Intuitions
This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from one’s (often tacit) beliefs. Although more promising than the concept model, the belief model fails to justify traditional philosophical use of intuitions because it is not clear a priori that the beliefs at issue are true. The latter model may, however, legitimize a less a prioristic approach to intuitions.
If anything unifies different philosophical methodologies it's some sort of reliance on intuitions. It's remarkable, therefore, how rarely we attempt to justify their employment in philosophy.
The intuitions philosophers care about are typically judgements about whether specific (hypothetical or actual) cases are cases of a certain kind. Some philosophical topic such as reference, knowledge or personal identity is under investigation. A theory is proposed and is then tested against our intuitions about specific cases that bear on the topic. In general, if our intuitions contradict what a theory implies about whether, say, S refers to x, or knows that p, or is identical to T, this counts against the theory. If on the other hand, our intuitions match what a theory tells us about particular cases, this usually counts in favor of the theory.
All procedures of this sort rest on a principle like I:
I Intuitions about specific cases can be used as evidence for and against philosophical theories.
This paper is about whether I can be justified. We examine two models, the Concepts Model (CM) and the Belief Model (BM). In our view, neither of them provides a solid foundation for I as it is traditionally applied in philosophy.
CM
CM has four components:
1. A concept, C, determines what it takes for something to fall under that concept (what it takes for something to be a C).
2. Someone who possesses or grasps a concept, C, doesn't always know explicitly what it takes to be a C because some (maybe most) concepts are understood by us in part tacitly.
3. Intuitions about whether specific cases fall under C are reliably guided by, or generally "match" one's understanding, tacit or otherwise, of C.
On July 15th 2008, Caylee Anthony was reported missing by her grandmother, Cindy, who claimed that she had not seen her granddaughter in 31 days. Cindy called the police after picking up her daughter Casey’s impounded vehicle, which smelled strongly of a decomposing body. Cindy found a bag of garbage in the trunk of Casey’s car but no trace of a body. Cindy had attempted to contact and visit Caylee over the past month, but Casey Anthony refused visitation, claiming that Caylee was with a nanny named Zenaida Fernandez Gonzalez, or at the beach or parks. Casey had given Cindy various explanations as to Caylee’s whereabouts before finally telling her mother that she had not seen Caylee for multiple weeks.
ABSTRACT: Indeterminacy theories, such as Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy principle on rules and language and Quine's indeterminacy of radical translation, raise some fundamental questions on our knowledge and understanding. In this paper we try to outline and interpret Wittgenstein's and Kripke's indeterminacy, and then compare it to some other related theories on indeterminacy of human thinking, such as raised by Hume, Quine, and Goodman.
In “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, Thomas Kelly gives two responses to the question “How should awareness of disagreement, with those that you take to be your epistemic equal, effect the rational confidence you have in your beliefs?”. Kelly discusses two possible responses to the question. The first is Richard Foley's first person perspective argument. Adam Elga calls the second the right reasons view (Elga, 2007 pg. 485). Kelly pursues the latter, and does not go further than agreeing with Foley that we should only view these disputes with a first person perspective.
ABSTRACT: BonJour argues that there can be no basic empirical beliefs. But premises three and four jointly entail ‘BonJour’s Rule’ — one’s belief that p is justified only if one justifiably believes the premises of an argument that makes p highly likely — which, given human psychology, entails global skepticism. His responses to the charge of skepticism, restricting premise three to basic beliefs and noting that the Rule does not require ‘explicit’ belief, fail. Moreover, the Rule does not express an epistemic duty. Finally, his argument against this fails since it is false that if an experiential state has representational content, then it is in need of justification. I venture the diagnosis that BonJour mistook the representational content of a cognitive state for the assertive functional role of a belief. Foundationalism may well be false, but not for BonJour’s reasons.
Today, approximately 25 percent of children and teenagers are obese and the number is on the rise. Since the 1960’s childhood obesity has increased by 54 percent in children ages six to eleven. In children twelve to seventeen it has increased by 39 percent. (Silberstein, 1) Childhood obesity is so prevalent among these age groups that it has reached epidemic proportions.
Elissa, Jelallian and Steele, Ric. “Handbook of Childhood and Adolescent Obesity”. New York, NY: SpringeScience+Business Media, c2008.Print.
Schizophrenia is a disease of the brain that is expressed clinically as a disease of the mind. Once it strikes, morbidity is high (60% of patients are receiving disability benefits within the first year of onset) as is mortality (the suicide rate is 10%). (www.nejm.org/content/1999/0340/008/0645.asp). Because its symptoms and signs and associated cognitive abnormalities are diverse, researchers have been unable to find localization in a single region of the brain. This essay will discuss the symptoms, treatments and causes of schizophrenia.
Marcus, Lauren, Ph. D., and Amanda Baron, M.S.W. "Childhood Obesity: A Growing Problem." Www.aboutourkids.org. NYU Child Study Center, May 2004. Web. 27 Oct. 2013.
Juan R. Bustillo, MD et al, (2001), The Psychosocial Treatment of Schizophrenia, American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 163-175.
conceptualization of the term/concept, and it also helps to show that the concept is indeed
Childhood Obesity in America. (n.d.). Retrieved Jan 22, 2011, from Seattle Sutton's Healthy Eating: www.seattlesutton.com/media/document/childhood-obesity-in-america
The broad category of schizophrenia includes a set of disorders in which individuals experience distorted perception of reality and impairment in thinking, behavior, affect, and motivation” (Whitbourne & Halgin, 2013, p. 199). “The symptoms of schizophrenia are divided into two groups, positive and negative. Psychological disturbances "added" to the patient's behavior as a result of the illness are known as positive symptoms. Psychological capabilities the schizophrenic person has "lost" as a result of his illness are known as negative symptoms” ("Schizophrenia Symptoms", 2010).
...h not justifiable enough to be relied. Even though the inductive reasoning has been a success in the determination of events and instances that have occurred in the past, philosophers still argue about its appropriateness, in the modern society (Earman, 2006, p.36). The problem of induction has been analyzed through various philosophical studies with the aim of finding a justifiable answer to the dilemma. The uncertainty of inductive reason forms the basis of myriad questions that engulf the justification of the approach. According to some philosophers, it is possible that some unknown phenomenon might occur, leading to justification with a known phenomenon. As aforementioned, falsification and irrationalism are some of the solutions to the induction problem. It is, therefore, imperative for individuals to falsify the beliefs through hypothesis and empirical testing.
Alcoholism refers to the abuse of alcohol by individuals who are unable to control their binge drinking behavior over a prolonged period of time. Alcoholics are not simply people who consume alcohol; instead, their entire lives revolve around alcohol. While many people usually dismiss the effects of heavy drinking to a hangover that will not last beyond the day, the effects of alcoholism are infinitely more enduring and devastating not only for the alcoholics, but also for their families and friends.
Through sensation, we get to be familiar with some given truth. This can, however require not, prompt information about that certainty, accomplished by seeing its relations to other given certainties. Both sensation and observation include a quick instinct of some given articles. Creative energy, less quick, recovers mental duplicates of past sensations and observations, notwithstanding when their outside jolts are no more present. Conviction is the sense or feeling that thoughts or recommendations framed in the creative energy relate to reality. Each recommendation can be investigated regarding its question and whether that protest is accepted. The object of a suggestion involves a subject, (for example, my steed), a predicate (wings), and a connection between them (my steed has grown wings). The conviction is the psychic disposition a brain has towards that question (for instance, I trust it or deny it or am in uncertainty about