Based on the evidence and findings of the research the following are recommendations to enable the Army maintaining an operational reserve capability: 1. Maintain current RC force structure and capabilities in order to preserve the operational reserve capacity to meet the Army’s joint requirements. 2. Increase the statutory available training days for RC operational units up to 60 days to be applied during collective training years 3-4 in order to mitigate RC readiness risks and provide a truly balanced and ready total force. -Heavy maneuver units 60 days -Light maneuver units 54 days -Functional and Multi-functional units 49 days -Operational Sustainment units 49 days 3. Manage readiness through the Army Sustainable Readiness Model for 1:4 deploy-to-dwell ratio (5-year progressive …show more content…
The RC provides over half of the Army’s total capacity and this becomes increasingly important in the verge of balancing the force mix. One approach to lower risk without growing end-strength or major re-structuring is through greater utilization of the RC forces. Moreover, the current and future operational environment is dictating the high demand and enduring role of the RC in our Nation’s defense. Though the RC will always carry the responsibility to maintain strategic depth, its evolution suggests the necessity to maintain its operational mindset. The Army has been starring at this problem set for decades with no substantial changes. The government has invested in numerous studies and commissions to look at the pre-mobilization training model, all yielding the same results; it needs to be updated to reflect the current and future environment. Based on the evidence and findings of this research, the Army requires to maintain its operational reserve capability and the RC requires additional pre-mobilization training days and optimization to maximize its operational
I will go to division and ask that they exclude our S6 shop from any future division CPX’s while we prepare for the NTC rotation and the RAF mission. Word will spread that the new brigade commander is going to bat for the unit. I will work with the combined arms battalions and make sure they are focused on their core infantry and armor skills and provide them the resources and training that they require to get back up to full readiness levels. In regards to red-cycle tasking, we need to change the perception that this is for the Brigade, this is for the soldier’s development for promotion we will roll this into our preparation for NTC and not take it as another tasking. It is simply to prepare us for deployment. As I had mentioned above, with the families fully supporting the brigade by the show of solidarity and community support for what their soldier is doing and why the stress levels on the home front will be reduced and will, in turn, diminish the issues of domestic violence, DUI’s and divorces will hopefully be reduced and when you have happy families you will have dedicated soldiers ready and willing to work
While many of these changes include the advancements in technology and ingenuity, nothing can replace the rich history, proud culture, and bright future of the NCO Corps. Though several additional factors doubtlessly play roles in the strength and continuity of the corps, I do not believe any have contributed to the extent of the solid rank structure, efficient training network, and passionate NCO Creed. These elements have worked together in continuously strengthening and molding the NCO Corps, and they will remain building blocks that will project the Army into the
Joint Publication 3.0 entitled Joint Operations, defines Joint Sustainment as the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint Publication 4-0 further states, “Effective joint logistics planning identify future requirements and proposes solutions; it requires joint logisticians to understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS).” Logisticians use seven principles in their planning at the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war to ensure operations are logistically supportable. These principles are responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability,...
A military officer must manage pieces of one of the largest organizations in the United States government - an organization that accounts for the third largest piece of the American budget and is comprised of 1.3 million active sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines, many of whom are tasked with being deployable to any location within 48 hours. This is only possible through concise, professional communication on the part of every service member, especially
LM06, Strategic Planning Student Guide. (2013). Maxwell-Gunter AFB. Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education (AETC).
However, development starts day one with training. Therefore, the Soldiers have to be experts who have assumed the character and identity of the profession; professionalism in Soldiers enables them to perform their duties with lots of motivation and inspiration. For example, 42A - The Human Resources (HR) Sergeant supervises, performs personnel and administrative functions in support of company, battery, and troop; detachments at division, corps, and echelons above corps must master their skill level in an effort to be a subject matter expert in their profession. The functions of Human Resource support four fundamental competencies: Man the Force (ex. Strength reporting), Provide HR Services (ex. Postal operations), Coordinate Personnel Support (ex. Morale, welfare, and Recreation), and Conduct HR Planning and Operations (ex. Planning and operations) in which a HR personnel must accomplish to support the mission. As a result, a professional Soldier should meet very high standards of a profession, for example character, competence, expertise and morality to fulfil their HR role. These standards are attained through rigorous training, development, and educating the Soldiers on how to serve the nation and the constitution as professionals. After nine years of war, which erupted from 9/11 we assess the attributes
We can identify three major cultural dimensions that help us to understand what leaders must focus on as they guide the transition of the Army. First, professional Identity, which is guided by Soldiers at all levels who are striving for excellence in their functional specialty, i.e., HR Sergeants. Soldiers who have goals and ideals of the Army to ethically put service and duty first. HR Sergeants are trained and well educated in their field. They are taught to put Soldiers first and have great customer support skills. Second, community, the sense in which Soldiers stop thinking about “I” and start thinking “we”. The bond among units who not only believe in cohesion with Soldiers, but their families too. The HR Sergeants are there to take care of Soldiers when financial issues arise with them or their families and don’t back down until the situation is solved. Last, hierarchy, which leads to order and control and provides Soldiers with moral reference and a sense of direction. The HR Sergeant has the mentality of mission first, knowing who to contact at the next level for assistance helps get the mission
Sir, I am honored by the privilege to once again serve in 4th Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT). Over of the last 30 days, I had an opportunity to reconnect, and reflect on the current state of the Brigade. The 4th ABCT has a rich history of success and glory. It is my goal to put in place the systems and practices for this great organization to exceed all past and present accomplishments. As a result of my assessment, I identified three areas of focus that will improve our organization: a unit vision, a change in organizational culture and climate, and building organizational teams. I have no doubt that with the implementation of these three areas of focus, I will be the transformational leader that 4th ABCT needs as we prepare for the upcoming National Training Center (NTC) rotation and tackle the task of the Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) mission.
Ever since, the U.S. has managed an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) to provide the humanpower to support the interests of the U.S.. In 2001 and 2002 respectively, the U.S. started the War in Afghanistan and the Iraq War. These wars have changed the success of the AVF, testing its effectiveness outside of peacetime. The US military slowly had more trouble recruiting enough volunteers to maintain the force required. In 2008, in order to combat this problem, the Department of Defense (DoD) created a directive that called for a long-term plan to increase the size, roles, and responsibilities of the Reserve Forces component of the military going
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Readiness is of the utmost importance with training being the most significant aspect that contributes to Readiness. Each Soldier needs an individual training plan. The plan should take the Soldier from enlistment to discharge or retirement. It is each Soldiers responsibility to be proficient in their field craft. This includes being fit mentally and physically, and trained to win in a complex world. It is the responsibility of the NCO to train these Soldiers. Unit training plans will address the readiness and resilience of individual Soldiers to ensure their fitness to accomplish their mission. Units must conduct realistic training at the individual, squad, platoon and company levels focused on Mission Essential Tasks (METs) for their
The most difficult barrier to conducting initial individual training is the varying backgrounds of all of the soldiers. In ...
To be considered a professional, in the Army one must exemplify several essential characteristics and qualities. Some of these characteristics are expertise, trust, development, values, and service. These are just a few features that an individual needs; h...
Before I describe to you some of the “routine” and specific situations, investigations, and actual cases and dispositions I encountered I feel I should outline some of the training that that I received starting with the Military Police and Basic Training. Looking back I see the importance of the initial Army training that centered on physical conditioning and the discipline necessary to obey and follow orders to become part of a team. We learned that what was good for one was good for all and of course the reverse. Each morning we stood inspection outside of the barracks with our field packs on. Part of our required equipment during the inspections was a razor. We found out why one morning at the beginning of our training cycle when one of