Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare by Richard Arneson

The desire theory of wellbeing, or preference-satisfaction, traditionally argues that desire-satisfaction adequately measures overall subjective wellbeing. Yet in his article ‘Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare’ (1990), Richard Arneson alludes to challenges with preference-satisfaction in the analytic discourse, and establishes his own conception of subjective wellbeing. My aim in this essay is to evaluate Arneson's account of hypothetical ideally considered preferences and extended deliberation and argue that, while his conception of wellbeing succeeds in overcoming some issues with preference-satisfaction, it renders one critical issue of its own. More precisely, I shall propose that, in some cases, Arneson's conception of subjective wellbeing cannot provide an adequately detailed criterion for evaluating specific time frames.

To contextualise Arneson’s conception, this essay begins with a brief outline of preference-satisfaction for subjective wellbeing. I then explore major components of Arneson’s conception and, ultimately, identify an issue that arises from his conception.

Due to limited space, this essay only discusses Arneson’s use of simple equivalent decision trees to measure subjective wellbeing, as opposed to mixed decision trees, which contain different pure choice and chance paths. This is because Arneson intended an individual’s hypothetical ideally considered preferences to underscore ‘equal opportunity for welfare… [with] equivalent decision trees’ (p.178) and because mixed decision trees highlight a myriad of complexities, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this essay.

According to preference-satisfaction , wellbeing is measured by the fulfillment of informed...

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