General Blaskowitz, the Army Group G Commander’s assigned objective was to maintain possession of the Southern coast of France at all costs. The ability to counter the threat of an Allied invasion of Southern France would require reinforcement and fortification of Army Group G units, which, together, constituted the German Center of Gravity in the Southern France Theater of Operations. Army Group G’s leadership attempted to accomplish this task in a number of ways:
The factor of Force bore heavily on the German defensive capabilities. The demands of Operation OVERLORD created significant shortfalls in terms of unit strength, force structure, combat power and overall readiness among Army Group G units. Prior to OVERLORD, Army Group G maintained a relatively well-balanced force. However, shortages in manpower and sustainment degraded functional areas and compounded challenges in command and control, logistical support and intelligence management. Inadequate management of essential operational functions challenged Army Group G’s ability to achieve its assigned objective.
Army Group G attempted to supplement shortfalls in the Factor of Force with alternate, even foreign sources of Force. For example, in order to beef up unit strength, the Germans maintained Ost Forces. However, Ost Forces comprised non-German conscripts and volunteers of questionable overall quality. Furthermore, they were fielded as separate units when they may have been more effective had they been integrated with the regular German units. This also raises the question of Unity of Command, as a number of Ost Forces were also not under the direct command of Army Group G and appear to have been seen as “outsiders,” thereby undermining Unity of Effort. ...
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...ivities and presence with overwhelming conventional force. Although successful in driving the FFI out of the Rhone Valley, the mismatch between German Forces and FFI guerillas exposed vulnerabilities in the German army and resulted in the frittering away of elements of Force as attempts to contain the FFI involved shifting manpower resources away from the fight and into base security.
Ultimately, Army Group G was unable to take advantage of the factor of Space provided by concentrating forces in the Toulon-Marseille region. For example, as reports of the invasion began to filter in to the Nineteenth Army, comms were interrupted by cut telephone lines. As a result, leadership lost the ability to make important tactical decisions and inform the strategic chain of command. These developments offset the Space-Force advantages the Germans had hoped to gain.
One of Currie’s most impressive and important achievements had come during the winter or 1919-17, while he was still a divisional commander. By analyzing the fighting he had witnessed on the Western Front, Currie had drawn up what proved to be a blueprint for tactical success. In a paper, Currie synthesized the best of British and French concepts, and with many of his own beliefs based on personal experience. Under Sir Arthur Currie, the Canadian Corps emerged as an outstanding formation on the ...
The United States Army has been a leader in military prowess on the world stage since its inception in 1775, and with such a record, it is reasonably assumed that there must be solid foundation within the organization working to maintain the high level of performance. The Noncommissioned Officer Corps is one institution within the Army that serves as a large portion of this foundation that makes it the fighting force that it has always been, and the noncommissioned officers have been an integral piece since the very inception of the Army. The Prussian General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, organizer of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps, encapsulated this idea when he coined the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the backbone of the Army. (Arms, 1991) In an Army that is continuously adjusting to world around it while maintaining its status as the military leader to all other nations, the Noncommissioned Officer Corps has always provided the platform for continuity through a growing rank system based on its original core, an evolving training program to develop effective leaders, and a creed that moves us forward while remembering the rich history of the corps that came before us.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Cameron, R. S. (2003). The army vision: The 4th AD in world war II. Military Review, 83(6), 59-68
At the same time, the SOF units were diligently working with the Northern Alliance and local fighters to gain trust and also train them for future battles.... ... middle of paper ... ... 2 Colonel John T. Carney Jr., No Room for Error, 277.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
...portant before engaging in any warfare. The team should plan well on how to engage the enemy and adhere to the plan unless an unprecedented occurrence takes place; the team should also consider a plan B. Thirdly, apart from physical warfare, the mental warfare can be used to convey a message that affects the confidence of the enemy negatively. The First Special forces adopted a strategy of scaring away the Germans using stickers with threatening messages; the color of their faces was also scary and facilitated in camouflaging. Fourthly, military concepts should never be made public, the adoption of the force was a big secret but the success was tremendous. Lastly, coordination and a good chain of command is key in conquering in any battle. Without proper coordination an army can be destabilized by the enemy, however, proper chain of command guarantees performance.
war went on, was that of encouraging at least some degree L&LL. At the same time they stoically maintained a toecap-to-toecap confrontation with the German Army whilst periodically energetically pursuing the High Command’s policy of continuous offensive action. This meant that when the German High Command in 1918 finally felt obliged by external factors to take the great gamble of their last great offensive on the Western Front, the German Army suffered increasingly unsustainable levels of attrition to their armies. Secondly, by thus steadfastly holding the Germans and their allies at bay in the trenches, the trench fighters enabled the twin pressures of the Allied land and sea blockade, and the failure of German State’s domestic production, to squeeze the fighting heart out the German nation and its autocratic rulers.
Early in the operations Alexander’s vague commander’s intent encouraged Patton to develop an independent understanding, different from Alexander’s, to the point that he assumed he would push north, beyond phase line blue, along with Montgomery to protect his flank all the way to Messina. (site) Mission Command crises culminated when General Alexander shifted the boundaries between the 7th and 8th Armies.(site) Alexander made his decision based on lack of trust in the 7th Army and his own clouded commander’s intent and incomplete understanding of the follow-on effects of a quick capture of Messina. His decision denied the Allies an opportunity to execute a quick breakout through the Axis defenses. But more importantly, it motivated General Patton to abandon his disciplined initiative and ignored Alexander’s directive to push north to protect Montgomery’s flank. Instead, he drove to Palermo seeking to reclaim this army’s prestige and later with a secure port of Palermo beat Montgomery to Messina. (site) The Allies’ poor foundation of Mission Command delayed a promising advance and replaced it with a rogue commander this allowed the German General Hube, a very competent combatant, time to concentrate and consolidate his forces to stiffen his defensive positions to delay the Allies until he was able to evacuate the bulk of his forces
To write this book the author, John Toland, had to devote 15 years researching different stories from all sides of the war. He studied war memoirs, interviewed war veterans, and read military documents. While doing this he focused on both the allied and axis forces to truly understand both sides of the story and be able to write such a descriptive and accurate piece of work. This research was used in the book to describe the unlikely victory of the Americans over the Germans during the “Battle of the Bulge”.
Field, Frank. British and French Operations of the First World War. Cambridge (England); New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
... many French commanders not even knowing where their own subordinate units were located.11 The French placed their defense in old, outdated tactics of static warfare. Gone were the days of two sides slugging it out against prepared reinforced defense structures. Closely integrating concentrated armor, infantry, and closely supported by aviation assets all combined to crush France in a matter of only six weeks. France was simply not prepared for this new age of warfare.
It began to emerge the differences in tactics. The question was whether to continue so far the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Forces Europe, General Eisenhower’s tactics attacking on a broad front, or due to problems of supply to take just one mighty blow. In that period Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery developed a new operation plan, which would include the use of 1st Airborne Army (Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton), actually 1st Airborne Corps (Lieutenant General Frederick Browning). The Corps comprised of 82nd US Airborne Division (Brigadier General James M. Gavin), 101st US Airborne Division (Major General Maxwell D. Taylor), and 1st British Airborne Division (Major General Robert “Roy” E. Urquhart) supported with, under his command, 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade (Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski). These units should be dropped along the roa...
A defined chain of command with equal representation from all the armed services coupled with standardized clear communication and training throughout the branches, results in an elite fighting force with endless capabilities. Efficiency is the major goal behind Joint Warfare and so long as the clear channels of communication throughout the services hold true, this goal is attainable. This efficiency, though almost impossible to fully achieve, was seen during Desert Storm. During the Desert Storm campaign, General Schwarztkopf was Commander and Chief of US Central Command (USCINCCENT). His first order of business was to name component commanders.
Valour was of many importance to the Germans in the field of battle. When battles were