The Unified Command Plan (UCP), as originally described in the “Outline Command Plan” of 1946, established in the National Security Act of 1947 and later amended by the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, sets forth basic guidance to all combatant commanders (COCOMs). The UCP also establishes combatant command missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates geographic areas of responsibility for geographic combatant commanders; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional combatant commanders. The UCP was a revolutionary leap forward in restructuring America’s military power following the lessons learned from World War II. However, the 21st century presents a less-delineated, dynamic threat environment with ambiguous, non-state adversaries widely dispersed and deeply integrated in transnational affairs. Simply put, the globe is not as easily divisible as perhaps it once was. In many cases, emerging threats and actors blur geographic boundaries and require unconventional thinking, methods, and often interoperability among COCOMs to effect success. Established missions among unified and functional commands often overlap traditional responsibility demarcations causing friction. Therefore, Congress and the national security leadership in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense should examine UCP organizational COCOM structure to determine if its present form aids COCOMs in completion of their missions and/or meets present U.S. national security needs. In the modern era, the global force projection structure as outlined within the UCP may, in fact, be more optimally aligned and gain more unity of effort organized around functional capability requirements. From its inception in 1946 to... ... middle of paper ... ... joint coordination and better poise the U.S. forces to conduct the most probable missions. Works Cited Andrew Feickert. The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013. Accessed December 3, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf. Lutz, Brenda J., and James M. Lutz. Global Terrorism. Routledge, 2008. Mathew Puglisi, Jason Hanover, and Kathleen List. “Geographic Bureaucracies and National Security: The Need for a Common Interagency Regional Framework.” Last modified August 2007. Accessed December 5, 2013. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0709/pugl/puglisi_geographic.html. “Introduction - Unified Command Plan (UCP).” Global Security.org. Last modified July 22, 2005. Accessed December 3, 2013. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/unified-com.htm.
The mission command philosophy helps commanders counter the uncertainty of operations by reducing the amount of certainty needed to act. Commanders can build teams and achieve their final goals through adapting the six principles of mission command to warfighting situation. I analyzed and compared the performance of General Sherman and General Hampton in four of six mission command principles.
...at home. Based on the QDR Gen Casey writes the objectives memorandum to best support the defense of the United States and support the civil authorities at home.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
O'Shea, Brandon J. "ARMY.MIL, The Official Homepage of the United States Army." "OPERATION POWER PACK. N.p., 20 Apr. 2010. Web. 27 Feb. 2014.
middle of paper ... ... Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2012. —. ADRP 5-0 The Operations Process.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mission Command White Paper (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 April 2012),pg 3
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Wendt, Alexander. “Constructing International Politics.” International Security. Cambridge: President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995. 71-81. Print.
Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand [cited 12 September 2011]. Available from: http://www.questiaschool.com>. US Department of State.
CF02,Full Range Leadership Development. (2012). Maxwell Gunter AFB. Thomas N. Barnes Center for Enlisted Education (AETC)
The most effective commanders through their leadership build cohesive teams. Mutual trust, shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk serve as just a few principles for mission command. Mutual trust is the foundation of any successful professional relationship that a commander shares with his staff and subordinates. The shared understanding of an operational environment functions, as the basis for the commander to effectively accomplish the mission. While my advice for the commander on what prudent risks to take may create more opportunities rather than accepting defeat. Incorporating the principles of mission command by building cohesive teams through mutual trust, fostering an environment of shared understanding, and accepting prudent risk will make me an effective adviser to the commander, aid the staff during the operations process, and provide an example for Soldiers to emulate.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1 (Washington DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013), V-17.
- - -, dir. “Air Force Special Operations Command.” The Official Web Site of the United Stated Air Force. U.S. Air Force, 20 Sept. 2011. Web. 9 Feb. 2012. .
The Technical Escort Unit (TEU) now provides the Department of Defense and other federal agencies to include the Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an immediate response capability for chemical and biological warfare material. Its mission is to provide a global response for escorting, packaging, detection, rendering-safe, disposing, sampling, analytics, and remediation missions. This does not only include chemical weapons for which it was originally created, but now incorporates biological weapons, state sponsored laboratories, small independent laboratories and small non-weaponized radioactive materials. Most recently, they have been task organized to assist Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as a force multiplier; the objective of this is to give the Battle Field Commander instant on the ground intelligence regarding Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) hazards within their Area of Operations (AO). With this new mission with the BCT, the TEU is becoming an expeditionary force.
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations