Introduction Main Body ~ The doctrine of promissory estoppel was established with the intention of preventing injustice. This may arise in circumstances whereby, party A makes an agreement with party B under contractual legal rights. However, party A may choose to go back on his original agreement as a result, the other party will seek to enforce their strict legal rights. The doctrine originated in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877). In the lease agreement, it required that the lessee to repair by given notice. The landlord gave notice for repair within six months. The tenants were initially inquiring to purchase his premises. The landlord then entered into negotiations along the tenants, whereby he had also agreed that he would not enforce the obligations required, while negotiations take place. Negotiations continued for two months then broke down. Landlord sued for not carrying out repair duties required in the lease. Consistently, House of Lords held that ‘tenants was entitled to equitable relief against forfeiture of the lease on the ground that the running of the six-month period was suspended during negotiations.’ Nevertheless, House of Lords refused to accept the argument, as ‘it was unsupported by consideration therefore, arguably unenforceable.’ This case lead an interest among the likes of Lord Denning, who is acknowledged for the invention of the doctrine of promissory and genuinely putting the doctrine into practice. The doctrine emerged through the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947). The claimant had let a block of flats in London, on a 99-year lease at the annual rent of £2500. During the 1940s, as a result of outbreak of war and evacuation from London, they were ... ... middle of paper ... ...t of the doctrine to be removed is not expressed, however, there are reference to whereby terms use of ‘limit’ and ‘refine’ which is believed to emphasises on the practical benefit rather than legal. Russel LJ, views the doctrine through occasion technalities, where courts can preven giving effect to the intention of parties. He further adds, that ‘consideration’ is considered as a ‘vititaing factor’ which is a requirement for ‘valid and subsisting contract.’ Russel LJ, does not distinguish the doctrine along with public interest but the formately of it. In contrast, Lord Goff rasies doubts as well, whereby he states, contract is widely seen as deficient’ where the ‘prsence of an unnescessary doctrine of consideration.’ Professor Dawson further supports, this suggests that the argument is based around that consideration ‘draws the net of enforceability too tightly.’
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Show MoreThe decision of the House of Lords in City of London Building Society v Flegg marks a key stage in how the balance is drawn between occupiers and creditors in priority disputes; the seeds of which were originally planted in the Law of Property Act 1925. It posed a serious challenge to the conventional understanding of overreaching and the machinery of conveyancing.Ref ?
For example, "A promises B that he would not enforce his legal rights and B acted and relied on it without giving any consideration, equity would not allow A to renege on his promise to B" (LawTeacher, n.d.).
well-established principles of contract interpretation, the Court finds the exception for "third-party fees" and "fees, fines, and penalties" was not intended to apply to
In Palgo Holdings v Gowans , the High Court considered the distinction between a security in the form of a pawn or pledge and a security in the form of a chattel mortgage. The question was whether section 6 of the Pawnbrokers and Second-hand Dealers Act 1996 (NSW) (‘the 1996 Pawnbrokers Act’) extended to a business that structured its loan agreements as chattel mortgages. In a four to one majority (Kirby J dissenting) the High Court found that chattel mortgages fell outside the ambit of section 6 of the 1996 Pawnbrokers Act. However, beyond the apparent simplicity of this decision, the reasoning of the majority raises a number of questions. Was it a “turning back to literalism” as Kirby J suggested, or was it simply a case where the court declares that parliament has missed its target?
In the 19th century, promissory estoppel was first introduced in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co , where Lord Cairns ruled that parties who have entered into fixed terms and then afterwards, by their own act or will, enter negotiations which influence the other party to assume that the stringent rights that were originally imposed will not be enforced or will be deferred, should be unable to reverse from this if it is inequitable for them to do so. This doctrine was resurrected by Lord Denning in Central London Property Ltd v High Trees House Ltd , where he expanded on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and ruled that where there is a promise intended to form legal relations and the promisor knew it would be acted upon and it was acted upon by the promisee then the promise made would be binding even with a lack of consideration.
...ntradiction of terms. If the Court finds it unsatisfactory, doesn’t that imply that the Court already believes the authorities are not doing justice? How much “convincing” would they need? Duffy again points out the need for revision in the treaty.
Having evaluated the current state of English contract law, mainly made up of piecemeal solutions, it can be seen that despite being satisfactory and doing its job, there still remain gaps within the law of contract where unfairness is not dealt with. Moreover, due to the ad hoc nature of those piecemeal solutions, the latter have often produced inconsistent justice and have manifested cases of unfairness. Hence, “a relatively small number of respected Justices have endeavored to draw attention to the fact that the application of a general principle might be useful and even necessary in English law.”
The case of Kamloops v. Nielson was a landmark decision for tort law, since it established the duty of care principle in Canadian private law, which prior to this case was used in the Anns v. Merton case and expanded the scope of duty first identified in Donoghue v. Stevenson. In the historic case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, duty of care was established to include anyone that could be foreseeably harmed by someone’s actions, creating the neighbour principle. The Anns v. Merton case expanded the scope of the neighbour principle to including public bodies, such as the municipality. The case involved a faulty building foundation, which resulting in requiring repairs for the house, and whether the municipality should have to pay for the repairs, since it was the job of the municipality to inspect and ensure the building was properly constructed. Whether public tax allocations should be subject to tort litigations was placed in question in the case but the municipality was held liable for damages nevertheless.
It has been generally acknowledged that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel has much in common with common intention constructive trusts, i.e. those that concern the acquisition of an equitable interest in another person’s land. In effect, the general aim is the recognition of real property rights informally created. The similarity between the two doctrines become clear in a variety of cases where the court rely on either of the two doctrines. To show the distinction between the doctrines, this essay will analyse the principles, roots and rationale of both doctrines. With reference to the relevant case law it will be possible to highlight the subtle differences between the doctrines in the cases where there seems to be some overlap. Three key cases where this issue surfaced were the following: Lloyds Bank Plc v. Rosset (1991), Yaxley v. Gotts (1999) and Stack v. Dowden (2007). This essay will describe the relevant judgements in these cases in order to show the differences between the two doctrines.
The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.
Cecil Wright, ‘Introduction to the Law of Torts’ (1942) 8 Cambridge Law Journal 238, 243.
...mended that in determining whether in an individual case the term or notice was fair and reasonable, both substantive fairness (‘the substance and effect of the term’) and procedural fairness (‘the circumstances existing at that time’) be taken into account. (42)And additionally there are requirements that the contract must be written in ‘plain, intelligible language’ for a reasonable person would understand.
In Krell v. Henry {1903} a plea of frustration succeeded because the court held that the common purpose for which the contact was entered into, could no longer be carried out. But in the same year for similar set of facts, the Court of Appeal decided in Herne Bay v. Hutton [1903] that the contract had not been frustrated because the "common formation of the contract" had not changed. It clearly was a policy decision which shows the reluctance of the courts to provide an escape route for a party for whom the contract ha...
This essay will examine the doctrine of Judicial precedent that helps form the English Legal System. It will illustrate various views that have been raised by Judges and relating cases to the use of ‘Stare decisis’ when creating precedents. In addition it will discuss how the developments in the powers of the courts now also allow them to depart from these precedents to an extent.
Proprietary estoppel is a legal principle which prevents someone, who has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs from illegally going back on the words which led to their belief. It arose in the case of Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862), where a son spent £14,000 on building a house on the land with his father approval and promise that he would be in charge of that land but later found out that his father did not leave the property to him in his will. Lord Westbury held that the freehold int he land had been transferred to the son. However, four elements must be proved in order to claim for proprietary estoppel which are :