No Universal Truth

No Universal Truth

Hume wrote, “be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man,” (qtd. in Jones 351). This statement strikes me more than all others, written by Hume or any of the philosophers from W. T. Jones’ Hobbes to Hume. It demonstrates to me that even after all of the inquisition towards what and how we can know anything, and the very methodical ways in which Hume is reputed to examine these things, he realizes that nothing is truly certain and begins to lean towards a pragmatic and radically empirical point of view. It is, therefore, also my conclusion that, as much as we may aspire to find the universal, indubitable, and objective truth, none of it can be proven to be universal, indubitable, and objective.

In support of this view—the “abandonment of the quest for certainty, acceptance of provisional solutions as long as they work, and readiness to discard them when changing conditions make them no longer appropriate”—I will endeavor to briefly examine substance, the self, and the presumed necessary connection of ideas or events (Jones 349).

By applying his own empirical criterion of meaning to the examination of such a notably philosophical concept as substance, Hume flat out disposes of the entire notion itself. As has been formerly introduced by Descartes, substance is a fluctuating thing that takes on the same meaning as is best described by that certain je ne sais quoi. It is that certain something you just can’t put your finger on, and “by substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist,“ (qtd. in Jones 174-175). Descartes naturally takes this thing to be God, but never questions the meaning of God or substance a...

... middle of paper ...

... and finally removes reasons for the existence of any connection between any of the ideas which we as a species have always held as being related. Hume also refutes any reason to believe in the existence of an external world, or a world without us, which has not been discussed here. In the end, there is really no reason to believe in the existence of existence, if Hume’s deductions are to be taken quite so seriously. Of course, if that were to be done, none could live as they do.

Since Hume himself is concerned with a philosophy that concerns the everyday individual, not even he can truly accept that nothing exists. It is when he reaches this point himself that he realizes one can “be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man,” (qtd. in Jones 351).

Works Cited

Jones, W. T. Hobbes to Hume. 2nd edition. Fort Worth: Harcourt, 1980.