International Law

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Why do nations obey international law? Although I am not a Native English speaker, and you may infer it while reading the article, I should primarily state that the question accommodates wrong choice of words, which bars the researchers who intend to answer the question to find a correct answer. First of all, it should be clarified that what is tried to truly mean by using the word “nation”. There are several definitions of the word. John Salmond’s definition is perhaps one of the mostly accepted definitions; “The nearest we can get to a definition is to say that a nation is a group of people bound together by common history, common sentiment and traditions, and, usually (though not always, as, for example, Belgium or Switzerland) by common heritage. A state, on the other hand, is a society of men united under one government. These two forms of society are not necessarily coincident. A single nation may be divided into several states, and conversely a single state may comprise several nations or parts of nations.” Any research, unless supported by sufficient sociological data, will most likely lack the understanding of a nation’s behavior pattern. However when the articles are examined, one can, or at least should, realize that they are examining the states’ or the governments’ behavior patterns. Which is why, it will be more accurate to use the word “state”, “government” or another word which will more accurately describe the subject of research. Second inaccurate choice of word is “obey”. Wittgenstein notes “When I obey a rule, I do not choose I obey the law blindly.” As the realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau states more accurately, nations do not obey with internatio... ... middle of paper ... ...isa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry. 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115, 1992 Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, And Reputation Mechanism: Towards A Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328. P2340-2344, 2004 Id. Eli Berman, Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 115 Q.J. Econ. 905, p921-29, 2000 Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, And Reputation Mechanism: Towards A Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328. P2346, 2004 George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 95, p95, 2002 Id. Eric Singer & Valerie Hudson, Conclusion: Political Psychology/Foreign Policy, The Cognitive Revolution and International Relations, in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,p256

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