churchland 353). Only time will tell whether eliminative materialism will someday become our new account of the mind.
“All manner of nonphysical phenomena may coexist with [physical phenomena], even to the extent of sharing the same space-time, provided only that the nonphysical phenomena are entirely inefficacious with respect to the physical phenomena.” (p. 24)
Holtzman, Jack M. "A note on Schrodinger's cat and the unexpected hanging paradox." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science v39. 1988. 397-401.
An underlying theme present throughout the series is the possibility that our existence is not the only one. According to current theories in physics, it is entirely possible that our universe is just one of many universes f...
Wittgenstein, Ludwig; G. E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.). Philosophical Investigations. 4th edition, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.
Therefore a change in some element of the system forces always a re-definition of the remaining members of it. Accordingly, the new metaphysics of reality heralded by the
Quantum thermodynamic scientists are aiming to explore the behavior outside the lines of conventional thermodynamics. This exploration could be used for functional cases, which include “improving lab-based refrigeration techniques, creating batteries with enhanced capabilities and refining technology of quantum computing.” (Merali P.1). However, this field is still in an early state of exploration. Experiments, including the one that is being performed at Oxford University, are just beginning to test these predictions. “A flurry of attempts has been made to calculate how thermodynamics and the quantum theory might combine” (Merali P. 1). However, quantum physicist Peter Hänggi stated that “there is far too much theory and not enough experiment” (Merali P.1) in this field of study, which is why its credibility is undermined. Nevertheless, people are starting to put more effort into understanding quantum thermodynamics in order to make
Stemming from the first years of the 20th century, quantum mechanics has had a monumental influence on modern science. First explored by Max Planck in the 1900s, Einstein modified and applied much of the research in this field. This begs the question, “how did Einstein contribute to the development and research of quantum mechanics?” Before studying how Einstein’s research contributed to the development of quantum mechanics, it is important to examine the origins of the science itself. Einstein took much of Planck’s experimental “quantum theory” research and applied it in usable ways to existing science. He also greatly contributed to the establishment of the base for quantum mechanics research today. Along with establishing base research in the field, Einstein’s discoveries have been modified and updated to apply to our more advanced understanding of this science today. Einstein greatly contributed to the foundation of quantum mechanics through his research, and his theories and discoveries remain relevant to science even today.
Russell’s Theory of Definite Description has totally changed the way we view definite descriptions by solving the three logical paradoxes. It is undeniable that the theory itself is not yet perfect and there can be objections on this theory. Still, until now, Russell’s theory is the most logical explanation of definite description’s role.
In March, Einstein creates the quantum theory of light, the idea that light exists as tiny packets, or particles, that we now call photons. Alongside Max Planck's work on quanta of heat, and Niels Bohr's later work on quanta of matter, Einstein's work anchors the most shocking idea in twentieth century physics: we live in a quantum universe, one built out of tiny, discrete chunks of energy and matter.
Though Einstein was one of the greatest contributors to physical science of our times, he was by no means the most brilliant theorist or experimenter. Competent specialists within the field of physics could have better accomplished some of his mathematical deductions. In fact, he needed the assistance of a friend, mathematician Marcel Grossman, to wield the tools necessary to develop his general theory of relativity. Einstein shined brightest within a theoretical context, but, despite the fact that his relativistic theories were most revolutionary, the study of quantum mechanics made a larger impact on the way physics is studied today. What, then, set Einstein apart? Curiosity was the key factor. As Einstein said, "I have no special gift - I am o...
‘… To obtain something resembling a scientific handle on the concept of information we need to begin with a clear picture of what we are observing. Physics is concerned with physical bodies of all kinds, their properties and their behaviour. We do not have to define the concept of a body in so many words because we can show a person so many concrete examples that he can learn to use the word ‘body’ as competently as we do ourselves. Similarly, we can start our exploration of information by using the concept of a sign. We might tell someone that a sign is any physical object, event, or property of an object or event which can stand for something else. But we do not leave it at that. We show them hundreds of diverse examples until they know what a sign is by ostensive definition (that is, by demonstration). In this way we escape the tyranny of a verbal regression into the domain of practical, concrete action.