My purpose in this essay is to explain and discuss the importance of the “moral twin earth” argument. This theory focuses on the argument first proposed by Hare, which states that in order to have a genuine moral disagreement there needs to be a common understanding of the concept in question. This theory holds importance because it openly refutes Cornell realism, which denies that moral terms, like ‘right’, are synonymous to any non-moral terms that may be part of the properties that ‘right’ picks out; the properties that are attached to moral terms, like ‘right’ are responsible for their usage. Thus, the goal is to show how the “moral twin earth” argument undermines the idea that moral terms refer to some natural properties of actions, which in turn regulate our moral practices.
The “moral twin earth” thought experiment says that we are to imagine that all Earth human species uses of the word ‘good’ (‘good-E’) entail the natural property, which makes things ‘good’ according to a normative consequentialist theory, let’s say the theory of maximizing happiness. The Earth human species would adopt any moral theory that allowed maximizing happiness as good-making.
Next, imagine that in a separate galaxy there exists a land, Moral Twin Earth. Moral twin Earth is so close to being identical to Earth; the species of twin Earth speak a language that is linguistically and semantically identical to the one Earth species speak, English. Additionally and most importantly, moral terms like ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ have the same functional properties that they do on Earth. (Horgan & Timmons 1992) The twins use these moral terms to figure out certain actions. For instance, they try to do things to which they apply ‘good’; and th...
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... rise to the Open-Question Argument again. The moral terms ‘good’ on Earth and on twin Earth will be regulated by a certain natural property, but one can always question whether that term is actually good. It is an open question whether maximizing happiness is good or whether is it good to maximize happiness. If property identity does not require synonymy, then it is fair to say that moral terms fail to refer to natural properties. The reference of some terms is not determined by a description or concept with which they are associated.
Works Cited
Horgan, T., & Timmons, M. (1992). Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness
Revived. Synthese, 2, 221-260.
Merli, David., (2002). Return to Moral Twin Earth. Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
32, 207-240.
Rubin, M. (2013). Biting the Bullet on Moral Twin Earth. The University of Western Australia, Australia.
Rossian Pluralism claims that there are multiple things that we have basic, intrinsic moral reason to do, which he names as the prima facie duties. These duties are not real, obligatory duties that one must follow under all circumstances, but are “conditional duties” (Ross 754) that one should decide to follow or reject upon reflection of their circumstances. This moral theory has faced criticisms, most strongly in the form of the problem of trade-offs. However, I will demonstrate that the problem of trade-offs is an issue that can be neglected as a valid objection to Rossian Pluralism because it is applicable to other theories as well and it is a factor that makes a moral theory more valuable than not.
In John Ludwig Mackie’s book Inventing Right and Wrong, he claims that “in making moral judgments we are pointing to something objectively prescriptive, but that these judgments are all false”. By saying this, he supports his main point that there are no objective values. However, John McDowell will be against Mackie’s argument, for he suggests that besides primary qualities, there are also secondary qualities that can be objective. I hold the same viewpoint as McDowell’s. In this essay, I will firstly explain Mackie’s argument, then illustrate McDowell’s objections, and finally explore some potential responses by Mackie.
Mere Christianity is divided into four books or sections that build and expand off of the prior. The first book is entitled “Right and wrong as a clue to the meaning of the universe” and he examines the common understanding among all men of a universal moral law hardwired in the minds of men. He begins this examination with a presentation of man’s concept of right and wrong. The simplest understanding among all men is the concept of fairness. This fair play points to a law and can be seen in the reactions of mankind to justice and injustice. He contrasts this moral law, the Law of Human Nature, with the law of nature found in the world. The mind of the moral relativist denies such standards yet fail to recognize their call for fairness as a fatal flaw in their reasoning.
That morality is not relative, Rachel argues, “ Claims made by its proponents go beyond what the facts or arguments can establish”. She argues that we do not need morality because of culture differences and values based on where we are. Also talks about what can be learned from relativism and states that because of it morality is not needed and know what to do based on their moral codes.
The purpose of this essay is to elaborate on John Ludwig Mackie’s argument that all moral judgments are false considering they presuppose moral objectivity which is itself inaccurate. To do so, I shall explain Mackie’s reasoning as to why the belief that moral values are objective was founded, and clarify Mackie’s arguments for why such an idea is misleading. Furthermore, I shall demonstrate how John McDowell’s color analogy can successfully prove Mackie wrong. The argument of this essay will establish that Mackie is immune to the idea of moral objectivity for he finds it queer and unsupportive of the relativity shown throughout the world. However, Mackie fails to acknowledge that properties that are dependent on
Recent literature has aimed to reconcile the content of Kant and Aristotle’s work on morality, or at least, to compare the theories as though they are contending. However, I shall argue that the two philosophers are answering intrinsically different questions. If two philosophers operate within a precise domain of philosophy, it can be tempting to assess their distinct arguments as disagreeable with the other. However, in some cases, their arguments may be aimed at responding to different questions. In such instances, endeavors to reconcile or compare the fabricated ‘opposition’ between two arguments can be unproductive and perplexing, ...
Humanity is taught to be moral, to do good and avoid evil. However those lessons become foolish when we ask what is morality, the thing that we are told to achieve. For many morality is doing what is good and doing good is moral. This roundabout answer may be satisfactory to some that only look at the surface of the issue, however once the digging begins the grad question of morality comes into question. While this question has been looked an infinite number of times without being universally solved certain patterns have been made in the conclusions great thinkers and scholars come to regarding morality. One of these particular ideas involves a rationalist perspective that rationality defines morality or that moral failings imply rational failings. This concept is supported by Shafer-Landau and Korsgaard while thinkers like Williams and Foot disagree with such a claim. It should be understood that morality and rationality are intertwined were a moral failing correlates with a rational failing.
Perhaps the most important question moral philosophy can ask is: who or what is entitled to moral rights? When we discuss differing moral philosophies such as utilitarianism or deontology we do so with the underlying assumption that human beings are centric to the moral code. Should we assume this? Historically speaking humans have only been present on this planet for 100,000 years. The planet itself has been around 4.6 billion years, so the environment and animal life existed long before intelligent human life emerged. Why then, is morality generally accepted to be applied solely to humans? To answer this question I intend to discuss some of the basic tenets of morality, such as the moral community. What does membership in the moral community entail? Does not being a contributing member to the moral community mean that you are not entitled to moral consideration? The way humans deal with the topics of animal rights and environmentalism hinge upon the answer to these questions.
In this paper, I examine the connection between judgments of fact and moral judgments in an attempt to discern whether moral judgments are simply a subset of judgments of fact. I will look mostly at an argument posed by many moral realists that takes moral facts to be “supervenient natural facts which are independent of our theorizing about them”1 and in which moral judgments are determined by objective facts which relate to human flourishing or pleasure and pain. I will also, though, take a look at the fact/value gap and determine the effect on the connection between moral judgments and judgments of fact of an attempt to close this gap.
Through an understanding of natural selection, I have come to accept that all creatures currently in existence are equal. However, for the purposes of this paper, I am limiting my question to the relevance of equality for human beings. I am narrowing my categories because morality is a human created concept couched in language, the use of which differentiates humans from other organisms. Dennett claims:
1. First, the concepts of good and morality exist. The very existence of the idea of good argues for something in human society that is different than the bunnies and the wolves. "Nature" is amoral; the bunnies do not protest the fact that wolves eat them. There is no notion, outside of Bambi, that the animals consider some of themselves good and some bad. Thus, the nature of humanity is somehow different than other creatures. Somehow we know that certain principles and actions are "good" and acceptable, rather than simply necessary for existence. We contemplate the abstract thought of moral principle itself, and the universality of such an idea. All human cultures do not have exactly the same moral codes, but all cultures have a moral code. This concept of the nature of humanity argues for a code of morality that fits all people; we seek it, we believe it, we feel that we need it.
We need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined?. [What if] morality itself were to blame if man, as a species, never reached his highest potential power and splendour? [GM P 6]
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.
In God and Objective morality: A debate, Craig interprets the objective morality and states that the existence of God is the only foundation of objective morality. My purpose of this paper is to argue against Craig’s argument. My thesis is objective morality does exist in society to both theists and atheist, and the foundation of the moral value to individuals does not have to be God. For an atheist, God is also an abstract and not reliable foundation. Social harmony is the general foundation of moral value in modern society, and it is objective without the existence of God. In §1, I present the Craig’s argument and explain the motivation of each premise. §2, I present my critique and show that Craig’s argument fails. In §3, I defend against possible rebuttal.
In his essay, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,” James Rachels argues that cultural relativism is an unsatisfactory moral theory because it is based upon an invalid argument, if cultural relativism were true, this would have some troubling and implausible consequences, and there are some moral rules common to all societies. In this short paper, I will argue that moral objectivism is a more satisfactory moral theory than ethical relativism.