While I except the political process model as the most accurate theoretical description of social movements, I do not agree with Costain's reformulation of 'political process.' Indeed, I believe that Costain succumbs to a subtle regression into elitist theory. In Social Movements as Interest Groups, Costain begins by stating that "traditional measures of interest group influence frequently fail to capture the impact social movements have on legislation" (p. 285). From this opening, we can assume that she intends to reveal the actual impact of social movements on legislation through a non-traditional method of measurement. In this context, Costain searches for a theory that captures the influential dynamics of social movement success.
This can be contrasted with the newer thinking (and to a lesser extent, the practice) within governments and the bureaucracy of insisting that public organisations must demonstrate more foresight, responsiveness, innovation and prudent risk taking, while being granted more authority and freedom from rules and procedures and held more strictly accountable for results. In short, the negative blaming approach typically followed in parliament does not fit well with the more constructive, learning approach being promoted within the APS. The role of partisanship in parliament is controversial. For some commentators competition among parties provides the incentives and energy which drive the parliamentary process and ensure that the deficiencies in performance of governments are revealed. Critics see prevailing partisan approaches to the enforcement of political accountability as too ritualistic, narrow, negative and theatrical.
Briefly, the Direction phase has to re-evaluate it’s position due to the change in political environment; the collection and anlysis phases are inundanted due to the information age; and the dissemination phase is often misused by policymakers. The following will suggest that the cycle can be changed to better reflect operational realities; a more productive solution than a complete revolution. Comparing it with a more complex Systems model; and suggest a more detailed model of the traditional intelligence cycle will do this. Understanding the need for these changes will in turn illustrate the dra... ... middle of paper ... ...lins, A., (ed) Contemporary Security Studies, US, Oxford University Press, 2007, p256. Dupont, 2003, p18.
In this paper, I will argue that interest groups are indeed a double-edged sword in affecting the democratic quality of European Union legislation. Before this topic can be adequately addressed, I believe that it is necessary to clarify a general definition of an interest group. For purposes of this paper, I will refer to Rainer Eising’s definition of an interest group, because I have found it to be the most expansive and relevant towards the argument being made in thi... ... middle of paper ... ... of interest group lobbying far exceeds the negative; however the negative implications are of huge importance. Taking the current status of the full-fledged role of interest groups within the United States as a comparison to the nascent status of interest groups within the European Union, one can see the hazards of not addressing the negative discrepancies. It is my conclusion that the improvement of the democratic deficit as demonstrated by the interest groups thus far in the Union has proved the importance of interest group lobbying.
This essay addresses the criticism firstly by clarifying the concept of democratic legitimacy and democratic deficit. It also introduces pertinent theories with a focus on the constructive and ideological complexity of the EU. Then it explains the contextual and normative relation between the EU and democracy from its history and some of the major treaties. The essay continues to the debates between advocates and critics of the EU’s democratic legitimacy, yet with a focus on the latter, further dealing with two main dimensions of institutional flaws affecting the legislative process and the insignificance of European citizens to the EU regime. After remarking conventional and possible measures to alleviate the deficiency, it draws a conclusion that the de... ... middle of paper ... ...larship Series, Paper 4628.
The answer isn’t always straightforward, but the short version is that federalism is crucial to democracy. That is, placing limits on the authority of the central government as to prevent tyranny. If this limitation comes at the behest of investing some degree of authority into separate subnational units, the main conundrum we then face is how powerful should these states be? Does it matter whether the constitution outlines their authorities or not? I argue that the specification of powers is indeed important because at the crux of federalism the main behavioral determinant is to whom are the subnational governments are responsible.
The Future of the European Union The link between internationalization, governance and democracy is a central problem for politics as well as for political science. Even if clear evidence on the nature of this link is not yet available, the literature seems to support the view that internationalization both undermines the capacity for governance and puts into question traditional forms of democracy. Because it could be quite complicated to look at the EU model from a point of classical democratic nation-state, it seems to be reasonable to discuss this problem, not by abstract reasoning, but by focusing on a concrete case. European Union is the best case available, which in recent decades has developed into a new type of political system with enormous consequences on democracy and governance in its member states. Despite repeated attempts for major institutional reforms, this system is likely to persist in its basic structures for the future and is unlikely to develop into a federal state or to disintegrate into a classic international organization.
Examining these studies reveals their advantages and disadvantages in how they ... ... middle of paper ... ...ssell J., 2007: Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973–2004. Acta Politica 42 (2-3): 128-152. Gabel, Matthew, 1998: Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of Five Theories. The Journal of Politics 60 (2): 333-354. Garry, John/Tilley, James, 2009: The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU.
However, they have avoided it because of the fact that it’s troubling to measure the influence concept quantitatively (Mahoney 35; John 27). Some of the reasons for are that there are too many variables, assumptions about the effect of lobbying are flawed because studies have been unable to establish convincing counterfactuals such as what effect an organization would have on policy if lobbyists' activities were not performed, and that self-reports on inf... ... middle of paper ... ...eir goals. Overall it is difficult to truly measure quantitatively the influence of a lobbyist, although evidence from all sources prove that influence can go either way. Works Cited Adams, Brian E. Citizen Lobbyists: Local Efforts to Influence Public Policy. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 2007.
Andrew Moravcsik believes concern about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ to be misplaced. Judged against existing democracies, rather than ideal parliamentary democracy, the EU is legitimate. Most critics overlook the relatively optimistic conclusion because they analyse the EU in ideal and isolated terms, drawing comparisons between the EU and a utopian democracy. This use of idealistic standards is leads many analysts to overlook the extent to which delegation and insulation are widespread trends in modern democracies. When analysts criticise the lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU they generally point to the mode of political representation and the nature of policy outputs.