Kant: Metaphysical Exposition of Space Explain and asses what you think to be the best argument Kant gives as his “Metaphysical Exposition of Space” (B37-40) that space cannot be either and actual entity (Newtonian concept) or any independent relation among real things (Leibnizian concepti be on). In other words, is he successful in arguing that space must be (at least) a form of intuition? Do any of his arguments further show that space must be ONLY a form of intuition and not ALSO something Newtonian or Leibnizian? In his Metaphysical Exposition of Space, Kant attempts to show that the experience of space is just a form of intuition. Kant defines space as that of which we sense out side of us, in comparison to our mind, which is our inner sense.
In this thesis I propose a new philosophical framework for the philosophy of physics as an alternative to the existing scientific realism and antirealism debate. Such reconsideration of the debate is warranted by the widely shared perception of a disconnect between the philosophy and the practices it purports to describe. Specifically, I offer a shift in focus from analysis of the justificatory practices of physicists to an examination of the methodologies evident in the presentation of theories. I will show that this scientific activity can be described in terms of a tension between a "conservative" strategy and an "innovative" strategy. This interaction will be demonstrated in two case studies.
Mathematical Models of Spacetime in Contemporary Physics and Essential Issues of the Ontology of Spacetime ABSTRACT: The general theory of relativity and field theory of matter generate an interesting ontology of space-time and, generally, of nature. It is a monistic, anti-atomistic and geometrized ontology — in which the substance is the metric field — to which all physical events are reducible. Such ontology refers to the Cartesian definition of corporeality and to Plato's ontology of nature presented in the Timaeus. This ontology provides a solution to the dispute between Clark and Leibniz on the issue of the ontological independence of space-time from distribution of events. However, mathematical models of space-time in physics do not solve the problem of the difference between time and space dimensions (invariance of equations with regard to the inversion of time arrow).
These definitions of absolute mechanics are, in fact, used retroactively to validate the existence of absolute space. In using discussions of absolute place, velocity, and acceleration, Newton's proponents hope to show that there is a difference between these and their relational counterparts. There is an inherent flaw, though, in arguing for an independent, self-evident difference betwe... ... middle of paper ... ...of absolute space isn't of practical importance in physics. In our everydayness "instead of absolute places and motions, we use relative ones". It is only in "philosophical disquisitions we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of them" (155).
Contemporary Cosmology and Philosophy and the Beginning of the Universe ABSTRACT: Since the 1970s both in physics and cosmology, there has been a controversy on the subject of the ‘beginning of the universe.’ This indicates that this intriguing problem has reached scientific consideration and, perhaps, a solution. The aim of this paper is to try to answer the question as to whether the origin of the world has slipped out of the hands of philosophers (and theologians), and passed in its entirety into the realm of science, and whether science is able to solve this problem by itself. While presenting the main views in this dispute, I try to show also that metaphysics, philosophy of nature and epistemology provide important premises, proposals and methods that are indispensable for a solution. These premises concern such issues as the extremely subtle problem of the sense and existence of ‘nothing,’ the problem of extrapolation of local physics onto the large-scale areas of the universe, the epistemological status of cosmological principles, as well as problems of the origins of the laws of nature. This last issue is entangled in the difficult problem of the ‘rationality of the world’ and the problem of overcoming the dichotomy of laws and preconditions, according to which the conditions and laws are independent of each other.
Because auxiliary hypotheses are needed, Newtonian mechanics is misclassified as non-scientific according to version one. The second version states that a theory T is scientific if and only if it is possible to deduce from T with auxiliary hypotheses, at least one prediction about the results of observation.
In An Introduction to The Philosophy of Physics, Marc Lange offers a novel interpretation of entangled quantum systems, a view that may not have these consequences. However, this interpretation seems to have interesting consequences of its own. In this paper I will formulate and examine Lange interpretation of quantum entanglement, and attempt to motivate it. In section I, I will give a brief sketch of quantum entanglement and what it's standard taken to mean. In section II, I'll discuss Lange's interpretation, and how it commits one to the existence of multiply located objects, and reasons one might not be happy with this conclusion.
I believe that science precipitates from an inner curiosity how about how the world works. I believe that after looking into the past, we can deduce that science has had a dual function: to explain observable or unobservable phenomenon and to help predict the outcome of our actions. For example, with the gravitational theory, at first we attempted to explain the motion of falling objects and then assuming that this force that we call "gravity" would stay relatively static, we could predict the outcome of other falling objects. Instrumentalist is a noble theory, but I don't believe it to be historically consistent with the aims of science as it was created. Consequently I propose an empiricism approach to science.
For Kant, intuition can mean sense content but can also mean something of the imagination. Kant relies on this intuition and tries to find the structures of spatiality itself. This first resolves in a deadlock asking the question, “what is space?” Two opposing theories he transcends are theories from both Newton and Leibniz. For Newton, time and space are real and absolute. This means that if there are no objects, there is still space.
(3) These were motivated by a fear that Kant's conceptualism, of the mind imposing space and time on the world, may lead to anti-realism, such as that of Husserl's bracketing the existence of the world based on his extensions of Descartes and Kant. (4) Nominalism and idealism are anti-realist but conceptualism and conventionalism need not be. I extend the typology of knowledge by adding knowledge by invention. Many fundamental propositions of mathematics, science and metaphysics hence shift from the realm of synthetic à priori to the realm of knowledge by invention. For Poincaré fundamental definitions of mathematics are neither à priori nor à posteriori, but conventional.