J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. gives us the definition of strategic art, stating “it is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action) and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.”1 During the Peloponnesian War we see Sparta and Athens following and discarding the first words of the definition with sometimes skillful formulation of strategy, and at times anything but skillful strategy - completely ill-informed, unimaginative, and incomplete. We also see how well each city-state adapts to strategic realities through the first phase of the war. There are lessons in Thucydides history of the Peloponnesian War for strategists today on how a country develops a …show more content…
The Spartans did not heed Archidamus’ warning that “unless we can either beat them at sea, or deprive them of the revenues which feed their navy, we shall meet with little but disaster.”8 From the beginning, Sparta should have developed an alternative course of action, a branch plan in modern American military terms, to execute if the invasion of Attica did not quickly end the war. There was little time for Sparta to build or develop a naval force to match Athenian naval power, but an alternative plan to erode away the Athenian empire, similar to the one employed by Brasidas in 424 BC, was possible much earlier in the war and could have eroded Athenian financial support from their empire. For as Thucydides tells us, “the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their [allies] payments.”9 Conditions were present for Sparta to reduce the Athenian empire as many Greeks wanted or feared losing their independence from the Athenian empire.10 While not excusing Sparta’s initial failure as described above, it is understandable, based on the conservative Spartan culture, why they did not develop an alternative course of action for defeating …show more content…
After the defeat, busy with defending their lands and putting down a revolution, Sparta sues for peace, which Athens rejects as they “kept grasping at more.”39 If the Athenian objective was to maintain her empire and conduct affairs in her national interest without interference, then Athens should have accepted the Spartan peace offer. Instead, they reject the offer, convinced by their recent success they can get more if they continue the war. The war continuing, Sparta is forced to change course in their strategy and free a number of Helots to join Brasidas for his expedition into Thrace and Chalcidice. As described before, Brasidas decisively defeats Cleon at Amphipolis and takes the strategic initiative away from Athens. This defeat will be a major reason for peace between Athens and Sparta, but a peace not as favorable as one after
There is no coincidence that the rise of Athenian Democracy goes chronologically hand in hand with the rise of the Athenian Navy. Following the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks, Athens’ naval successes allow it to surpass the previous naval power of Corinth; create the Delian league to fund and support this navy; and eventually ruffle enough feathers with their fellow Hellenic neighbours that they inspire the Peloponnesian war. Overall their naval reputation and intimidation comes from the skill of the men who maneuver and command the ships, and the tool they use to wield their power, the Athenian trireme. By looking at the design of the trireme, and the work and numbers put both into the ship and the men that drive it, hopefully both the wealth and skill of the Athenian navy can be appropriately highlighted. In the end, it is this immense power and resources that allow the Athenians to overstep their limits and caused such demoralizing defeats such as the expedition at Syracuse and the eventual loss of the Peloponnesian war, after which they prove unable to grow to the same undefeated sea power they were.
While Simon Hornblower acknowledges the limitations of the alliance, he is perhaps the strongest proponent of the importance of Persia’s financial support. He recognizes that Sparta’s victory at Notion in 407 was as much the result of poor Athenian leadership as Persian money, and that this financial backing did not prevent the disastrous loss at Arginusai the following year. Despite these statements, Hornblower is adamant that “The Peloponnesian War had been won because of Persian money.” P.F. Rhodes continues this reasoning in A History of the Classical Greek World, 478-323. He contends that Persia’s assistance helped Sparta effectively combat Athens at sea, and allowed them to remain engaged until Athens could no longer continue. These theories all center around the question of why Sparta won the war. However, if we flip our perspective and examine why Athens lost the war, Persia’s money becomes considerably less significant. It is to this examination that we now turn our
The rocky relationship between the two became irreperable when Sparta asked Athens for aid against the helots. When the large Athenian army arrived, Sparta had a change of heart, and dismissed the force, fearing that the Athenians would side with the helots against them. Insulted, Athens broke off relations with Sparta, striking an alliance with A...
If the Athenians had used the proven principles of war, they would have had two courses of action. One, not become involved in the dispute,or two, take decisive action immediately and crush the Syracusans. Instead, as history points out, the Syraclisans defeated the Athenians who, as a result, lost their empire.
Throughout the Ancient Greek world, there have been many wars and standoffs. However, there has been only one which changed the course of Greek history forever; the Peloponnesian War. Caused by the growing tension between Athens and Sparta, it came and left, leaving only destruction in its wake. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War caused the downfall of Greece, and the end of the Classical Age.
In Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles commends the ergon of Athenian heroes, which has placed them in the realm of logos, while directing the Athenians to follow these ideals of logos. The maintenance and continued success of Athens' political establishment relies on the prevalence of polis, rationality and discourse over family, emotion and reckless action. However, the indiscriminate turns of fate and fortune, often place logos in opposition with the base, primal nature of ergon. Both Thucydides and Sophocles recognize that when logos conflicts with the unexpected ergon, the preservation of rationality and unanimity among the citizens of the polis depend on the leadership of a single honest leader. In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides presents Pericles as a man of logos, whom Athens needs to achieve its full potential as an empire and later to rescue her from disaster. Likewise, Sophocles presents Theseus, in Oedipus Colonus, as the perfect successor of Pericles, who returns Athens to its former glory before the end of the war. In these two examples, we see that the dominance of logos over ergon within a polis lies in the ability and logos of the city’s current leader.
The Peloponnesian War is the conflict between the pelopoponesians league led by Sparta and the Delian league, led by Athens. Much of our knowledge on the causes and events of the Peloponnesian War, depends on the Athenian Thucydides 460-400 BC, writer of the History of the Peloponessian War. He servd as an Athenian commander in Northern Greece during the early years of the war until the assembly exiled him as he lost an outpost to the enemy. During this exile, he was able to interview witnesses on both sides of the conflicted. Unlike Heredotus he concentrated on contemporary history and presented his account of the war in an annalistic framework that only occasionally diverts from chronological order. In his account, he discuses the precursors to the war, including the 30 years truce and revolutions, such as the stasis in Corcyra. When looking at wars, the primary focus is normally the fighting itself, such as what we see for World War II. However, it is important to look at the anatomy of war, meaning what effect the war has on the people who are experiencing it first hand, and the consquences that the conflict has on the rest of the world. Therefore in this essay I shall discuss, drawing directly from Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, how the civilians reacted to the war, their involvement and socio economic factors. Furthermore, the first section of my essay shall focus on the direct effect of war on the people, regarding the plague, and violence and hopelessness that was experienced. Then I shall go on to discuss more general effects of the war and how it affected the Greek world, discussing the social and economic losses that occurred such as the cost of the war in attica, the coup d’etat that occurred in gove...
The decision to conduct the Sicilian Expedition is met with opposition from senior leadership and was not a good long-term strategic option for Athens. The vast differences between the strategic leadership styles of Nicias and Alcibiades, coupled with the allied support shortcomings, lend to the failure of this expedition and ultimately with Sparta defeating Athens in devastating fashion.
Thucydides multifaceted yet thorough account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 BC allows a modern strategist an opportune and relevant model for the application of the end-ways-means construct for analyzing Athenian strategy. Through insights gained reviewing this campaign’s planning and execution, I will illustrate and link justifications for the Athenian intended ends. I will similarly articulate their ways through their planning and methods, then their means through their resources and force composition and strength. Finally, an evaluation of risks ties these factors together and allows an assessment on overall failures.
...s of the war itself, there are a number of crucial points which set the course of the tide, and I have tried to illustrate those which I consider to be most important and influential. In any case, it seems that if Athens would have continued with the policy of Pericles, she might not have been so weakened by the destruction of her superior naval forces, which, it seems, can largely be accounted for by Alcibiades and his supporters.
There are times in history that something will happen and it will defy all logic. It was one of those times when a few Greek city/states joined together and defeated the invasion force of the massive Persian Empire. The Greeks were able to win the Greco-Persian War because of their naval victories over the Persians, a few key strategic victories on land, as well as the cause for which they were fighting. The naval victories were the most important contribution to the overall success against the Persians. The Persian fleet was protecting the land forces from being outflanked and after they were defeated the longer had that protection. While the Greeks had very few overall victories in battle they did have some strategic victories. The Battle of Thermopylae is an example of a strategic success for the Greeks. The morale of the Persian army was extremely affected by the stout resistance put up by King Leonidas and his fellow Spartans. The Greeks fought so hard against overwhelming odds because of what they were fighting for. They were fighting for their country and their freedom. They fought so hard because they did not want to let down the man next to them in the formation. Several things contributed to the Greeks success against the Persian invasion that happened during the Second Greco-Persian War.
The Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) was a conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta that resulted in the end of the Golden Age of Athens. The events of the war were catalogued by the ancient historian Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ writings showed the ancient Greek belief that there is a parallel between the city-state and the character of its citizens; in order for the city-state to be successful, its citizens must be virtuous. Thucydides did not believe that the true cause of the Peloponnesian War were the immediate policies of the Athenian Empire against the city-states in the Peloponnesian League but rather the fundamental differences in the character of the two city-states
As can be expected from pioneer governmental institutions, Athenian democracy was not perfect. In fact it was far from it. It resulted in the establishment of poor policies by aggressive populists who sought "...private ambition and private profit...which were bad both for the Athenians themselves and their allies." (Thucydides). These self interested populist leaders with personal gain in mind established extensive internal political instability "...by quarrelling among themselves [and] began to bring confusion into the policy of the state." (Thucydides). Repeated opportunities to accept terms of peace after the battles of Pylos (425), Arginusae (406) and Aegospotami (405) were ignored by the inefficient Athenian demos eventually resulting in the devastation of the once dominant city-state. Internal political strife can also be attribu...
In the years following the Persian Wars in 479 B.C., Athens had come out on top being the most dominantly powerful of any Greek city with a navy that had superior strength that increased day by day. The Athenians “ruled with heavy-handed, even brutal force as well as with reason” (Kagan 2). This was due largely to the fact that Athens had a stable and effective government, which only increased their advantage in proving themselv...
In the year approximately 500 B.C., the Greek civilization came upon a time of peace. Because of the tranquil times, the civilization’s society had more time to focus on writing, math, astronomy, and artistic fields, as well as trade and metallurgy. Out of all the city-states of Greece, two excelled over all the rest, Sparta and Athens. Even though they were the most advanced and strong civilizations, they were bitter enemies. While Athens focused mainly on the people’s democracy and citizen rights, Sparta were ferocious and enslaved its original inhabitants, making them unable to leave