Operational Design (OD) enables commanders, and their staffs, to solve problems of varying scope and severity at the conceptual level. The elements of OD help provide the framework to guide the operational planning process from understanding the problems sets concerning the operational environment, to shaping coherent and executable courses of actions (COA) for the joint force. In particular, the OD elements of military end state, objectives, and center of gravity (COG), work together to help develop a compelling planning framework by providing the focus of effort towards desired political ends, in which the plan works to achieve. United States (U.S.) historical examples from World War II (WWII) to Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom …show more content…
This key factor helps to synchronize joint players, enhances unity of effort and brings clarity to levels of risk associated with the intended operation. A professional builder would not likely begin planning construction for a home without a clear illustration of the desired end state. It would be similarly foolish for operational planning to develop without a clear picture of a desired military end state that satisfies the conditions for achieving national objectives. Although the desired military end state may be quite similar to broader national strategic objectives, it narrows the focus to more specific criteria and conditions required to help focus the operational planning framework. In recent decades, the (U.S.) has validated the importance of this critical element by clearly defining the end state prior to military commitment, yielding success during Operation Desert Storm, while in contrast, facing challenges associated from an ill-defined desired end-state during Operation Iraqi …show more content…
Military objectives help build the foundation for joint operational planning by identifying crucial goals and objectives necessary to attain the desired end-state. From these aims, planners can determine the necessary tasks in planning to meet national goals, mitigate risk, and establish unity of effort. The formation of objectives also aids in the development of OD as they help articulate what actions to accomplish, and identify the effects that are necessary for success. These goals synchronize the joint planning process in articulating what is required to achieve the end state across all spectrums. Objectives formulate the direction towards the specified aim, guides higher-level goals towards the sought after end-state, articulates and focuses tasks or actions, and enables planners to focus construction of the joint operational planning process. The Allied invasion of North Africa during WWII illustrated the vital link of developing objectives to accomplish a desired military end
Effective planning is impossible without first understanding the problem. Commanders rely on personal observations, experiences, and input from others to develop understanding. They also prioritize information requests and incorporate additional information as those requests are answered. A complete understanding of the problem and environment builds the foundation for the operational process and ...
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
LM06, Strategic Planning Student Guide. (2013). Maxwell-Gunter AFB. Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education (AETC).
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
In late November 2001 Task Force 58 launched from ships off the coast of Pakistan to conduct the longest ranged amphibious assault in history with 403 Marines and Sailors, 4 fast-attack vehicles, and a variety of supporting equipment,. General James N. Mattis successfully accomplished this in large part to the effective execution of mission command. Commanders can utilize mission command as a philosophy or a warfighting function. Mission command as a philosophy is the use of commander's intent and mission orders to empower agile and adaptive leaders. It enables commanders to counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty required to act in a given situation. Commanders build cohesive teams, provide a clear commander's intent and guidance, encourage the use of disciplined initiative, and use mission orders through the operations process to effectively use mission command as a philosophy. Commanders drive this operations process using mission command through six steps. First, they must understand the operational environment and the problem. Second, a commander must visualize his desired end state and operational approach. Third, he must describe that visualization to subordinates using time, space, purpose, and resources. Fourth, commanders must direct forces throughout preparation and execution. Finally, through each of the first four steps, commanders need to lead through purpose and motivation and assess through continuous monitoring and evaluation. General Mattis successfully utilized mission command as a philosophy by understanding, visualizing, leading, describing, and assessing through the operations process as the commander of Naval Task Force 58.
The means to the application of military force must be in line with achieving national objectives.
Leaders today need to have an appreciation for the operation process, understand a situation, envision a desired future, and to lay out an approach that will achieve that future (Flynn & Schrankel, 2013). Plans need to be created that can be modified to changes in any factors considered. However, plans should not be dependent on specific information being precise or that require things to go exactly according to schedule. Instead, the staff NCO should be flexible where they can and always be prepared for the unexpected. Today’s military members are fighting an unconventional war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The enemy constantly changes their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) to counter the United States technological advances, making planning very difficult for leaders. There are multiple tools at a staff NCO’s disposal to try to anticipate an outcome of a current operation, but also assist with the development of concepts in follow-on missions. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is just one tool a staff NCO can utilize. In order to stay ahead of the enemy, create effective plans and orders, it is critical for a staff NCO to assist the commander, and understand that the MDMP and planning are essential in defeating the enemy and conserving the fighting force.
“Operational design is a journey of discovery, not a destination.” Operational design provides a framework, with the guidance of the Joint Force Commander (JFC), that staffs and planning groups can use to give political leaders, commanders, and warfighters a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the problems and objectives for which military forces will be committed, or are planned to be committed. Furthermore, operational design supports commanders and planners to make sense of complicated operational environments (often with ill-structured or wicked problems), helps to analyze wicked problem, and devise an operational approach to solve the problem in the context of the operational environment.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Current military leadership should comprehend the nature of war in which they are engaged within a given political frame in order to develop plans that are coherent with the desired political end state. According to Clausewitz, war is an act of politics that forces an enemy to comply with certain conditions or to destroy him through the use of violence. A nation determines its vital interests, which drives national strategy to obtain or protect those interests. A country achieves those goals though the execution of one of the four elements of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economical means. The use of military force...
Current guidance direct from the GEF/JSCP sets forth six specific areas in which a TCP must address. These requirements help the GCC staff develop their approach to the AOR. First, staffs must build a comprehensive theatre assessment that paints a clear picture of the current environment. Critical to this assessment is the identification of risks as they will keep playing moving forward and seek to mitigate future risks. Second, and only after a clear picture is painted for the commander, a mission statement will be published that provides detailed information on “what” will be achieved in the AOR. Thirdly, comes a posture plan which includes both technical and tactical information on “how” the mission statement will be achieved. Next,
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
In every organization, different operational functions exist to ensure the smooth learning of the organization. In order for an individual to have the knowhow on how to operate the functions delegated to them they must have implicit knowledge on the functionalities themselves. Understanding markets, customers and the company goals has always proven to be a core starting point for individuals who ply their trade in the organization. The essence of the skills is evident in globalization, cooperate social responsibility and risk management issues. In operations management, the basic principles of operations should be followed to ensure that the profitability of the organization ensures the operation of the organization is