United States Armed Forces were able to accomplish their mission during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, there were quite a few deficiencies in the conduct of the first joint operation since Viet Nam. This paper will evaluate command and control during the operation using the attributes of commander’s intent, mutual trust and understanding. It will also evaluate the joint functions of intelligence, protection and fires.
Commander’s intent establishes a clear and concise expression of the operation and the desired end state. This intent binds understanding, the mission, and the direction to subordinate elements.
Although the invasion of Grenada was a success, there were problems with the commander’s intent. Since the contingency operation had a very short planning timeline, it appears elements of the commander’s intent were not clear. During the planning process, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was unable to design a suitable concept for the joint operation. Stewart postulated that the Command was neither trained nor manned to mount this type of operation as the Command’s main focus was to reinforce Europe after a Soviet attack.
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...
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...AQ&usg=AFQjCNFIz4HQNnSs6HZIQunxtZDCoxiIRw (accessed December 24, 2013), p. 5.
Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008), 32.
Ibid, 33-34.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 34-35.
Ibid, 34.
Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper”
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
Ibid, III-20.
Ibid, III-21.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 32.
Ibid, 15.
Joint Operations, III-29-30.
Ibid, III-32.
Joint Operations, III-22.
Ibid, III-24.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 22.
Ibid, 24.
COL Prescott’s role in the Battle of Bunker Hill, or more correctly know as the Battle of Breed’s Hill, is a great example of how to properly execute mission command. An overview from The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Moncure) reveals a number of operation and strategic objectives that the American militia had to consider. In this instance, COL Prescott takes charge of 1200 men with instructions to defend against incoming British forces that were seeking to occupy the surrounding hills during the Siege of Boston campaign. COL Prescott utilized a variety of steps in the operations process that contributed to his expert utilization of mission command over his forces. Through various sources from published works by experts on the subject, COL Prescott’s mission command demonstrates its effectiveness in his understanding of the situation against the British, his visualization to create an end state for t...
Bombs At Bikini the official report of Operation Crossroads written by W. A. Shurcliff historian of Joint Task Force One
Commanders must be able to describe their operation visualization to staffs and subordinates. It fosters a working relationship and a shared understanding of the situation, mission and intent. Without description of mission command from the commander, a unit may not be able to accomplish their task or mission.
“Operation Rolling Thunder.” Military Analysis Network. 1998. Federation of American Scientists. 20 Dec. 2003< http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/rolling_thunder.htm>.
Mission command is the commander's use of authority and direction to empower adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations. It helps subordinates exercise disciplined initiative when operating within their commander’s intent. To facilitate effective mission command, commanders must accomplish four consecutive stages of the operations process. They must thoroughly understand the problem, visualize a solution that achieves a desired end state, and then accurately describe this visualization in order to direct the organization. Commanders continually lead and assess their organizations and provide input and influence to their subordinates and staff.
Amid the snow-covered hills in the tiny village of Chipyong-Ni, Korea, a battle ridden 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division made a decisive stand from February 13-15, 1951 that would lead to the first operational win against a much stronger and larger force. In what some considered being the Gettysburg of the Korean War, the Battle of Chipyong-Ni was a bitterly contested engagement between the X Corp, 23rd Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, under the command of COL. Paul Freeman the North Korean People’s Army and the Chinese Communist Forces’ (CCF). This analysis will demonstrate that COL Paul Freemans’ ability to properly use mission command ultimately led to the first operational defeat of the enemy since the Korean War had started.
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
Air Force Special Operations The United States of America is a powerful and well known force throughout the world. It has become a superpower of nations in just about three hundred years, being one of the newest nations in existence today. Its military reaches out into several countries in the globe and holds a presence as a peacekeeper and wielder of democracy. Of the US military’s five branches, the Air Force is the ruler of the skies, keeping control of the earth’s aerospace. Without the Air Force Special Operations, the military could not complete operations as effectively or efficiently as it potentially could.
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
The commander’s intent is a critical part of mission command. The commander, through the commander’s intent, must blend the art of command and the science of control that integrates all joint warfighting functions. ADM Wesley McDonald, Commander US Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), failed to convey the commander’s intent to the joint force for Operation Urgent Fury. This failure promoted misunderstanding and mutual trust issues among the joint force that affected the integration of joint functions such as intelligence and sustainment.
The American Revolution was a struggle for the American military from the beginning. The British Army was a better trained and equipped force. The Battles of Lexington and Concord following the battle of Bunker Hill were significant to the victory of the American forces over the British. The Battle of Bunker Hill on the Charlestown peninsula north of Boston on June 17th 1775 was arguably one of the key events that set in motion American victory. The battle was a loss for America, but the audacity and strength the American militiamen showed in the face of adversity inspired later actions by other forces in America to fight against a far superior enemy. This paper will analyze the tenets of mission command as exercised by Colonel William Prescott, to include: understanding the battlefield, visualizing weaknesses, and directing reinforcements throughout his leading and assessment processes. COL Prescott also used his presence on the hill to motivate his men to hold their positions in the face of overwhelming odds.
“Ready for War.” Intelligence Reports Iss. 131 (Fall 2008). 46-54 SIRS Researcher. Web. 03 Feb. 2011.
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.