What philosophers had been saying could simply not be said. Their philosophy was beyond the scope of what could be said and was therefore nonsense. By plotting the limits of language, Wittgenstein expected to be able to deal with the problems of philosophy finally. Outside the limits of what can be said lies nonsense, so any theory of language must occur within these limits. Wittgenstein thought that the nature of language could tell us what can and cannot be done with it.
But, often they contain numerous implications with value for innovation, as they can anticipate holistic projections which are not yet fulfilled by theoretical analysis. This paper deals with the question, of whether the cognitive content of metaphors can be put to use in philosophy, and, if so, what cognitive or methodological place metaphors have within philosophical discourse. Three philosophical attitudes toward metaphors can be distinguished: First, the various arguments for rejection of metaphors in philosophy. Second, the unrestricted affirmation of metaphors, taking "absolute metaphor" as the replacement of metaphysics. The third position can be described as the restricted affirmation of metaphors.
Intuitions This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true.
Some logicians have rejected propositions in favour of sentences, arguing in particular that there is no satisfactory identity criterion for propositions (cf. Quine, 1970). But is there one for sentences? The idea that logic is about sentences rather than propositions and that sentences are nothing more that material inscriptions was already developed by Lesniewski, who also saw immediately the main difficulty of this conception and introduced the notion of equiformity to solve it. His attitude his well described in a footnote of one of Tarski’s famous early papers: As already explained, sentences are here regarded as material objects (inscriptions).
A posteriori judgments, on the other hand, are statements in which experience determines how we discover the truth or falsity of the statement. Thus, this distinction also marks the difference traditionally noted in logic between necessary and contingent truths. But Kant also made a less familiar distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, according to the information conveyed as their content. Analytic judgments are those whose predicates are entirely contained in their subjects; since they add nothing to our concept of the subject, such judgments are purely explicative and can be deduced from the principle of non-contradiction. Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are those whose predicates are altogether distinct from their subjects, to which they must be shown to relate because of some real connection external to the concepts themselves.
Philosophers tend to think literal speech is the default; however, common speech is littered with metaphors and other figurative elements. Within metaphors, the two things often differ categorically, yet the sentence is not only intelligible it may even be illuminating and express an important truth. But how do we understand metaphorical meaning as readily as we do? Davidson’s causal theory. Davidson argues that metaphor is somehow a matter of bringing out similarities between things or states of affairs.
Goodman's hypothesis of 'grue' is quite different from the above two indeterminacy in terms of both objective of introducing the concept and the usage of it. Goodman's issue is to search for the rules in screening out 'bad' assumptions in induction. This induction issue is not indeterminacy of Wittgenstein's skeptic arguments or Quine's radical translation. Wittgenstein and Kripke's conclusion that that rules are brute facts seems to be questionable. Form of life is one of Wittgenstein's key concepts in his theory on rules and is linked to rules in some crucial ways.
Husserl, Carnap, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein ABSTRACT: Phenomenology and logical positivism both subscribed to an empirical-verifiability criterion of mental or linguistic meaning. The acceptance of this criterion confronted them with the same problem: how to understand the Other as a subject with his own experience, if the existence and nature of the Other's experiences cannot be verified. Husserl tackled this problem in the Cartesian Meditations, but he could not reconcile the verifiability criterion with understanding the Other's feelings and sensations. Carnap's solution was to embrace behaviorism and eliminate the idea of private sensations, but behaviorism has well-known difficulties. Heidegger broke this impasse by suggesting that each person's being included being-with, an innate capacity for understanding the Other.
Such a foundational framework (which I call Evidence Logic) is described and analysed in terms of its ability to tolerate substantial evidential conflict while not allowing contraditions. 0. Overview The variegated landscape of theories of truth and systems of logic, wherein each is cogently argued while yet inconclusive, is substantially accounted for by the fact that we just don’t know enough yet about the nature of our universe, let us call it R, to be able to settle on one or the other of these theories and systems as adequate for the representation and processing of our knowledge about R. In this paper firstly we discuss this thesis, that it is primarily our ignorance of R, and not any failure to rigorously construct our theories and systems, that is a fundamental cause of the inadequacies of these theories and systems. Secondly we will delineate a scientific perspective, Explorationism, which, if the thesis first considered is correct, is deserving of advocacy. Finally, we exemplify this perspective by exhibiting a logic, Evidence Logic (EL), which incorporates a broadened concept of negation which (1) provides for the representation and processing of both confirmatory and refutatory evidential knowledge including the possibility of a generous range of conflicting evidence while yet (2) enforces noncontradiction.
Some kinds of utterances which have an indicative grammatical form seem, for different reasons, to be unable to say something true of the world. Logical contradictions are only the prime example of something the author baptizes impossible descriptions. So-called performative contradictions (e.g., "I do not exist") make up another kind, but there are at least two more such kinds: negating affirmations and performatives which cannot be explained within the philosophy of language. Only philosophical anthropology can explain their feature of "impossibleness," and a distinction between unreflective and reflective consciousness is central to the explanation. Particularly important here is G. H. Mead's distinction between two aspects of the self: the "I" and the "me."