Conclusion Although empirical rational expectations theories make no ideological claims, they can have ideological relevance. The rational behavior they attribute to humans may lead to ideological expectations. If so, rational expectations theory suggests that we not only have a “reason” to be ideological -it is rational to be so-but that we will in fact be ideological much of the time. Some rational expectations theories equate “rational” with “self-interested” and assert that people invariably act out of self-interest. If self-interested action contributes to the general welfare, then presumably one can be ideological simply by yielding to one’s inclination to act out of self-interest, although this popular view is difficult to defend empirically.
The justice objection has two responses: one of defeat, the other of integration. I have found the response of defeat (that justice can be overridden) to be unsatisfactory, since justice is an intrinsic good that is absolutely necessary for human flourishing. The conciliatory approach to the justice objection seeks to integrate justice into the higher level rules. I think that this is a credible utilitarian position. It captures the importance of justice in our moral reasoning and legitimates utilitarianism as a moral theory without sacrificing the principles of consequentialism nor utility.
Consequentialism, by definition, rejects the notion that these principles are inherently right. The action the consequentialist considers ‘right’, is the one whose outcome will maximize the good, and minimize the bad. A judicious consequentialist would not only consider immediate or obvious outcomes, but also broad or long-term consequences such as the future well-being of society. Disparity between these moral theories means that what is considered the right action varies in situations, such as Bernard William’s thought experiment ‘Jim and the Indians’ . A non-c... ... middle of paper ... ...roup, as it aims to maximize the good.
As defined, “If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible, though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better than none at all” (Utilitarianism, 25). By this, in most ordinary circumstances, common moral rules should be able to distinguish what promotes the most happiness without needing the principle of utility. And only when the secondary rule conflicts, you should use the principle of utility.
Accordingly, as an example, belief Z must be able to justify itself without a belief Z1, and be able to justify belief Y at the same time. Thus, inferential justification must be possible for non-foundational beliefs; noninferential justification must also be possible as well. How one arrives at noninferentially justified beliefs is one of the biggest problems for the foundationalist. In my opinion, it is hard to accept that there can be foundational beliefs that are self-justified because, as has been pointed out, if a belief is to be self-justified, person O must “know” in some sense what characteristic of that belief makes it self-justified, otherwise the belief is arbitrary. So, supposing that characteristic Q is what makes belief P justified, person O would then have to know that belief P has characteristic Q.
The explanatory claims are descriptive in position in which they present principles that can’t be broken like sociology and laws of science, while normative claims are justificatory in position that explains in a sense “one ought” thus generating duties. For this, three arguments for egoism were presented: The Psychological egoism, the ethical egoism or common sense morality in disguise and the rational egoism. Ethical theories are theories that assigns fundamental role to self-interest. This fundamental role can be explanatory or justificatory. Rational egoism states that any act is rational if and only if it serves self-interest.
Morality that is case-by-case or situational is a morality that is based off of the circumstances and moral facts of each individual situation rather than the same considerations for similar actions. Moral particularism supports my claim because it argues that the import of any consideration is context dependent, that exceptions can be found to any suggested principles, and that moral wisdom consists in the ability to include them under codified rules (Little, Margaret). When making a decision, a generalist is concerned with the good and bad that will come from an outcome. The generalist strives to always maximize happiness or goodness (Hursthouse, Rosalind). In order to maximize happiness, the generalist takes a situation and uses the same considerations for deciding whether or not one should perform an action case by case based on the goodness gained from the action.
(1) It holds that is always instrumentally rational for one to further her own interests and in that certain situations (exemplified by the prisoners dilemma) it is more rational to forego one's own interests (providing others do so also) than to behave in a straight-forwardly rational way. The rules allowing one to escape prisoner's dilemmas—the rules it is rational to accept providing all others accept them also—are simply the rules of morality. Hence it is rational to be moral. (2) Plato agrees that rationality requires self-interested action. However, he distinguishes between perceived self-interest and actual self-interest and argues that any apparent conflict between rationality and morality is simply a conflict between one's perceived self-interest and the requirements of justice.
There are two versions of utilitarianism, act and rule utilitarianism. Although they oppose each other, they are consistent with the utilitarian principle that was just explained. Act utilitarianism holds that what is believed to be morally right or wrong is based on consequence. When deciding which action results in the most good, it is dependent on whomever or whatever will benefit the most from it. Then, rule utilitarianism is dependent on moral rules.
Teleological ethical systems are the opposite of deontological systems. It judges the consequences of the act rather than judging the act itself. If the results can be considered good consequences, then the act must have been good (Frankena, 1973, 14). The phrase "the end justifies the means" that has been used many times in many different situations suggests that the end result is justified by the means that were used to achieve the outcome. This is a consequentialist type of statement.