Before we look at the images of managing change that were present in the NASA case study let us review a few of the key events in this case study. The case study for this assignment looks at Challenger and Columbia NASA space shuttle disasters and the commission findings on the disasters/recommendations. Now with a short review of the case study what image(s) of change are present in the case study? From the case study the changes introduced are images of managing. These changes are both management of control and shaping. As NASA recovered from the 1986 Challenger disaster, it used the classic Fayol characterization of management such as planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and controlling to correct from the top-down the issues that had caused the Challenger disaster (Palmer Dunford, Akin, pg.24, 2009). NASA approached the changes that need to be enacted as a result of the Challenger and also the Columbia disasters from the change image of a director. NASA ...
R. M. Boisjoly had over a quarter-century’s experience in the aerospace industry in 1985 when he became involved in an improvement effort on the O-ring which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster. This was used to bring the Space Shuttle into orbit (OEC, 2006). Morton Thiokol is an aerospace company that manufactures the solid propellant rocket motors used to launch the Challenger (Skubik). Boisjoly authored a memo to R.L. Lund, Vice President of Engineering and four others, in regards to his concerns about the flawed O-ring erosion problem. His warnings were ignored leading to the deaths of six astronauts and one social studies teacher.
...ondered why they had survived and what could they have done to help others who hadn’t. Either way a person can look at it, the loss of nearly three fourths of their crew was not a good way to end their adventure (Nelson, 93-101; Hickman, 3-4).
“Houston, we’ve had a problem here.” John Swigert’s highly memorable quote from the equally memorable Apollo 13 mission, so simply and calmly stated, came to be known as a resounding understatement (Space 1). What Swigert had referred to was the start of a perilous voyage through deep space aboard a severely damaged space shuttle. However, under a heavily contrasting set of circumstances, Apollo 13 began looking like one of the smoothest flights of the program (Dunbar 6). Up until the point in which the crew began to feel the vibrations, it was seeming to be just another one of NASA’s successful space missions put together by one of the collectively smartest groups on the planet. Each of the Apollo missions were planned and executed beautifully
At 9 a.m. on February 1st, 2003, disaster struck the space shuttle program: Columbia had disintegrated upon re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere just 16 minutes before it was supposed to land at Kennedy Space Center (National Geographic News par 2-3). The shuttle had been damaged by little more than foam from the external tank but it was enough to make it susceptible to the high temperatures it faced as it descended through the atmosphere. The idea that a space shuttle can endure damage that is unforeseen or unavoidable is well within reason. However, in retrospect it was found that foam strikes were present on most shuttle missions and NASA had a history of diminishing their recognized danger in favor of increasing the chances of meeting mission deadlines. Columbia and its crew of seven astronauts were doomed from launch due to a combination of the damage it sustained and the unwillingness of program managers to allow anyone to investigate it further during the mission. The Columbia disaster should spur NASA to reevaluate their policies in order to pay closer attention to matters of safety in their space programs.
By examining this further, we will look at the lives of the seven who died in
Space exploration has changed and developed since the first man was sent into space. Advanced rockets, new computer technology, and remote controlled robots are only a few of the things that made space travel possible. Even though this technology was efficient, it was not cheap. When a rocket was sent into space, only the capsule holding the astronauts returned to space. This expensive way of space travel was forever changed with the creation of the space shuttle. The Columbia space shuttle was important to space exploration because it used new technology that changed space travel, completed missions that other spacecraft could not, and brought new people into space.
On February 1, 2013, the second major tragedy in the history of the space shuttle program occurred when the space shuttle Columbia dismembered while trying to re-enter the atmosphere over the state of Texas, all crew members on board were killed and questions were asked on how a normal procedure as the landing of this spacecraft became such a disaster. This tragedy occurred minutes before the shuttle was scheduled to land at Florida’s Kennedy Space Center. A later investigation determined that the catastrophe was caused by a problem that took place shortly after liftoff on January 16 when a piece of insulating foam disassociated from the Shuttle’s propellant tank and damaged the edge of the Columbia’s left wing. This case study tries to explain the decision making process, organizational culture, and organizational learning that NASA used during the entire Space Shuttle Program and led to this major failure.
The catastrophe that happened on the shuttle of Columbia was something that everyone saw and everyone felt. Inside the shuttle the astronauts were trying to figure out what was happening, but unfortunately there was no more time. “During the shuttle’s ascent into the atmosphere, a large piece of foam had broken off the left bipod area of the shuttle’s external fuel tank and had smashed into the ship’s left wing” (Surowiecki 215). This quote demonstrates in full detail what was happening to the shuttle. While the shuttle was departing the people from the control where looki...
Due to all of NASA’s promises to the nation in order to have public support for the Challenger project, the company was distracted in making decisions. The people apart of the project have made compromises and have taken short cuts. This includes insufficient
On 1979, Rockwell converted the test craft to an actual spacecraft. On some of the earlier missions, the Challenger did launch a satellite that would relay signals to let astronauts stay in touch with controllers back home. Another memorable moment took place in April 1984, a mission that would be the very first repair of a satellite. Challenger had already done nine missions before the day that tragedy struck. The Challenger crew included Francis R. Scobee, Michael J. Smith, Ronald McNair, Elison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, Gregory Jarvis, Christa McAuliffe. On January 28, 1986, the crews have been training up for this mission for months. It was a cold morning in Florida. Engineers were informing NASA that it could have been too cold for the shuttle to launch. The engineers advised NASA to launch the next day for the temperatures were going to be warmer and the conditions were going to be ideal. The reason for the advice to launch another day because shuttle parts are meant to launch in more temperatures that are moderate. NASA did not want to take the advice for the start of the mission. The engineers cautioned NASA one more time, and NASA then cautioned back at the workers about their careers. After that, workers wanted to keep their career so they did not continue the fight for the delay of STS-51L
Contextual analysis is made up of three basic components; intended audience, setting and most importantly purpose. Authors often times consider and work each contextual piece into the construction of their given argument. An argument is not powerful if audience preference is not a main concern, if the setting isn’t taken into consideration, or if the purpose is not relevant to the current situation. On January 28th, 1986 the shuttle challenger exploded 73 seconds into its take off. President Ronald Reagan wrote a critical speech to address the tragedy that had struck our nation that day. It is highly evident in his address that kept audience, setting, and purpose in mind. He comforts a worried public using calm tone and simple yet effective diction to convince the American nation that it’s necessary to go on and continue the space program and ultimately the scientific revolution.
This tragic accident was preventable by not only the flight crew, but maintenance and air traffic control personnel as well. On December 29, 1972, ninety-nine of the one hundred and seventy-six people onboard lost their lives needlessly. As is the case with most accidents, this one was certainly preventable. This accident is unique because of the different people that could have prevented it from happening. The NTSB determined that “the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flightcrew.” This is true; the flight crew did fail, however, others share the responsibility for this accident. Equally responsible where maintenance personnel, an Air Traffic Controllers, the system, and a twenty cent light bulb. What continues is a discussion on, what happened, why it happened, what to do about it and what was done about it.
The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.