For example, punishment can be unjust if it is excessive and if it is lenient in how much a criminal is punished. Retributivism can then be used as a single aim or principle to justify a conceptual institutional structure like punishment. Retributivism is a form of punishment that requires that the punishment fit the crime. There are two justifications for retributivism: retributivism is justified in punishing those who deserve punishment and that we should punish those who deserve punishment in proportion to their desert. There is a third justification for retributivism, which states that the weight of the criminal offence stems only from the individual’s own act and not anywhere else.
One, Kant argues that a punishment must fit the crime. He would argue that the degree of suffering inflicted on the victim should be inflicted on the perpetrator. Two, if one commits a crime, he is exposing himself to the danger of his actions. If crime were to become universalized, and therefore acceptable, what is... ... middle of paper ... ... way, to prove that our principles, based on perception, can be rationally applied. Because of this inability to prove our rational perception and thus a moral principle based on that perception, we are unable to demonstrate whether our motives are truly correct.
I will begin to illustrate what Waldron means by such a right. Before we even look at the meaning of “a right to do wrong”, Waldron clarifies that he is looking at “wrongs” from a moral view not a legal view. “A right to do wrong” means that an action is morally wrong but it is an action that an individual has the moral right to do. It is suggested that an individual should not act in an immoral way but has the choice to do so. Waldron wishes to answer the inconsistencies in the paradox of the moral right to do wrong.
The basic premise of Harry G. Frankfurt’s, Alternate Possibilities and Morality argues against the idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, which states, that a person is only morally responsible for his or her said action if they could have done otherwise. Although many can agree that this constitutes for an astounding contradiction to the development of morality and choice, I do not believe that Frankfurt’s response constitutes as a genuine counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. According to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities the issues that arise is whether there is a presence of freewill and the effect that freewill plays on morality. This idea of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities complements the definition because according to Webster’s dictionary the definition states, ‘freewill is the freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention.’ According to this definition and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities it is agreed upon that freewill is a factor that must be taken into consideration when discussing the value of the actions committed by the individual. Human actions are the primary motives for wanting this concept of free will, and determining its validity as part of the issue of values and the morality of the individual.
Despite Mill's conviction that act-utilitarianism is an acceptable and satisfying moral theory there are recognized problems. The main objection to act-utilitarianism is that it seems to be too permissive, capable of justifying any crime, and even making it morally obligatory to do so. This theory gives rise to the i... ... middle of paper ... ...absent in the utilitarian standpoint. Ergo, rule- utilitarianism does not allow for an individual's freewill because it tells one to examine others rules, or beliefs and not one's own. Thereby conforming to sociality.
But to grant that rule-responsibility is socially essential does not grant that it is the essence of morality. QE is flawed as it reduces the topic of moral character to the topic of conscientiousness or rule-responsibility, but it gives no account of the role of the character as a whole in moral deliberation and it excludes questions of character that are not directly concerned with the resolution of problems. Taking into account the criticisms of modern ethical theory I have discussed, it is clearly evident that an ethical theory shaped in light of these criticisms would be very similar to virtue ethics, emphasizing character and centering around the question, "how should I live? ".
Simply, moral terms therefore do not describe some objective state of affairs - but are reflections of personal taste and preference. Hence the statement above, which refers to both `doing good' and `doing bad' are not universal imperatives - but reflections of the specific intentions and desires of the contract and the individuals involved. Furthermore this raises the issue, as to whether one can do good or harm anyone who was done so to ... ... middle of paper ... ...ng surprising here: it is tough making it alone and so there are good reasons why humans will do better if they do co-operate with others. But does this prove that co-operation is just another form of selfishness that we care only about our own interests and we co-operate in order to further those interests? In effect an answer to this depends entirely upon the individual; such an ambiguous statement undoubtedly entails a great difference in answers and interpretation.
It defines the purpose of different actions carried out. Therefore, it is right to say that if an intention is good or evil, then it ought to be morally justified. However, the end does not justify the means, in other words a wrong/evil intention does not result in a good moral act. In conclusion, the understanding of morality builds a core perspective to better objectives and defined goals. Work Cited Sciglitano, Ki and Peter Savastano.
Ethical egoism is a mistaken theory in that it leads to logical contradictions (Rachels p.87). If one were to protect one’s interest that would require one to prevent another from carrying out their duty to their self, it would be both right and wrong to do so. However that is not logical and self-contradictory, thus not would not be basing conduct on reason. To reiterate, the theory of ethical egoism states that one should put his or her own needs before others, this fails the second part of the minimum conception of morality. Furthermore in advocating that one treat others in differently when there are no factual differences is unjustifiable and makes this an arbitrary doctrine.
SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd; in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ... middle of paper ... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats "Why should I be moral?" as something more complicated than a request for a reason.