Peter Geach's Analysis Of The Socratic Fallacy

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Peter Geach’s essay on the Socratic fallacy poses a large problem for the Socratic method of obtaining answers to the What-is-F? question. He claims that Socrates makes an error when he refuses to accept examples as knowledge, primarily citing the Euthyphro as the source. In my last essay, I examined whether or not Socrates commits the Socratic fallacy in two of the early dialogues, namely, the Euthyphro and the Laches. So, I shall begin by giving a brief recapitulation of my previous essay as well as outlining Geach’s Socratic fallacy. Additionally, I will bring up an objection that Beversluis raises to my view. Then I shall explain the importance of the fallacy and the theory of the fallacy within the Socratic dialogues as it relates to …show more content…

question. The Euthyphro has Socrates and Euthyphro discussing what piety is. In an attempt to give an answer to this question, Euthyphro states that what he is doing now namely, prosecuting his own father for murder is pious (5E). Socrates rejects this as an answer saying that he wishes to know “what this form [piety] is” (6E). In essence, what Socrates is looking for here, is a formal definition. In his paper, Geach claims that this is a grave mistake on Socrates part. In his search for knowledge of piety, Socrates has made the errors that Geach enumerates …show more content…

Firstly, Beversluis and Prior posit that there seems to be a large difference among the Platonic dialogues of the meaning of knowledge (within the dialogues themselves) pre and post–Meno (Beversluis 218, Prior 101). Not only can this indicate where among the Platonic corpus the Socratic fallacy is more likely to arise, but also, depending on the definition of knowledge, the Socratic fallacy may be applied in different ways. This also creates a problem for the Socratic fallacy, as applying a definition of knowledge post-Meno may not in fact be the sort of knowledge Socrates is looking for and the definition of knowledge pre-Meno seems to be in flux as most of the early Platonic dialogues end in aporia. Another important thing to note in regards to the theory surrounding the fallacy is that there seems to be a lack of textual evidence on Geach’s part to suggest that the Socratic fallacy is such a massive setback in the Socratic method as he seems to think (Beversluis 212). Additionally, with the pre and post-Meno distinction in mind, it may only be possible to examine the early dialogues for the Socratic fallacy, those that are arguably Socrates’ point of view rather than Plato’s (Prior 100). This further distinction creates the

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