Dostoyevsky stands on the opposite side of the spectrum, exposing the shortcomings of reason with frightful realism. He, in my opinion, makes incredibly insightful points about this discrepancy between how things "should" be and how they are. When comparing the manifestos of these two thinkers, Spinoza’s Ethics and Dostoyevsky’s Notes from the Underground, one can easily see the difference in language. Spinoza’s language is strictly mathematical. He is not concerned with engaging the reader.
You may say that some are merely subscribing to these mathematical facts and take them for granted. But surely, even those that subscribe to some set of moral guiding principles (through organized religion or a similar practice) may disagree with some of the proponents. It is the grounds of moral disagreement which is detrimental to Ross's argument here. I hope to have shown that Ross's ideas about prima facie duties and how they relate mathematical axioms are not sound. Neither axioms or prima facie duties have a self-evident nature, which hurts Ross's ideas of objectivity in these rules.
Plato's Moral Psychology I argue that Plato's psychological theories are motivated by concerns he had about moral theory. In particular, Plato rejects the modern account of rationality as the maximization of subjectively evaluated self-interest because, had he adopted such an account, his theory of justice would be subject to criticisms which he holds are fatal to the contractarian theory of justice. While formulating a theory to remain within ethical constraints sometimes violates the canons of scientific theorizing, Plato avoids this mistake. The first serious account of justice Plato considers in the Republic is the contractarian account. (1) It holds that is always instrumentally rational for one to further her own interests and in that certain situations (exemplified by the prisoners dilemma) it is more rational to forego one's own interests (providing others do so also) than to behave in a straight-forwardly rational way.
Socrates purposefully fails to use a universally applicable proof for shapes to define a square. All shapHis ignorance is used to inspire Meno’s review of the argument and develop a correct definition for excellence. For Meno’s benefit, Socrates contradicts his methods of deduction and proves excellence is divine. Plato employs Socratic irony to inspire a resolution to a problem by facilitating individual thought and input. As a result, Socrates’ ignorance is based on contradiction because contradiction entices review and the development of a correct resolution.
When considering the Platonic form of goodness, Kant's idea of the good will is similar in that it adheres to a theoretical universal, and that reason is essential to its discovery. However, the concept of the Golden Rule is not important to Plato and he would certainly scoff at the exclusivity of the term "moral." But at the heart of the comparison lies the .sim• arity in the importance of reason, the importance of duty, and the idea of a universal. 9 Ibid.,953. 10 Ibid.
But to grant that rule-responsibility is socially essential does not grant that it is the essence of morality. QE is flawed as it reduces the topic of moral character to the topic of conscientiousness or rule-responsibility, but it gives no account of the role of the character as a whole in moral deliberation and it excludes questions of character that are not directly concerned with the resolution of problems. Taking into account the criticisms of modern ethical theory I have discussed, it is clearly evident that an ethical theory shaped in light of these criticisms would be very similar to virtue ethics, emphasizing character and centering around the question, "how should I live? ".
Discarding mathematical propositions themselves on the grounds that they are not immune to doubt evoked by a powerful agent does not generate a substantial problem for Descartes provided that he believes that he can justify them by appeal to God's benevolence. The question whether Descartes impugned veridicality of mathematical propositions via the arguments of the First Meditation is of epistemologically significance for an inquiry into the nature of Descartes' doubt experiment with a view to a plausible answer to this question may offer us clues to understand the nature of Cartesian theory of justification and the nature of foundationalistic epistemology in general. The evil genius hypothesis introduced in the last paragraph of the First Meditation does not seem to call veridicality of mathematical propositions into question: Descartes does not mention mathematical truths when he finalizes the setting of the doubt experiment. The text is ambiguous at this point and the reader is left ignorant whether simple truths of arithmetics or geometry are held exempt from doubt evoked by the evil genius hypothesis. Does this final tool of the doubt experiment put emphasis on the dubitability of judgments of common-sense ontology based on sense perception alone?
In the world, there are two categories of what people think about. One of them is relations of ideas. This is the type exemplified by geometry and algebra since facts within these subjects are found through reason of thought. However, the other type, matters of fact, could be discoverable through evidence and empirical thinking. One of David Hume’s greatest contributions to philosophy is his skepticism in challenging what people think by proposing that even “fundamental truths” could be subjective and caused by our limitations as humans.
However, the reason he criticizes Pythagoras for explaining moral virtue in terms of mathematical principles,(1) is that Pythagoras is starting from principles which are inadequate to explaining this matter. Of the two mistakes, that as to the starting point is plainly more serious. Every error as to starting point entails error as to one's subsequent proceeding, but not vice versa. A principle is always a principle of something, and every method or orderly proceeding has a principle or starting point.
Between the two theories, I will analyze which reasoning is more idealistic. Socrates explains that akrasia is not possible through his reasoning of doing something that is negative is the cause of ignorance. Socrates explains that we never subconsciously do what is bad (Aristotle on Weakness of Will).Ultimately, Socrates claims if one knows good, they will pursue it and that if one does what is wrong, it is done involuntarily out of ignorance (Arrington 18). When Socrates reasons and expresses his explanation in the Protagoras and Meno, the question of weakness of will is brought up and his reaso... ... middle of paper ... ...e to what brings pleasure. That person made a choice and I firmly believe actions can be voluntary and feelings playing a role with action as Aristotle believe.