Lyndon B. Johnson's Immediate Advocacy of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
President Lyndon B. Johnson's immediate advocacy of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, acting as head of state, influenced Congress to unintentionally give him a blank check in conducting the Vietnam War. Johnson's accusation of unjustified attacks on American ships by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin led to the resolution's nearly unanimous passage in Congress three days later. Although with the passage of time the certainty of these attacks has come into question, President Johnson through his presidential powers was able to get the Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed, which gave him near free reign in conducting the Vietnam War.
The events leading up to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution must be understood with knowledge of the Johnson administration's motivations during that time period. As early as May 1964, Vietnam experts in Washington were creating a resolution that would give Johnson the ability to use unlimited force in North Vietnam. However, Johnson thought that the timing was not right to call attention to this escalating war in Southeast Asia. Considering the benefits of a resolution, his Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara believed that attaining the capability to perform air strikes would raise South Vietnamese morale. Even though Johnson and his staff were forced to fight a defensive war, they knew very well that a resolution passes by Congress would very well change that. (1)
A generally accepted modern-day account of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents that occurred in early August of 1964 should precede evaluation of how the Johnson administration handled the situation. The USS Maddox began a reconnaissance patrol along the coast of North V...
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Bibliography:
(1) Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (Oxford University Press 1997), 145-146.
(2) David L. Anderson, Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (University Press of Kansas 1993), 113-122.
(3) Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (University of California Press 1999), 196-197.
(4) Eugene G. Windchy, Tonkin Gulf (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1971), 211.
(5) Logevall, 205.
(6) Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (The University of North Carolina Press 1996), 227.
(7) Logevall, 204.
(8) Joseph C. Goulden, Truth is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality (Rand McNally & Company 1969), 17.
(9) Schulzinger, 150-151.
(10) Goulden, 18.
Appy’s book is valuable to its readers in showing how Vietnam became the template for every American war since, from novelties like the invasion of Grenada to the seemingly never-ending conflicts post-9/11. But before all that, there was Vietnam, and, larger lessons aside, Appy’s book is a fascinating, insightful, infuriating and thought-provoking study of that conflict, from its earliest days
The Vietnam War: A Concise International History is a strong book that portrays a vivid picture of both sides of the war. By getting access to new information and using valid sources, Lawrence’s study deserves credibility. After reading this book, a new light and understanding of the Vietnam war exists.
In August of 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the closest thing there was to declaring war on Vietnam. A war that resulted in millions of people dying, and the loss of liberties for a large number of people. The Resolution was passed because the government (and the American people) believed that the Vietnamese had fired torpedoes at a US destroyer on routine patrol in the Tonkin Gulf on August 2, 1964. It was also reported that a second deliberate attack happened against a pair of ships two days later on August 4, 1964. Based on this information, the President in a news conference announced to the U.S. that he was ordering air strikes against North Vietnam in retaliation for the attacks on US ships. But information now leads us to believe that President Johnson had ordered bombers to strike for an attack that never happened. It has even been reported that before the air strikes even began there was reason to believe that the attack on August 4th never happened. There are transmission reports from the commander in the Tonkin Gulf, Captain John J. Herrick stating that there was an overeager sonarman who "was hearing ship's own propeller beat" and freaky weather conditions. Also, Navy pilot, James Stockdale, who was flying in the area that night, stated that "our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets there were no boats there. There was nothing there but black water and American fire power."
Fussell, Paul. "Vietnam." The Bloody Game: An Anthology of Modern War. Ed. Paul Fussell. London: Scribners, 1991. 651-6.
“The Price of Military Folly.” U.S. News Online. 1996. 10 April 2000 . Robinson, Linda.
Only in the Vietnam War was the United States’ participation criticized. This is such a gigantic change from prior wars that it bears study as to why it happened, and better yet, should have it happened. This paper will discuss the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, by asking the simple question, Should have the United States’ gotten involved in the first place? This paper will prove that, in fact, America should not have gotten involved in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War took place between 1947- 1975.
Marder, Murry. “Nixon Opposes Repeal of Tonkin Resolution: Administration Opposes Senate Repeal of Tonkin Gulf Resolution.” The Washington Post. December 18, 1969. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/docview/143683440.
On August 2, 1964 an incident happened between the USS Maddox and a North Vietnamese torpedo ships. While the Maddox was doing a casual sweep through of the Tonkin Gulf, the North Vietnamese ships began to follow. Captain Herrick ordered his men to shoot while he radioed an aircraft carrier for assistance. After feeling threated, the North Vietnamese ships each fired one torpedo. Two missed and the third failed to launch. The Maddox was barely touched, as for the Vietnamese ships, two were in bad shape and the other had sunk. Meanwhile, over in Washington D.C., President Lyndon B. Johnson was frantic about the situation he had been informed of. At first, President Johnson had no desire to hold any reprisal against North Vietnam. He proceeded to tell Russia that he had no interest in extending the conflict. However, he did warn that there would be consequences for their action. This conflict had our stationed soldiers on high al...
This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It continues with Johnson and his administration making decisions over and over that continued to commit more and more involve...
So many things influenced our involvement in the Vietnam War, and Lawrence examines the decisions we made in a greater context than just our own. He argues that international pressures controlled the attitudes and ideas of the United States, for the most part.
Christopher D. O’Sullivan, Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention from Vietnam to Iraq (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 62.
Anderson, D. (2002). The Columbia guide to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press.
The conflict in Vietnam for the United States started when President Dwight D. Eisenhower went along with the domino theory and sent in military advisors in South Vietnam to stop the communist movement from taking place in South Vietnam. The Vietnam conflict was between the communist’s and the United States. North Vietnam was led by Ho Chi Minh, and Ho Chi Minh led the Viet Cong, a guerilla group to help spread communism. The United States were supporters of the South Vietnam because they wanted them to maintain their government rather than falling to the domino theory of communism. After Eisenhower’s term ended John F. Kennedy became president and took control of the situation of Vietnam but on November 22, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated. Lyndon B. Johnson succeeded presidency and the problems of Vietnam were left to himself. In 1963, the Tonkin Gulf incident occurred where, the U.S.S Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese naval ships on august 2 1964. Two days later an even more controversial attack happened where it was reported another ship was attacked again but has later been proven false. Johnson used these events to gain congressional approval to enter into Vietnam. However the Tonkin Gulf Incident was questioned to have even happened which makes the war undoubtedly questionable Immediately after the incident . Many troops were killed in Vietnam and the United States eventually lost the war and does not achieve their goal to stop communism. Despite the large amount of conflict in Vietnam that needed to be resolved, escalating the war was the wrong idea by Johnson, as the many consequences of the war for the United States outweighed the potential spread of communism.
Kennedy and Diem were both killed in 1963 and 1964. Johnson took control of the situation by increasing the amount of money and manpower put into Vietnam. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving the president full military power. After Johnson dramatically escalated the amount of soldiers in Vietnam, The North Vietnamese mounted a surprise attack during the Vietnamese new year, and this strike was called the Tet Offensive. It made America more aware of what they were up against, that the communists were capable of fierce, guerrilla warfare, unlike anything Americans had ever fought before. Images of the terror and disarray reached back home, and the U.S. began to wonder how effective their involvement in Vietnam really was.
Willbanks, James H. "The Real History of the Vietnam War." ARMCHAIR GENERAL Nov. 2007: 54-67. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 3 Apr. 2014.