Thus, the scientific method is the application of induction into practice. In Karl Popper’s paper The Problem of Induction, however, Popper argues that induction is not adequate justification to warrant a reasonable conclusion. In fact... ... middle of paper ... ...g on the fact that we can breach these inevitable gaps of knowledge and still find a conclusion. As Kuhn comments, science requires a definitive paradigm in which we can commit to, because without it, there would be no scientific advancement. In this sense, the inductive reasoning used in the scientific method is justified, as our understanding of scientific truths and all scientific advancement relies on its existence.
The above explanations also against the idea that - 'science is objective' because I claimed that individual opinion and speculative imagining should be seen as a part of developing science knowledge. As a result, I would say that science is partially subjective and partially objective. In conclusion, the view of Chalmers would be falsified and against to Popperian's hypothetico-deductive method. I agree with Popperian's view and objected the definition of science which defined by Chalmers because science knowledge is not always reliable. Also, individual opinion and personal speculative imagining and have a place in science.
and "Is there a criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?" seems to be put together in the following summary. At first Popper seems to just be criticizing the integrity of some sciences and/or scientists who nebulously back their vague and general theories with references to observations that may be inconclusive or scanty which they presumably call "scientific method." He cites Freud and Adler's psychological theories, as well as the socio-economic or historical theory or Karl Marx as theories in which "Whatever happens always confirms it." The overarching or oversimplification of these theories which seem to many to be a strength, for Popper was actually a weakness.
The method by which we gather this knowledge and the ability of the knowledge to accurately explain why things work the ways they do are equally important. Moreover, with science we are trying to bring an order into, a chaotic world. With giving things names we take the mystery out of it and it makes it less scary for us. Also, this gained knowledge needs to be continually compared to the real world to test and improve its accuracy and demonstrate its explanatory power (Popper 1988). I agree with Popper (1988), who stated that only those propositions that research may prove false should be considered as scientific (the principle of falsification).
Therefore, the difference between Popper's claim and earlier theories of what constitutes science may be in definition. Popper himself states (Klemke, 1988, p.27) that observations are interpretations relative to the theory one wishes to support (or refute). One must define one's terms so that the theory itself is clear and open to rebuttal or verification. Perhaps the conflict between the earlier criteria for science and Popper's criterion is one of clarity, not theory. Although traditional theory on what science consists of is viewed as inductive, it appears that at least some of the criteria are, in fact, deductive.
For Popper, as well as many other philosophers and scientists, the advancement of knowledge is dependent on the suggestion of new, probable ideas, not on bastardized ones derived from trite combinations of truth. According to Simkin, “Popper is against all forms of justificationism. They all involve a logical regress, as each justifying statement can be challenged, and the challenge has to be met by providing a justification for that statement itself” (Simkin 34). The reason that Popper was so against the practice of justificationism was that a scientist could exploit his data to confirm the hypothesis he
Popperian hypothetico deductivists would find several problems with the view of science Alan Chalmers stated in ‘What is this thing Called Science?’ From “Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge” to “Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven” popper would disagree to everything. With Chalmers falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism view, his statement indicates that scientific induction is completely justifiable. However as it is now known, induction is not a reasonable way to prove or justify science. One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason.
For the first part of Poppers argument I must adamantly agree. Science is a continual process through which induction and empirical method play a major part, Nonetheless, if a theory is to be scientific it must be able to be tested. It must have this component of Falsifiability! If we do not continually test ourselves and strive for reaffirmation we risk falling in to a pit of conjecture and; I would further say that any theory that cannot be falsified by either present means or by proposed means cannot be a scientific one.
Falsificationism states that a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable or verifiable. In other words if a theory, T, is testable, then it is scientific. With falsificationism, guidelines are used to decipher between testable and not testable therefore scientific and non-scientific respectively. So by using falsificationism consistently one should be able to solve the demarcation problem. But within falsificationism, some contradictions have arisen and from these, three versions of falsificationism have been formulated.
Realists argue that our best sciences yield information about the actual nature of the physical world. He might appeal to the "no miracles" argument, for example. However, this tactic presupposes the realist's own preferred relation between evidence and nature. Against this view, the antirealist argues that the product of scientific investigation is a description of observable phenomena and not of any underlying reality. Generally, antirealists have emphasized historical evidence against the realist picture and made arguments for one form of instrumentalism or another.