Deontology can be looked at as a generally flexible moral theory that allows for self-interpretation but like all others theories studied thus far, there are arguments one can make against its reasoning. One objection to deontological moral theory is that the theory yields only absolutes and cannot always justify its standpoints. Actions are either classified as right or wrong with no allowance for a gray area. Furthermore, the strict guidelines tend to conflict with commonly accepted actions. For example, lying is always considered morally wrong--even a “white lie.” Therefore, one must not lie even if it does more good.
The Distance Between Morality and Luck In the moral realm, I tend to align my intuitions with Kantian morality, forming a very strict interpretation of those actions which carry moral worth. As one who believes that the world is not governed by determinism, I place a great deal of emphasis on moral evaluation. This is why I find Nagel’s Moral Luck article so troubling. Nagel describes a concept which, if accurate, completely undercuts our conception of morality, disabling the ability to apply moral worth to decisions. I find, however, that one can tackle his dilemma and reveal holes in his argument in a manner that would allow us to uphold the concept of morality and moral evaluation in the world.
This paper seeks to bring the timely issue of absolute freedom and the possibility of its total realization back into ethical-political discussion. Through a close comparison of the theories of Fichte and Hegel via a critique of the former by the latter, I show that the antidote to many of our political, moral and theological distresses may well be found in Hegel’s concept of the State and Sittlichkeit-i.e., truly understood as the realization of absolute freedom, or the "We that is I." In the wake of the postmodernist onslaught one thing is certain: morality is in crisis. Where are we to look for answers? Perhaps to the German idealists.—That is, to their bold synthesis of right and freedom.
I begin by describing the Hickean account of religious pluralism. Essentially Hick aims to explain religious plurality through the shared salvific experiences and values of the Real. I then give Hick’s conception of what the Real is and how it relates to major religions. Hickean religious pluralism faces what I consider to be fatal criticisms with regards to the nature of the Real, the result is that either the Real is contradictory or fails in its explanatory value. I, therefore, conclude that Hickean religious pluralism is not a plausible philosophical position.
It has been presented in the last chapter that the important feature of modest classic moral intuitionism is the idea that self-evident moral beliefs are not justified only by intuition; rather there are other equal ways of justifications for them. Moreover, some moral intuitions and basic moral beliefs are defeasible in a way that t... ... middle of paper ... ...n sufficient mental maturity. It is obvious that reflection and mental maturity are matter of degree and for further reflection sometimes even we need to draw an inference. Moreover, recall that being a self-evident proposition does not mean that it is obvious to everyone. Some self-evident propositions may need lots of reflection for understanding them.
SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd; in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ... middle of paper ... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats "Why should I be moral?" as something more complicated than a request for a reason.
The particularist and the generalist both think that the perfectly moral person is one who is aware of the moral reasons present in a situation. However, the particularist has a different view of what it means to be aware of these reasons. The particularist’s view is one that takes moral reasons to operate in the same way that other or more ordinary reasons of action function (Dancy, Jonathan). The particularist believes in variability. This means that the particularist doesn’t believe that we are required to apply our principles consistently or apply the same principle to similar cases.
Specifically, a fundamental distinction is made between the universal and the individual. To the universal he attaches "healthy common sense" and "rationality"(Nietzsche, p.130). Although these may sound like desirable elements of human nature, Nietzsche argues that they are to be regarded as oppressive. From his perspective they restrict individualism. Nietzsche supports this claim by maintaining that people in the universal submit to a "law of agreement"(Nietzsche, p.130).
The main issue with these objections seems to be that Kant's theory breaks down to some extent in certain situations. However, it becomes possible that by further analyzing the situation at hand, certain allowances can be made. Perhaps then the most convincing argument for the theory is that on a day-to-day basis. Kantian Ethics provides a method for deciding the best and most moral course of action. Perhaps this is the purpose of moral theory in the first place.
His view of highest moral order may be something that looks to be inaccessible but it is definitely something that people should operate by even when they become hopeless or as Kant puts it, “overclouded by the sorrows of his own”. The standard that Kant sets in his Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals should be one that society follows when Works Cited Immanuel Kant - Groundwork for the metaphysics of Morals