In his work “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, John Searle says that in order to properly discuss whether strong Artificial Intelligence is possible, we must first ask the following question: could something think, understand and so on solely by virtue of being a computer with the right sort of program? In this essay I will discuss what the correct answer to this question could be. I will first focus on Alan Turing’s view that with the correct program, a computer could think. I will then move on to John Searle’s view that programs are not sufficient for intentionality, so the answer to the question is no. Finally, I will show why Searle’s argument, seemingly strong, seems to fall short when he talks about what he calls causal powers.
One of the
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For example, he does agree that a computer may eventually be able to win the Imitation Game, and he also agrees with the idea that a machine can think, because we humans are in fact thinking machines. However, Searle believes that a digital computer having the right program and exhibiting the right behaviour is not sufficient for the presence of thought. He explains this by imagining what he calls the Chinese Room, where a monolingual English man is in a room and must follow English instructions for manipulating symbols that he cannot understand. Unbeknownst to him, the symbols are actually Chinese letters, and the sets of symbols he is creating by following the instructions are sentences. The man seems to be able to speak fluent Chinese, but that is untrue as he is just using instructions, and does not understand the meaning of the symbols he is manipulating. Searle’s argument is that a computer works the same way by manipulating symbols only using their syntax—it will never genuinely understand Chinese (Cole, 2015). Indeed, the symbol manipulations don’t have intentionality as they have no semantics, which according to Searle, is what sets human mind apart from computers – semantics are what give symbols (e.g. letters) meaning (e.g. words and sentences). Computers may be able to exhibit the right behaviour, but it does not understand why it does so, or what the meaning of its behaviour is, which is why computers are …show more content…
He states that any attempt to create intentionality artificially would only succeed if we manage to duplicate the causal powers of the brain, because “anything with a mind must have causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain” (Warfield, 1999, p. 29). This seems to be a valid assumption, but according to Warfield, Searle takes it too far. It is true that a minimal amount of power is necessary to create a mind, but we do not know what this minimal amount is. Searle claims that it is the full causal power of the brain that is necessary to produce a mind, and uses the following example: if a petrol engine allows a car to drive up to 75 miles an hour, then a diesel engine, in order to do the same, must have at least the same amount of power as the petrol engine. This example assumes that the full power of the petrol engine is necessary to drive at 75 miles an hour, but this seems false. Indeed, the petrol engine could allow the car to go even faster, so the maximum power is not necessary to drive 75 miles an hour; only a certain amount of power is. In this case, we could assume that a diesel engine could have the power to drive at 75 miles an hour, but be less powerful than the petrol engine; for example, it only allowed the car to go up to 85 miles an hour. If we apply this to the brain, we could say that its full causal power is perhaps not necessary for
Roger Maris was born in Hibbing, Minnesota on September 10, 1934. His father, who worked for the Great Northern Railroad, moved the family to North Dakota in 1942where Roger grew up. The Maris brothers played sports and attended Shanley High School in Fargo, North Dakota. It was in the 10th grade when Roger met Patricia, his future wife, at a high school basketball game.
Are young children putting their health and even their lives at risk if they partake in the sport of football? Some claim that the American sport is far too dangerous and the risk of concussions and injuries far outway the pros of the physical sport, while others insist that technological improvements and new regulations have made the sport safer. Jonathan Zimmerman, a professor of history and education at New York University, argues in his paper, “We Must Stop Risking the Health of Young Football Players,” that football is a sport that is too dangerous for the youth. He states his belief that technological improvements in helmets and changes in the rules of the sport have had little effect on reducing injuries and that nothing has worked.
In the year 1957, Canada elected its first Prime minister without English or French root, John Diefenbaker. While growing up in the city of Toronto, because of his German name, he was often teased. [1] He grew up as an outcast, and so he was able to relate to the discrimination and inequality many of the minorities in Canada felt. This essay will attempt to answer the question: To what extent did Prime Minister John Diefenbaker help promote equality to the minority communities. . The minorities in this time period were the women, aboriginals, and immigrants. During his time as the Prime Minister, he was able to help protect the rights of this group because many of their rights were being abused by the society. Diefenbaker also helped the minorities to stand up for themselves and other groups. Diefenbaker was able to bring positive change to the minority communities by making an official Bill of Rights and appointing people of discriminated groups to the parliament while other members did not.
Andy Clark strongly argues for the theory that computers have the potential for being intelligent beings in his work “Mindware: Meat Machines.” The support Clark uses to defend his claims states the similar comparison of humans and machines using an array of symbols to perform functions. The main argument of his work can be interpreted as follows:
In this paper I will evaluate and present A.M. Turing’s test for machine intelligence and describe how the test works. I will explain how the Turing test is a good way to answer if machines can think. I will also discuss Objection (4) the argument from Consciousness and Objection (6) Lady Lovelace’s Objection and how Turing responded to both of the objections. And lastly, I will give my opinion on about the Turing test and if the test is a good way to answer if a machine can think.
The official foundations for "artificial intelligence" were set forth by A. M. Turing, in his 1950 paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" wherein he also coined the term and made predictions about the field. He claimed that by 1960, a computer would be able to formulate and prove complex mathematical theorems, write music and poetry, become world chess champion, and pass his test of artificial intelligences. In his test, a computer is required to carry on a compelling conversation with humans, fooling them into believing they are speaking with another human. All of his predictions require a computer to think and reason in the same manner as a human. Despite 50 years of effort, only the chess championship has come true. By refocusing artificial intelligence research to a more humanlike, cognitive model, the field will create machines that are truly intelligent, capable of meet Turing's goals. Currently, the only "intelligent" programs and computers are not really intelligent at all, but rather they are clever applications of different algorithms lacking expandability and versatility. The human intellect has only been used in limited ways in the artificial intelligence field, however it is the ideal model upon which to base research. Concentrating research on a more cognitive model will allow the artificial intelligence (AI) field to create more intelligent entities and ultimately, once appropriate hardware exists, a true AI.
Searle's argument delineates what he believes to be the invalidity of the computational paradigm's and artificial intelligence's (AI) view of the human mind. He first distinguishes between strong and weak AI. Searle finds weak AI as a perfectly acceptable investigation in that it uses the computer as a strong tool for studying the mind. This in effect does not observe or formulate any contentions as to the operation of the mind, but is used as another psychological, investigative mechanism. In contrast, strong AI states that the computer can be created so that it actually is the mind. We must first describe what exactly this entails. In order to be the mind, the computer must be able to not only understand, but to have cognitive states. Also, the programs by which the computer operates are the focus of the computational paradigm, and these are the explanations of the mental states. Searle's argument is against the claims of Shank and other computationalists who have created SHRDLU and ELIZA, that their computer programs can (1) be ascribe...
Computers are well known for their ability to perform computations and follow a list of instructions, but can a computer be a mind? There are varying philosophical theories on what constitutes a mind. Some believe that the mind must be a physical object, and others believe in dualism, or the idea that the mind is separate from the brain. I am a firm believer in dualism, and this is part of the argument that I will use in the favor of Dennett. The materialist view however, would likely not consider Hubert to be a mind. That viewpoint believes that all objects are physical objects, so the mind is a physical part of a human brain, and thus this viewpoint doesn’t consider the mind and body as two separate things, but instead they are both parts of one object. The materialist would likely reject Hubert as a mind, even though circuit boards are a physical object, although even a materialist would likely agree that Yorick being separated from Dennett does not disqualify Yorick as a mind. If one adopts a dualism view and accept the idea that the mind does not have to be connected to a physical object, then one can make sense of Hubert being able to act as the mind of Dennett. The story told to us by Dennett, is that when the switch is flipped on his little box attached to his body, the entity that controls Dennett, changes to the other entity. Since the switches are not labeled, it is never known which entity is
John Searle’s Chinese room argument from his work “Minds, Brains, and Programs” was a thought experiment against the premises of strong Artificial Intelligence (AI). The premises of conclude that something is of the strong AI nature if it can understand and it can explain how human understanding works. I will argue that the Chinese room argument successfully disproves the conclusion of strong AI, however, it does not provide an explanation of what understanding is which becomes problematic when creating a distinction between humans and machines.
Computers are machines that take syntactical information only and then function based on a program made from syntactical information. They cannot change the function of that program unless formally stated to through more information. That is inherently different from a human mind, in that a computer never takes semantic information into account when it comes to its programming. Searle’s formal argument thus amounts to that brains cause minds. Semantics cannot be derived from syntax alone. Computers are defined by a formal structure, in other words, a syntactical structure. Finally, minds have semantic content. The argument then concludes that the way the mind functions in the brain cannot be likened to running a program in a computer, and programs themselves are insufficient to give a system thought. (Searle, p.682) In conclusion, a computer cannot think and the view of strong AI is false. Further evidence for this argument is provided in Searle’s Chinese Room thought-experiment. The Chinese Room states that I, who does not know Chinese, am locked in a room that has several baskets filled with Chinese symbols. Also in that room is a rulebook that specifies the various manipulations of the symbols purely based on their syntax, not their semantics. For example, a rule might say move the squiggly
At the end of chapter two, Searle summarizes his criticism of functionalism in the following way. The mental processes of a mind are caused entirely by processes occurring inside the brain. There is no external cause that determines what a mental process will be. Also, there is a distinction between the identification of symbols and the understanding of what the symbols mean. Computer programs are defined by symbol identification rather than understanding. On the other hand, minds define mental processes by the understanding of what a symbol means. The conclusion leading from this is that computer programs by themselves are not minds and do not have minds. In addition, a mind cannot be the result of running a computer program. Therefore, minds and computer programs are not entities with the same mental state. They are quite different and although they both are capable of input and output interactions, only the mind is capable of truly thinking and understanding. This quality is what distinguishes the mental state of a mind from the systemic state of a digital computer.
The great Mickey Charles Mantle took his position at home plate with the crowd roaring like a tsunami all around him. Mickey swung at the zooming fastball and crack! The Mick had done it; two long bomb home runs in one game on both sides of the plate. Mickey Mantle was one of the best players to ever play the game of baseball.
This world of artificial intelligence has the power to produce many questions and theories because we don’t understand something that isn’t possible. “How smart’s an AI, Case? Depends. Some aren’t much smarter than dogs. Pets. Cost a fortune anyway. The real smart ones are as smart as the Turing heat is willing to let ‘em get.” (Page 95) This shows that an artificial intelligence can be programmed to only do certain ...
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.