Imagine a scenario where you are in danger and your only chance for survival would be taking a teleportation device to another planet where you are not teleported, rather recreated. Furthermore, your body’s “blueprint” is sent to another planet where you are reconstructed as an exact copy of your original self – Down to the last particle. The question of whether or not you would take this journey creates the philosophical argument of personal identity. Rather, would the new you, still be you? In this paper, I am going to prove that the decision to take this journey of entanglement would still keep your personal identity because of the experiences, conscious, and materialistic body that is retained in the recreation of your old self.
The problem that arises through the idea of teleportation is whether or not you retain your personal identity in the reconstructing process. According to Nova’s description of the process, your body is copied exactly from the original, materialistically as well as consciously. If this is true, then your new agent would also contain a mimicked copy of one’...
Personal identity, in the context of philosophy, does not attempt to address clichéd, qualitative questions of what makes us us. Instead, personal identity refers to numerical identity or sameness over time. For example, identical twins appear to be exactly alike, but their qualitative likeness in appearance does not make them the same person; each twin, instead, has one and only one identity – a numerical identity. As such, philosophers studying personal identity focus on questions of what has to persist for an individual to keep his or her numerical identity over time and of what the pronoun “I” refers to when an individual uses it. Over the years, theories of personal identity have been established to answer these very questions, but the
Personal identity examines what makes a person at one time identical with a person at another. Many philosophers believe we are always changing and therefore, we cannot have a persisting identity if we are different from one moment to the next. However, many philosophers believe there is some important feature that determines a person’s identity and keeps it persistent. For John Locke, this important feature is memory, and I agree. Memory is the most important feature in determining a person’s identity as memory is the necessary and sufficient condition of personal identity.
The purpose of this paper is to explore Locke's account of personal identity and show that critics of Locke's account wrongfully advocate for an interpretation that equates consciousness to memory. Section one of this paper will discuss Locke's account of personal identity as it appears in the text. Followed by section two which will discuss traditional interpretations of Locke's account which equate memory with consciousness. Section two will draw mainly on Thomas Reids "Gallant Officer argument. Finally, section three will reflect on the first two sections and argue why the memory criterion is wrong.
Therefore, they summarize that the reason why Clive suffers in the Amnesia is caused by the hippocampus is not affected. The Hippocampus is a structure that is located inside the temporal lobe, and that is a part of the limbic system. The function of the Hippocampus is similar to a post office used for encoding, storage and recalling memories, all presenting information would first remain, analysed and encoded in the Hippocampus then transmit them to different areas of the brain. In other words, Clive is unable to encode memory and hold information which is currently aware, and it is difficult to form new long-term memory such as explicit and semantic memory. Clive Wearing, now 78 years old, still cannot recover from the anterograde amnesia, he becomes a man who has the shortest memory in the world.
In David Lewis’ article “An Argument for Identity Theory” Lewis defends the psychoneural identity theory, arguing that mental states or experiences are neural states. In his main argument, he argues that physics can explain the causal relationship between mental states or experiences and physical phenomena. He uses an analogy of a cylindrical combination lock to explain the causal role that mental states play in producing physical phenomena. In order to put the lock into a state of being “unlocked”
Sameness of person consists not in sameness of soul nor the sameness of body, but in sameness of consciousness. According to the memory view, the personal identity is established by (genuine) memory-relations. Locke’s theory manifests the idea that rather than being tied to our physical bodies, our identity is bound to our consciousness. Locke, in one of his works states that consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind. Essentially, meaning that consciousness equals memories. Unlike, the conventional theories; bodily and soul view, Locke’s views that memory relations constitute “a person is a sequence of person-stages linked by (genuine) memory.” As personal identity is not bound by a constant component of a person to be present over a whole lifetime, neither body nor a soul.
The film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless mind focuses on the interesting topic of memory. The film follows two main characters, Joel and Clementine, who have both chosen to erase part of their memory. What both characters, and other characters in the movie, find out though is that our memory is complex and very flexible to what we make of it. The film reflects the tendency that we have as humans, to think that we are in control of our memory. The truth is that our memory is not like a video tape of the events in our lives nor is it a library of the knowledge we have collected. As I watched the movie, I couldn’t help but think; our memory is more like a ball of clay. Our minds can take the clay and make it into a shape and we can stare at that shape and know that shape but our minds will play with that clay and mold it into something different eventually. The idea portrayed in the movie is that no memory is safe from our meddling minds.
I. Introduction II. Dementia Senility is a misused term for the loss of ability to think, reason, and remember in older persons. Senility is not a medical condition; it is not normal, natural, or inevitable with aging; it is not limited to older people either. The term senility is replaced in most of my pertinent research by the medical term dementia, which seems to describe a group of symptoms that represent a change or deterioration from an individual's previous level of functioning (Tueth, 1995). Dementia has specific causes, which impair long-term memory and quite relevantly;: language, judgment, spatial perception, behavior, and often personality, interfering with normal social and occupational functioning.
Locke believed that the identity of a person has the sameness of the consciousness: “What makes a man be himself to himself is sameness of consciousness, so personal identity depends entirely on that—whether the consciousness is tied to one substance throughout or rather is continued in a series of different su...
Briefly, we can conclude by deduction that body, brain, and soul are not sufficient to explain personal identity. Personal identity and immortality will always cause questions to arise from philosophers, as well as other individuals, and although many philosophers may object and disagree, the memory criterion offers the most sufficient explanation.
In his 1971 paper “Personal Identity”, Derek Parfit posits that it is possible and indeed desirable to free important questions from presuppositions about personal identity without losing all that matter. In working out how to do so, Parfit comes to the conclusion that “the question of identity has no importance” (Parfit, 1971, p. 4.2:3). In this essay, I will attempt to show that Parfit’s thesis is a valid one, with positive implications for human behaviour. The first section of the essay will examine the thesis in further detail, and the second will assess how Parfit’s claims fare in the face of criticism. Problems of personal identity generally involve questions about what makes one the person one is and what it takes for the same person to exist at separate times (Olson, 2010).
What is personal identity? This question has been asked and debated by philosophers for centuries. The problem of personal identity is determining what conditions and qualities are necessary and sufficient for a person to exist as the same being at one time as another. Some think personal identity is physical, taking a materialistic perspective believing that bodily continuity or physicality is what makes a person a person with the view that even mental things are caused by some kind of physical occurrence. Others take a more idealist approach with the belief that mental continuity is the sole factor in establishing personal identity holding that physical things are just reflections of the mind. One more perspective on personal identity and the one I will attempt to explain and defend in this paper is that personal identity requires both physical and psychological continuity; my argument is as follows:
Organ transplants have led to the possibility of a new theory called cellular memory. The cellular memory theory suggests that individual nerve cells can hold traces of memory for up to a minute.(www.livescience.com) Cells in the mind store and remember information by coming together to create memories.(www.dictionary.com) The theory is still uncertain, and many scientists disagree about this topic because it is a very hard topic to research and find information on. (http://www.medicaldaily.com)
Do we have a soul inside ourselves? Does this “soul” make us who we are? Can the “soul” change? There are arguments between philosophers debating each side. Some believe that there is a soul, while others do not. Some believe that the soul can change, while others do not. There is no scientific evidence siding with either side. However, there are many studies that have been conducted in order to attempt to prove one side right. These attempts have not been successful. There have also been cases where individuals claim that they had a soul and lost it. Again, nothing has been proved; there are studies, and testimonials arguing one side or the other. Still we find ourselves asking the same questions over and over again. This essay will discuss
Self-identity is one of the main themes of philosophy throughout its history. In general, “self-identity” is a term that means thoughts or feelings with which you distinguish you from others, and we use the term in ordinary conversation without a solid concept of “self-identity”. However, arguing about self-identity philosophically, there arise many questions: whether there is any essence of yourself, whether you are the same person as you when you were a baby, whether memory or experience makes you, and what is “self-identity.” To solve these questions, many philosophers have been arguing the topic “self identity” for so long.