Metapsychologism In The Philosophy Of Logic
ABSTRACT: The problem of psychologism in the philosophy of logic and the different solutions of this problem are considered. Both traditional psychologistic and antipsychologistic solutions are shown to be untenable and the need for a new solution is demonstrated. The original program of metapsychologism is advanced as a solution to the problem of psychologism based on deduction-search theory. Two formalized levels of a logical procedure are distinguished: 1) an object-level at which a notion of inference is formalized; 2) a metalevel at which principles of deduction-search are formalized, and a thesis of metapsychologism according to which metalevel processes are formulated. Metapsychologism lifts usual psychologist considerations one level up in the hierarchy of logical procedure, while a non-psychologist justification of logical relations is kept at the object-level. The application of the thesis of metapsychologism to different concrete logical procedures is considered.
"In the old anti-psychologistic days ...".
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The debate between psychologism and antipsychologism in the XXth century psychology of logic seemed to be solved ultimately in favor of antipsychologism. After G. Frege, E. Husserl, R. Carnap and J. Lukasiewicz it was almost generally recognized that the only true philosophy of symbolic logic is antipsychologism. Antipsychologism was considered as a thesis belonging to the body of symbolic logic itself. In this paper I try to re-examine relations between antipsychologism, psychologism and modern logic.
The problem of psychologism
The re-examination mentioned presupposes an analysis of notions of psychologism and a...
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should know Babe Ruth is for the most important reason, that being the way he
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To write this book the author, John Toland, had to devote 15 years researching different stories from all sides of the war. He studied war memoirs, interviewed war veterans, and read military documents. While doing this he focused on both the allied and axis forces to truly understand both sides of the story and be able to write such a descriptive and accurate piece of work. This research was used in the book to describe the unlikely victory of the Americans over the Germans during the “Battle of the Bulge”.
Rationalism and empiricism were two philosophical schools in the 17th and 18th centuries, that were expressing opposite views on some subjects, including knowledge. While the debate between the rationalist and empiricist schools did not have any relationship to the study of psychology at the time, it has contributed greatly to facilitating the possibility of establishing the discipline of Psychology. This essay will describe the empiricist and rationalist debate, and will relate this debate to the history of psychology.
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Jaegwon Kim thinks that multiple realizability of mental properties would bring about the conclusion that psychology is most likely not a science. Several functionalists, specially, Fodor, take up the opposing stance to Kim, supporting that the multiple realizability of mental states is one of the reasons why psychology is an autonomous and justifiable science. Essentially, Kim think that in order for mental states to be multiply realizable then psychology must be fundamentally broken; with human psychology encompassing properties realized for humans and alien psychology encompassing those mental states realized in the alien way etc. I will demonstrate that even if one supports and allows the principles behind Kim’s argument they do not result in his final conclusion of psychology failing to be a science. By attacking his principle of Casual Individuation of Kinds I will show that Kim has failed to find the correct conclusion. Furthermore, I will consider a possible objection that Kim might have to my stance and give a short rebuttle. I will conclude by explicating Jerry Fodor’s account of what is Kim’s essential problem is. By showing that Kim’s conclusion fails it will entail that Fodor’s conclusion is more viable in reality.
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