The above explanations also against the idea that - 'science is objective' because I claimed that individual opinion and speculative imagining should be seen as a part of developing science knowledge. As a result, I would say that science is partially subjective and partially objective. In conclusion, the view of Chalmers would be falsified and against to Popperian's hypothetico-deductive method. I agree with Popperian's view and objected the definition of science which defined by Chalmers because science knowledge is not always reliable. Also, individual opinion and personal speculative imagining and have a place in science.
The next comparison I will make refers to Chalmer’s statement that “science is based on what we can see and hear and touch, etc.”. This is also concurrent with falsificationism as it considers all scientific knowledge to be falsifiable. In order to disprove a scientific claim then it must be testable and must therefore be based on what we can perceive around us. While Popperian hypothetico-deductivism seemingly solves the issues with induction, it also has some flaws which I will elucidate.
Also, confirming evidence should not count unless it is an attempt to falsify the theory. Now, Popper's concern the problem of the "logic of science" or the "logical problem of induction." Popper sees induction as having the same basic problem as the overgeneralization principle of the psychological, historic theories, ect. He regards no actual rule of induction ... ... middle of paper ... ...et who is to determine the evidence and theory to determine whether it is ad hoc? More importantly, when interpreting this, no matter who does it, how will you get past induction when interpreting the theory and/or evidence?
Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cognitive aims contradict one another. Finally, (v), Laudan's axiological constraints are too weak and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without justification some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan attempted from the beginning to avoid. Laudan's Theory of Aims In Science and Values, Laudan has developed the view that our scientific aims can sometimes be rationally selected by imposing two constraints (1) on them: 1. they should be jointly consistent, 2. a pragmatic constraint of empirical realizability, or non-utopianism.
When a person believes a theory to be true, everything that happens is a verification of the truthfulness of the theory. Popper’s example is how a Marxists can’t... ... middle of paper ... ...ctly what it was besides an instinct that it was different from more traditional sciences like chemistry or physics. Why was he so determined to separate empirical science from pseudo-science? If I could talk to Popper, I would ask him, "why bother trying to draw a line at all?" It would be more fruitful to try and distinguish between what is or isn’t true and what is or isn’t significant.
Popperian hypothetico deductivists would find several problems with the view of science Alan Chalmers stated in ‘What is this thing Called Science?’ From “Scientific knowledge is proven knowledge” to “Scientific knowledge is reliable knowledge because it is objectively proven” popper would disagree to everything. With Chalmers falsificationism or hypothetico-deductivism view, his statement indicates that scientific induction is completely justifiable. However as it is now known, induction is not a reasonable way to prove or justify science. One of a few problems that hypothetico-deductivists would find in Chalmers statement is contained in the phrase, “Scientific theories in some rigorous way from the facts of experience acquired by the observation and experiment.’’ Theories are never produced strictly, Popper would say, but firstly crafted through the thought and feeling of a scientist in their given field. This then discards the idea that theories are the result of facts and it then forwards the idea that a theory will be manipulated by individual people as they are no more than a personal concept with reason.
He wanted people to make predictions about things they didn’t know anything about. “As Popper represents it, the central problem in the philosophy of science is that of demarcation, i.e., of distinguishing between science and what he terms ‘non-science’…” (Popper, Section 3). The standard of falsifiability is a resolution to the problem of demarcation, because it says that declarations or organization of declarations, in order to be classified as scientific, should be capable of conflicting with probable, or reasonable, observations. Falsifiability is the idea that for any assumption to have credibility, it must be innately disprovable before it can turn out to be received as a scientific hypothesis or theory. In other words, he made the argume... ... middle of paper ... ...idea of a paradigm shift appears to go hand in hand with our perception about how a society’s outlook of immense problems progress and is a handy way to recognize how revolutions in our understanding of the planet have happened.
Thus, the scientific method is the application of induction into practice. In Karl Popper’s paper The Problem of Induction, however, Popper argues that induction is not adequate justification to warrant a reasonable conclusion. In fact... ... middle of paper ... ...g on the fact that we can breach these inevitable gaps of knowledge and still find a conclusion. As Kuhn comments, science requires a definitive paradigm in which we can commit to, because without it, there would be no scientific advancement. In this sense, the inductive reasoning used in the scientific method is justified, as our understanding of scientific truths and all scientific advancement relies on its existence.
Realists argue that our best sciences yield information about the actual nature of the physical world. He might appeal to the "no miracles" argument, for example. However, this tactic presupposes the realist's own preferred relation between evidence and nature. Against this view, the antirealist argues that the product of scientific investigation is a description of observable phenomena and not of any underlying reality. Generally, antirealists have emphasized historical evidence against the realist picture and made arguments for one form of instrumentalism or another.
Therefore, the difference between Popper's claim and earlier theories of what constitutes science may be in definition. Popper himself states (Klemke, 1988, p.27) that observations are interpretations relative to the theory one wishes to support (or refute). One must define one's terms so that the theory itself is clear and open to rebuttal or verification. Perhaps the conflict between the earlier criteria for science and Popper's criterion is one of clarity, not theory. Although traditional theory on what science consists of is viewed as inductive, it appears that at least some of the criteria are, in fact, deductive.