The Complexity of Nixon’s Opening of China
Anthony Bushong
Professor Deborah Larson
TA: Galen Jackson
Political Science 189 HC
21st of March 2014
Introduction
In 1972, President Richard Nixon was quoted as stating that his visit to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) “changed the world…to build a bridge across sixteen thousand miles and twenty-two years of hostilities.” By meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing, Nixon took groundbreaking first steps to opening relations and formally recognizing the People’s Republic of China. The history of the aforementioned hostilities between the United States and the PRC dates back to the Chinese Communist Party’s takeover of mainland China following its civil war in the post-World War II era. When the PRC was formally proclaimed in 1949 towards the close of the Chinese Civil War, the United States decided against recognizing its establishment and instead chose to back Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China. This decision was a product of its political environment, as President Harry Truman had just established the Truman Doctrine, which sought to check presumed Communist and Soviet aims to expand. In order to remain consistent and credible with its containment policy, a precedent was set and relations between the United States and the PRC remained closed. Tensions were only exacerbated during the Korean War in the 1950’s as the PRC intervened on behalf of the North Koreans and during the War in Vietnam in the 1970’s in their support of the North Vietnamese. Thus it is understandable that to the public eye, Nixon’s meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972 seemed to come out of the blue and was difficult to interpret given the context of Sino-US relations in the two deca...
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...threat to American interests. Prior to Kissinger’s heavy involvement in Chinese international relations, his specialty was Soviet policy and was in the midst of working on his policy known as détente, which reflects a general movement of slowly easing tensions. At first, Kissinger was hesitant when approached regarding an opening of relations of China, knowing that it would anger the Soviets and potentially disrupt his policy. Nevertheless, upon visiting his mentor, Kissinger came to the realization that “when you have two enemies, you help the lesser one.” Nevertheless, it became clear that détente and using China as a power check on the Soviets did not have to be discordant aims, as détente focused on an effort to “contain” the Soviets and thus, a visit to China fit right into the plan.
This is not to say that other efforts were not already being made to
On January 20, 1969, Richard Milhouse Nixon became the 37th president of the United States and faced great challenges at home and on the world front . Richard Nixon selected Henry Kissinger to be his assistant for National Security Affairs. Under their control for the next 6 years, they oversaw the formation of détente and the creation of Triangular Diplomacy. The Nixon-Kissinger strategy in approaching the Soviet Union was full of contradictions and risks. One of the most severe and most notable risks was the potential preemptive nuclear strike that the Soviets were threatening to take against China; an attempt by the Soviets to bully the Chinese into negotiating the Sino-Soviet border. Becoming involved in the Soviet affairs was very dangerous, because as Kissinger observed, the balance of power due to missile strength was shifting from the United States holding the upper hand to that of the Soviets being in control . Kissinger, upon realization of this fact, ...
During Nixon’s presidency, Communism was the number one threat, so for Nixon to open trade with Communist People’s Republic of China was an enormous success. In 1972 Nixon was the first U.S. president to visit the People’s Republic of China (http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/nixon-foreignpolicy). After China was attacked by Japan in 1895, all the powerful European countries wanted to divide up China to keep China safe from Japan and also to have the ability to control the goods coming out of their part of China. America did not want that, so they established the Open Door Policy with China which gave every country equal trading rights with China to keep China safe from the other countries who want a chance to extort China (http://www.americaslibrary.gov/jb/modern/jb_modern_nixchina_1.html). Nixon’s trip to China was to get China to trade with America, which at the time...
This essay will examine the three factors thematically, and in each factor, it will follow a chronology order. In the first part of the essay, it will discuss Canada’s political consideration in recognition China when taking the U.S. influence and the change of international atmosphere into account. Canada’s willingness in achieving an independent foreign policy led to its formal relations establishment with China in the early 1970s. Then it will discuss how the Chinese human rig...
One must wonder; what was Kissinger’s motive? Being pushed by “his boss” President Nixon to prevent communism in Chile at all costs is apparent, as is his friendly relationship with Pinochet that he developed. “I want to see our relations and friendship improve,” Kissinger states in a memoir to Pinochet during his trip to Chile that was intended to speak about human rights concerns (Kornbluh 1999; page 5). But what was truly the underlining motivation that caused Kissinger to risk his job and reputation to keep Pinochet in power? Could it simply be a lack of sympathy? Or was Kissinger just overly fanatical about stopping the spread of Communism?
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A few years before the conflict in Korea, US President Truman set forth an international policy known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine stated that the United States would aid countries that were fighting communist takeover. Combined with the ideological differences between the US and the USSR, the Soviet Union’s development of an atomic bomb pushed tensions past the breaking point, moving both countries into an arms race during which each attempted to amass more weapons than the other nation. Around the same time, over in Asia, the Communist Party banished Chinese Nationalists, the local democratic party, and began taking hold under Mao Zedong. This sparked fear within the Americans, for China was a large, influential country in Asia; Americans began to believe that China’s communistic society would influence its smaller surrounding countries to adopt communism as well. That series of events, along with the perceived threat of communism spreading, led to a tim...
As two historical giants, Stalin and Mao Ze-dong must be involved at the mere mention of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The relation between the two states leaders draws the outline of the basic structure of Sino-Soviet relations. In the memory of the generation of 1950s to 1970s, there usually five portraits were hung in public, which were Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Mao Ze-dong, even in Tian An Men’s lobby, as the leaders of International Communist Movement and the greatest teachers of the revolution. To be honest, for the generation of 1950s to 1970s, Marx, Engels and Lenin could be ‘deity’ who were in the distance, but Stalin and Mao were alive in the same world, and they were real mentors. Both of them were the revolutionary leaders, and both had distinct characters, as same as common, both men own the merits, the weaknesses, the temper and the natural instincts. During the long-term contact between Stalin and Mao, they left many fascinating stories, and numerous profound lessons. With the same communism belief, Stalin helped Mao fight for sovereignty in China, and provided actively various kinds of weapons, such as canons, tanks, rifles and machine guns, and tried to give useful idea and constructive advice. Two such extraordinary person met, friendship developed with contradiction. They were communists, and also they were leaders of different countries. As leaders of distinct sovereignty states, Stalin and Mao usually care much about their countries’ interests. In other words, Stalin and Mao were strategic partners. After Stalin was attacked in the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mao talked about repeatedly that Stalin tricked China four times and forbade Ma...
On June 4th 1989, the People’s Republic of China shocked the world when Deng Xiaoping, then the “paramount leader” of the CCP-controlled state, ordered the massacre of thousands of protesters demonstrating for greater freedoms in Tiananmen Square. Deng Xiaoping and Premier of the State Council, Li Peng, defended the hardlined action by considering the protests, a threat to the political order and stability of the nation. The international response to the incident was largely condemning; the forty-sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights found the CCP’s quelling of the demonstration to be a massive violation of human rights and many nations followed suit with economically and diplomatically punishing policies. The United States, under President George H.W. Bush, sought to suspend military technology exchange contracts with the PRC and leveraged its weight at the international level to impose lending penalties through the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The CCP’s supposed violation of human rights had dire politico-economic consequences, resulting in the rise of Chinese defense spending from 8.6% to 15.5% and a half-billion dollar fall in tourism revenue. Through the example of the Tiananmen Square incident, one can see how the PRC’s use of its domestic security apparatus, the force behind the CCP’s internal stability measures, can challenge international human rights standards set forth by Human Rights Organizations and affect Sino-American diplomatic and economic relations accordingly. Throughout this research paper, I will speci...
Nathan, Andrew J. "U.S.-China Relations Since 1949." U.S.-China Relations Since 1949 | Asia for Educators | Columbia University. Columbia University, 2009. Web. 26 May 2014.
Who is Henry Kissinger? Is he as Jussi Hanhamaki terms him “Dr. Kissinger” (the prince of realpolitik who put his remarkable insights to the service of a nation in deep trouble) or “Mr. Henry” (the power-hungry, bureaucratic schemer bent on self-aggrandizement)? This dichotomy is not the only one that exists when discussing Henry Kissinger. Stephen Graubard, Gregory Cleva, Walter Issacson and Jussi Hanhimäki have all written works that view Kissinger differently. Some of the differences are slight and all four sometimes agree but the best interpretation of Kissinger lies in viewing him through a lens of historical context. This view produces the image of Kissinger as realist who ultimately failed to account for the changing forces in foreign policy, ultimately this leads to his estimation as an architect of American foreign policy whose flaws kept him from realizing the paradigm he established of triangular diplomacy and détente would fail in many parts of the world.
Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were fully aware of the reality and “waged” détente vigorously to gain advantage in the global competition with the Soviet Union. They did not acknowledge the fact, however, and could not control conflicting public reaction when the Soviet leaders desired to do the same, both by intervening in the third world and by keeping up the arms race. Blame was associated not only to the Soviet leaders but also to the policy of détente, especially in the Ford and Carter
To sum up, the future trend of the Sino-US relation is to cooperate through competition, which is the “competitive coexistence”. China is growing, which is the reality that the U.S has to accept, and the interdependence between China and the U.S is stronger than ever before both politically and economically. Therefore, just as Robert (2013) pointed out in his article “the explore of a new type of great-power relationship would not only help the most two powerful countries to avoid the Thucydides trap, but also allow the world to become more vibrant and invigorated”. In other words, cooperate bring more benefits to the U.S. rather than compete with the rising China.
...9 due to the Soviet agenda of pushing for an agreement of principles or a non-aggression pact while the PRC denies the substance of these concessions by stating nothing can be accomplished until the border dispute is solved. Meanwhile, both countries were disturbed by the other’s relationship with the United States: the Soviet Union with Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and China with the developing détente fueled by the Soviet-American Salt I accords. Additionally, the North Vietnamese victory against the democratic West in the Vietnam War, while being a great victory for the communist world, caused a further rift in Sino-Soviet relations as this historically anti-Chinese region appeased to the Soviets. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty and the 1979 invasion of Vietnam and Afghanistan by China and the Soviet Union respectively, opened the Sino-Soviet gap even wider.
It is difficult to conclude anything other than that the alliance between the PRC and the Soviet Union was chiefly born out of necessity. Certainly, the common ideology and revolutionary nature of the CCP allowed for a collective understanding that sometimes amalgamated into shared objectives. Even so, PRC actions suggest an appeasement rather than a genuine alignment with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Beijing and Moscow appear reluctant allies, with a hint of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to their alliance – each, though particularly the PRC, facing deleterious consequences by pursuing an independent path.In cooperating, the PRC were able to build their state and counterbalancing the perceived US threat.
In order to have a better understanding about the conflict of Tiananmen and its influence on further American relations with People’s Republic of China, this paper gives a short background of the bilateral relations until 1990. Historically, the United States and China did not have good relations due to the political regime of China. In addition, China was not that developed economically to have trade or any kinds of relations with the US. According to some historical data, the first China-US negotiations at the ambassadorial level started on August 1, 1955. The bilateral relations of America and China consist of several stages. The first stage of the US-Chinese relations started in 1971 when both opened their doors to financial and economic ties. The trading volume of these countries stood at US$ 4...