Much like the course any sporting event is bounded by the rules of the game, the course of any philosophical discussion is bounded by the ideas accepted as axioms. A game of soccer in which the players were permitted to hold the ball in their hands would be radically different, even incomparable to a traditional game, even if all other factors (weather, location, player’s skill) were physically identical. In much the same way, although both begin with the same set of facts (materially closed universe, constant physical laws) Jaegwon Kim’s view on mental causation is radically different from Searle’s, because they approach the issue from different philosophical perspectives. Neither is wrong, if you reason using their principles. Neither is right, if you reason using the opposing principles.
Kim’s principles are this: mental states are macrostates (which may be multiply realized), supervenient on physical microstates. This supervenience can be seen as a sort of “vertical causation,” in which a microstate causes macroproperties to exist. He also allows for “horizontal causation,” in which physical states cause or compel other physical states, according to physical laws. His contention is that if a microstate, say m(F) of object X both vertically causes a macrostate F and horizontally causes another microstate, m(G) (which then causes its own macrostate G), it would be a mistake to say that the supervenient macrostate G is caused by F, even if (on the macro level) one appears to cause the other. That sort of macro causality Kim would describe as epiphenomenal causation, and therefore causally inert.
Searle takes a different approach. He begins by rejecting completely the distinction between physical and mental, folding in all menta...
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... in” certain aspects (mental aspects) that would otherwise be inexplicable in a sound theory. Searle’s account, in which singular events have multiple aspects, is appealing. However, it appears that by claiming that “mental” is an aspect of a larger physical event, one aspect of an event can have an ontological uniqueness that is not present in the other aspects. And since all aspects are facets of one physical process, it seems that Searle is saying that by simply thinking of an event one way, you can imbue it with properties not otherwise present. This seems too easy. In addition, Searle states in his response to Kim “there are no causal powers of [mental state] that are not causal powers of the neural structure.” If the ontologically irreducible aspect of a physical state confers no additional causal power, then that mental aspect is simply “along for the ride.”
ABSTRACT: Davidson argues (1) that the connection between belief and the "constitutive ideal of rationality" (2) precludes the possibility of their being any type-type identities between mental and physical events. However, there are radically different ways to understand both the nature and content of this "constitutive ideal," and the plausibility of Davidson’s argument depends on blurring the distinction between two of these ways. Indeed, it will be argued here that no consistent understanding of the constitutive ideal will allow it to play the dialectical role Davidson intends for it.
Searle’s argument is one against humans having free will. The conclusion comes from his view on determinism and his view on substances. His view on substances is a materialist one. To him, the entire world is composed of material substances. All occurrences can be explained by these materials.
Searle's argument delineates what he believes to be the invalidity of the computational paradigm's and artificial intelligence's (AI) view of the human mind. He first distinguishes between strong and weak AI. Searle finds weak AI as a perfectly acceptable investigation in that it uses the computer as a strong tool for studying the mind. This in effect does not observe or formulate any contentions as to the operation of the mind, but is used as another psychological, investigative mechanism. In contrast, strong AI states that the computer can be created so that it actually is the mind. We must first describe what exactly this entails. In order to be the mind, the computer must be able to not only understand, but to have cognitive states. Also, the programs by which the computer operates are the focus of the computational paradigm, and these are the explanations of the mental states. Searle's argument is against the claims of Shank and other computationalists who have created SHRDLU and ELIZA, that their computer programs can (1) be ascribe...
The other issue that is being discussed between the two philosophers is determinism. Also determinism must be defined before interpreting their views. Determinism according to the Encarta encyclopedia is "A philosophical doctrine holding that every event, mental as well as physical, has a cause, and that, the cause being given, the event follows invariably. This theory denies the element of chance or contingency." Also like to other definition for free will this is confusing and incomplete to the reader. I think that determinism is a theory that every event has a cause and effect and that once a cause is stated than the event will follow.
Causality has been a pivotal concept in the history of philosophy since the time of the Ancient Greeks. After David Hume, however, many have questioned whether there is (or can be) any metaphysical meaning of causality, or valid inferences based upon it. Xavier Zubiri (1898-1983) has rethought and reformulated the question of causality in light of its historical roles, well-known criticisms, and relevant contemporary knowledge. In doing so, he has achieved a unique perspective on the subject which should be of great interest to those concerned with causality and any of its applications.
The false cause logic exists when individuals mistakenly confuses the relationship between two or more elements with causation (Woodard et al., 2014, p. 94). This logic takes for granted a relationship between cause and effect exists without any solid proof or evidence to support the reasoning (Woodard et al., 2014, p. 95). Forbes published an article estimated that...
In Searle’s first argument against the distinction between the mental and physical, he assumes this mistaken assumption is largely due to one’s common-sense supposition that there indeed is a distinction between the mental and physical at some deep metaphysical level. Searle confronts this assumption with the simple fact that he believes Consciousness it is a systematic biological phenomenon, much like digestion, and as such, concludes, that consciousness is a feature of the brain as such such is part of the physical world. However, I agree with Searle in the sense that the through simple reduction there incidentally will be a metaphysical distinction between mental and physical, however I disagree with the way in which he counters this.
In this paper I will present an argument I have found in the Second Analogy for the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event. I will begin by briefly describing Robert Paul W...
Despite the detail and thought that went into both Pereboom and Kanes’ work, the debate of free will is nowhere near being settled. Regardless, it is the possible ideas and theories such as these that allow us to explore and understand the concepts that make up our universe.
(Harris, 2012). Look at it like this every single thing in the universe obeys the laws of physics, every single thing in reality obeys the laws of causality, everything that happens is a reaction to a prior action within an exact locality. Your physical body and brain are made entirely of molecules, how these molecules are arranged depends on your jeans and environment. Every choice you make results from molecular based electrical impulses and chemical transmissions between two tangible brain cells all these impulses and transmissions must obey the fundamental laws of physics including the laws of causality. Is it more likely that everything that pops into your head almost magically is a reaction to a reaction that happens
8 This paragraph and the next are a paraphrase of Terence Horgan, "Jackson On Physical Information And Qualia" Philosophical Quarterly, 34: (1984) 147-52.
This leaves a particularly large hole in identity theory. From neural dependence and the causal problem, it is almost impractical to endorse any type of dualism. But multiple realizability makes identity theory suspect as well. Also emotional additives, and the fact that epiphenomenalism is self undermining but not impossible, lead to slight suspicion of physicalism in general. Basically, this paper set out to endorse and defend identity theory but has concluded nothing definitively.
... in parapsychology where this provides an empirical case for non-materialism and a counter-example to physicalism.
Sigmund Freud's model of the mind can be likened to an iceberg, where the tip is visible above the water and the rest is hidden below the water unseen. The visible part is likened to our conscious mind from where we have our sensa...
But, “human persons have an ‘inner’ dimension that is just as important as the ‘outer’ embodiment” (Cortez, 71). The “inner” element cannot be wholly explained by the “outer” embodiment, but it does give rise to inimitable facets of the human life, such as human dignity and personal identity. The mind-body problem entails two theories, dualism and physicalism. Dualism contends that distinct mental and physical realms exist, and they both must be taken into account. Its counterpart (weak) physicalism views the human as being completely bodily and physical, encompassing no non-physical, or spiritual, substances.