Mission Command in Grenada

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United States Armed Forces were able to accomplish their mission during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. However, there were quite a few deficiencies in the conduct of the first joint operation since Viet Nam. This paper will evaluate command and control during the operation using the attributes of commander’s intent, mutual trust and understanding. It will also evaluate the joint functions of intelligence, protection and fires.
Commander’s intent establishes a clear and concise expression of the operation and the desired end state. This intent binds understanding, the mission, and the direction to subordinate elements.
Although the invasion of Grenada was a success, there were problems with the commander’s intent. Since the contingency operation had a very short planning timeline, it appears elements of the commander’s intent were not clear. During the planning process, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was unable to design a suitable concept for the joint operation. Stewart postulated that the Command was neither trained nor manned to mount this type of operation as the Command’s main focus was to reinforce Europe after a Soviet attack.
There was also confusion over unity of command. Admiral McDonald, commander of LANTCOM, made two errors in command and control. He did not assign one his subordinate commanders to act as the overall director of ground forces no matter what the service and he did not select the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps as the leader of Army forces. The lack of a single commander meant that coordination between the Marines and the Army was minimal. The lack of a designated ground force commander and the omission of XVIII airborne Corps muddied the commander’s intent. The services would have been ...

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...AQ&usg=AFQjCNFIz4HQNnSs6HZIQunxtZDCoxiIRw (accessed December 24, 2013), p. 5.
Richard W. Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2008), 32.
Ibid, 33-34.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 34-35.
Ibid, 34.
Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Command White Paper”
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.
Ibid, III-20.
Ibid, III-21.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 32.
Ibid, 15.
Joint Operations, III-29-30.
Ibid, III-32.
Joint Operations, III-22.
Ibid, III-24.
Stewart, Operation Urgent Fury, 22.
Ibid, 24.

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