United States Cyber Command is less than four years old. The merger and stand down of the Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) formed the bulk of the new organization. 9 This new construct integrated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities in one organization resulting in efficient and effective planning and execution of cyberspace operations. United States Cyber Command is tasked with operations to defend DOD information networks and to conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations across all domains. 10 United States Cyber Command is also tasked with ensuring US freedom of action in cyberspace and denying freedom of actions to our adversaries. This freedom of action requires a clear relationships to reach full potential. In a GAO report to congress on July, 2011 we find the following: DoD has assigned authorities and responsibilities for implementing cyber operations among combatant commands and military services; however, the supporting relationships necessary to achieve command and control of cyber operations remain unclear. According to the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, we can achieve cyberspace superiority only if command and control relationships are clearly defined. 11 The goal of reaching full potential in cyberspace operations starts with building close relationships between the cyber service components and finding the best way to support the GCCs. This process underway and is constantly reevaluated. The formation of USCYBERCOM was important. It elevates cyberspace in the mind of the warrior and in the consideration of the planner. If the desire is to operationalize cyber it needs to m... ... middle of paper ... ...of how much improvement the next evolution will bring. Works Cited 11 United States Government Accountability Office: Report to Congressional Requesters, “Defense Department Cyber Efforts: DoD Faces Challenges in Its Cyber Activities”, US Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, May 2011, page 6, http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321818.pdf 12 Andrew Fecikert, “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress”. Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, www.crs.gov, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf, page 15 13 Joint Publication 3-05, “Special Operations”, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, April 18, 2011, page III-2 14 Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “U.S. Regional Commanders get New Cyber Muscle”, Defensenews.com, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120609/DEFREG02/306090001/, June 9, 2012
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
The first failure experienced during the operations was that US Africa Command (AFRICOM) was an incomplete geographic combatant command (GCC). AFRICOM was established in 2008 as a new kind of geographic combatant command (GCC), one foc...
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
In 1943 the British and American Allies shared a common language and a common enemy, but they disagreed on the war’s grand strategy. (site) These strategic differences culminated in the Sicily Campaign, with Allied command and control exercise by Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, failed to employ the three essential attributes of mission command: commander’s intent, full understanding, and mutual trust among partners, as discussed in General Dempsey’s white paper. These failures in Mission Command also limited the Allies’ ability to effectively integrate the vital joint functions like Fires, Maneuver, and Protection. This essay will evaluate the Allies’ Command and Control and the other vital Joint Functions and expound on General Eisenhower
The Department of Homeland Security faces challenges of failure to coordinate and cooperate in the latest fight against computer crimes as well as more general intelligence-gathering operations. (...
There is a general discord among stakeholders on the definition of irregular warfare and where the term and concept fits within the joint and the individual services’ doctrine. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report uses the term “irregular” only once in its one hundred and five pages and only in terms of a focus on building the joint force’s capability and capacity to deal with irregular warfare while maintaining a clear conventional and nuclear global superiority. Currently, the definition is ambiguous and results in conflict or duplication of efforts across Department of Defense stakeholders. For the purposes of this paper, the stakeholders discussed are the Army and the Marine Corps. Stakeholders must reach a consensus and clearly define irregular warfare in order to establish comprehensive irregular war policy and strategy.
middle of paper ... ... Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2012. —. ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process.
The U.S. Government authorized USAFRICOM to plan kinetic operations with the involvement of multinational coalition forces across Africa. With the unrest and protests across Northern Africa, the U.S. Government authorized USAFRICOM to stand up its Joint Task Forces; these task forces would conduct offensive and defensive operations while protecting American and Allied nation civilians. Some of the offensive and defensive operations would consist of air and maritime actions. These task forces would also aid USAFRICOM in the transition of other nation’s leadership to operate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The threats to security from the United States Department of Defense, the national power grid and the Chamber of Commerce are very real and omnipresent. The Defense Department made an admission of the first major cyber attack upon its systems in August 2010. It was revealed that the attack actually took place in 2008 and was accomplished by placing a malicious code into the flash drive of a U.S. military laptop. “The code spread undetected on both classified and unclassified systems, establishing what amounted to a digital breachhead.” (2) This quote, attributed to then Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III, is just part of the shocking revelations that were disclosed in his speech made on July 14, 2011.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of Joint Warfare Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment.
The framework we will follow for the DoD is a descriptive control framework, which provides for governance at a high level. T...
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
It is unrealistic to imagine that the copious amount of departments responsible for cybersecurity are able to adequately protect the country; therefore, the government needs to form one department that can be responsible for all cybersecurity problems and cyberattacks. When forming this new department, resources from other groups that currently share responsibility can be moved in order to decrease the amount of resources needed for the new group. But, it is also unfathomable for the government to be responsible for all cybersecurity as “... the reality is that while the lion’s share of the cybersecurity expertise lies in the federal government, more than 90 percent of the physical infrastructure of the Web is owned by private industry” (McConnell 4). Therefore the government must collaborate with the private sector. This cooperation can be utilized to help form the new government group as “there is also an opportunity for the new agency to be formed in a more deliberate way, drawing on leadership from the private economy to promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness” (Cohen 2). By working with the private sector, the new agency can reduce costs of personnel and equipment, increase performance, and maintain diverse cybersecurity plans. Once a
The nation has become dependent on technology, furthermore, cyberspace. It’s encompassed in everything we deliver in our daily lives, our phones, internet, communication, purchases, entertainment, flying airplane, launching missiles, operating nuclear plants, and implicitly, our protection. The more ever-growing technology empower Americans, the more they become prey to cyber threats. The United States Executive Office of the President stated, “The President identified cybersecurity as one of the top priorities of his administration in doing so, directed a 60-day review to assess polices.” (United States Executive Office of the President, 2009, p.2). Furthermore, critical infrastructure, our network, and internet alike are identified as national assets upon which the administration will orchestrate integrated cybersecurity policies without infringing upon and protecting privacy. While protecting our infrastructure, personal privacy, and civil liberties, we have to keep in mind the private sector owns and operates the majority of our critical and digital infrastructure.
Today the U.S. military operates a Joint C2 structure, divided into geographical areas as G...