Bibliography “Cuban Missile Crisis” [Online] http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761579929/Cuban_Missile_Crisis.html#endads (10/28/04) Cuban Missile Crisis Memorandum of Meeting, October 17, 1962 (Avalon Project of Yale Law School) Brinkley, David. The Kennedy Circle; Luce. 1961 Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security Council. October 21, 1962 (Avalon Project of Yale Law School) "Cuban Missile Crisis," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004 http://encarta.msn.com © 1997-2004 Microsoft Corporation. “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba” .
In January 1979, Iranians opposed to the Shah’s rule invaded the American embassy in Tehran and held a group of 52 American diplomats and other hostages for 444 days. The Shah left Iran and the victorious Ayatollah Khomeini returned that February. Of the approximately 90 people inside the embassy, 52 remained in captivity until the end of the crisis. The reputation of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the hostage taking was further enhanced with the failure of a hostage rescue attempt that cost lives. The Ayatollah Khomeini set forth several demands to be met prior to the release of the hostages.
There’s no doubt that the two films were very different in the message that came across along with other plot details. Brothers tends to support Honda and his views on Godzilla using emotionally based reasoning. He discusses in detail the original film’s deeper message of the consequences of nuclear warfare along with his personal opinions of the movie of the brilliance and simplicity of the cinematography and special effects. Brothers feels as though the remake lacks in the emotional intensity and the main message that Honda created the film for. Yoshiko Ikeda of Ritsumeikan University, provides more factual reasons on why the events of the attack were not explicitly displayed to be against the United States in the article “Godzilla and the Japanese after World War II: From a Scapegoat of the Americans to a Savior of the Japanese.” As stated by Ikeda, the Japanese could not directly condemn America’s choice to bomb because, “any reference to the atomic bombing disasters was prohibited and information implying the existence of the army of occupation was also excluded” (49).
Nuclear Limitations and Disarmament When a lone B-29 flew over Hiroshima on August 29, 1945, the first nuclear weapon changed the course of international trust and relations. From that point on, countries tried to control each other with building and stockpiling superior nuclear arms. The question of nuclear limitations and of nuclear disarmament finally came under world review. The idea of one country possessing enough firepower to destroy the world is thoughtprovoking, but a look at the nuclear proponents brings up several good points. The concept of a world free of nuclear energy and weapons would shock most people.
He or she should care more for the in depth analytical studies done by experts who know best as to why America should or should not have dropped the atomic bomb. As more and more evidence has been presented to researchers, expert opinion on whether or not the United States should have dropped the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki has also changed. More and more researchers seem to feel that the atomic bomb should never have been used (Alperovitz 16). Despite several officials’ claims to enormous death estimations, an invasion of Japan would have cost fewer total lives. In addition, post atomic bomb repercussions that occurred, such as the Arms Race, were far too great a price to pay for the two atomic drops.
Such use of propaganda and suppression in the United States would be impossible and such a government using that would be called a Fascist government. In conclusion, I liked the book due the fact that Schaffer proved his thesis, the Great War gave rise to the American welfare state. I believe that Schaffer proved his thesis with clear and concrete evidence. I enjoyed how Schaffer shed new light on the Great War. Many historical accounts only deal with the actual fighting and not the behind the scenes action that Schaffer writes about.
Are Garrison's suppositions valid, or is it the way in which he presents these conjectures that makes them appear to be true? Garrison's passionate and charismatic rhetoric makes his accusations exce... ... middle of paper ... ... righteousness in the name of their former president. Testimonies from witness present at the assassination, in reality, do not exist. Because of the emotional high being experienced, viewers do not take the time to separate what is fact in Garrison's testimony from what is fiction. Stone successfully uses his final presentation of the factual Zapruder film to coerce a majority of both audiences into believing his contrived tale.
After two years leading a company in the field, Ellsberg had seen more than enough to know that the propaganda boasting U.S. success in Vietnam was simply false. Even McNamara himself agreed with Ellsberg that the war could not be won, just before making a statement to the press asserting his confidence in ou... ... middle of paper ... ...el-to-reel tape recorder. Nixon’s speech is highly censored, as only the most objectionable recordings are used in the film. It is a very effective technique, as it is shocking to hear Nixon casually suggest to Henry Kissinger that we simply drop a nuclear bomb on Hanoi. While Daniel Ellsberg’s story is certainly one worthy of a blockbuster documentary, it is not the only case to have made strides for our First Amendment rights.
One factor in Khrushchev’s decision was a strategic one (Hersh 346). A year earlier, the United States had placed several medium-range nuclear missiles in Turkey ("Cuban 774). The missiles were just across the Black Sea from the Soviet Union, within sight of Khrushchev's summer home (Hersh 346). President Kennedy had earlier ignored his advisors and placed nuclear missiles in Turkey. Another factor was a threat by the US to one of the Soviet Union's satellite countries, Cuba (Hersh 346).
As a result of this information, President Kennedy formed what was known as the "Excomm" short for executive committee made up from twelve of his closest advisers within his administration. President Kennedy told Excomm to come up with possible solutions to this potential crisis. Shortly after the Excomm was formed, President Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and confronted his about the military build up of arms in Cuba. Gromyko denied any build up and stated Russia was just supporting Cuba with small defensive weapons (RFK 23-42). During the next few days, Excomm came back with two possible solutions; the ... ... middle of paper ... ...ind closed doors.