Recognizing the great extent of moral disagreements, some contemporary philosophers start to wonder whether morality is absolute in its nature. They propose a theory known as Moral Relativism, which holds that “moral statements are true or false only relative to some standard or other” (Dreier, p.1); no absolute moral fact exists independently of those standards. The opposite theory of Moral Relativism is Moral Absolutism---the idea that moral proposition is determined by absolute, unvarying moral facts. In this paper, I will argue that Moral Relativism is not a suitable theory in explaining the nature of morality. I will start by introducing two famous arguments in favor of Moral Relativism and explain why they are flawed arguments.
Deontology when looked at loosely is simply a moral theory that says we have morals and we need to consider them when making decisions. Therefore, one may conclude that the overall principles or deontology are correct and that this moral theory should not be dismissed.
Lastly, it will be shown how "weighing and balancing" and "specification" are integral components in this model and were also practiced by Mill and Kant in their moral systems. Introduction This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole.
The Distance Between Morality and Luck In the moral realm, I tend to align my intuitions with Kantian morality, forming a very strict interpretation of those actions which carry moral worth. As one who believes that the world is not governed by determinism, I place a great deal of emphasis on moral evaluation. This is why I find Nagel’s Moral Luck article so troubling. Nagel describes a concept which, if accurate, completely undercuts our conception of morality, disabling the ability to apply moral worth to decisions. I find, however, that one can tackle his dilemma and reveal holes in his argument in a manner that would allow us to uphold the concept of morality and moral evaluation in the world.
I will begin to illustrate what Waldron means by such a right. Before we even look at the meaning of “a right to do wrong”, Waldron clarifies that he is looking at “wrongs” from a moral view not a legal view. “A right to do wrong” means that an action is morally wrong but it is an action that an individual has the moral right to do. It is suggested that an individual should not act in an immoral way but has the choice to do so. Waldron wishes to answer the inconsistencies in the paradox of the moral right to do wrong.
In Ross's discussion of moral epistemology in What Makes Right Acts Right?, he makes a number of claims for moral objectivity and a set of prima facie duties. In Ross's view, these prima facie duties should govern how we behave in every sort of moral situation. Much of Ross's argument depends on this duties being innate and objective. This paper will criticize Ross's claims, specifically on the grounds of the existence and objectivity of these prima facie duties. I intend to show that Ross's comparisons about prima facie duties and mathematical axioms are baseless and false.
Moreover, I also argue that our use of the concept of efficiency presupposes the decisions which we make with regard to the kinds of costs we recognize. Such decisions do not come out of the blue; they relate to the opposite evaluations of efficiency mentioned above. The decisions concerning what we consider to be costly determine in part the actual content of the concept of efficiency. I argue that this content must be in harmony with the meaning of the different practices in which we are engaged, otherwise this concept can easily lead us astray. Therefore, a proper use of the concept of efficiency demands a clear and reliable view of these meanings.
However it is agreed upon on the existence and need for morals, thus the call for a minimum conception of morality. Every theory must have this minimum in order to be considered a true moral theory. In essence, it must “guide one’s conduct by reason while giving equal weight to the interests of each individual who will be affected by what one does” (Rachels p.14). This poses a problem for ethical egoism as a moral theory since ethical egoism does not meet either of the requirements. Ethical egoism is a mistaken theory in that it leads to logical contradictions (Rachels p.87).
We have to balance the question of our philosophical grounds for believing that the moral theory is in fact true — that it corresponds to the demands that actually exist for us in reality — rather than merely being an accurate codification of what we happen to believe. It could still turn out that the 'true' moral theory, the theory that comes closest to capturing the things one actually ought or ought not to do, coheres less well with our ordinary moral beliefs than another theory which is less revisionary in its consequences. The issue I'm addressing is the proof of a set of moral principles, the proof of the validity of a moral outlook or theory. Various attempts have been made to avoid this seemingly irrational consequence by supplying what often have been referred to as "proofs" of' moral principles. The term "proof" as so used had a widely variable meaning but in general what is intended is a set of considerations, other than the internal consistency and adequacy of the theory, which are particularly persuasive in making a choice of one theory or principle over another.
Discussion of The Issues Raised in Meta-Ethics Ethics is the study of how people behave, and how they should behave. It is based on ideas of what is morally 'good'. But, in order to understand ethics, a definition of 'good' needs to be determined. Here, one sees that such ideas will vary from person to person and from culture to culture. Likewise, such ideas explain why there is such a variety of moral systems in use today and a marked difference in the level of commitment to a personal moral code.